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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis examines British foreign policy towards Danubian Europe from the end of 
World War One to the Rhineland crisis of 1936 with special reference to security issues. 
The Foreign Office’s attitude towards the alliance known as the Little Entente, which 
was comprised of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania, is the primary focus of the 
study, and, by implication, the British outlook on the countries with which the Little 
Entente was mainly concerned, namely Hungary and, to a lesser extent, Austria and 
Bulgaria, also features heavily. Danubian Europe presented constant and serious 
security risks for European peace and stability and, for that reason, contrary to 
conventional wisdom, it commanded the attention of British diplomacy with a view to 
appeasing local conflicts. This study looks at the manner in which the Foreign Office 
perceived and treated the antagonism between the Little Entente and Hungary, on the 
one hand, and the impact that the former had in connexion with Franco-Italian rivalry in 
Central/South-Eastern Europe, on the other. With Hitler’s accession to power the Little 
Entente was viewed in Whitehall in relation to its place in the prospective policy for 
preserving Austrian independence and containing German aggression in the region. It is 
suggested here that the British approach to security problems in Danubian Europe had 
certain permanent features which stemmed from the general British outlook on the new 
successor states – the members of the Little Entente - founded on the ruins of the 
Habsburg monarchy. It was the lack of confidence in their stability and permanence, as 
well as the misperceptions about the motives and intentions of the policies pursued by 
other Powers towards Central/South-Eastern Europe, which accounted for the apparent 
sluggishness and ineffectiveness of the Foreign Office’s dealings with security 
challenges.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
 
 
 
 
British policy towards Danubian Europe during the interwar period remains a strangely 
understudied area. The region, and Czechoslovakia in particular, is, of course, regularly 
mentioned in the rich literature about the ‘appeasement policy’ and its culmination at 
the Munich conference, but its treatment is invariably reduced to the role of a passive 
object in the Great Powers’ diplomatic trial of strength. Although such a view is not 
without its justification in the actual course of events, it unfortunately tends to 
marginalise the need to examine the British attitude towards the region itself, which is 
without doubt an inseparable part of the entire European jigsaw.   
 There are only a few works which directly address the question of British policy 
towards Central Europe. Gábor Bátonyi’s work is a pioneering study of that kind in 
which he reviews British policy in three parallel case studies dealing with Austria, 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia.1 The same approach, but covering a shorter period of 
time and substituting Poland for Austria, is applied in Miklós Lojkó’s book.2 The only 
work which directly touches on the subject of this thesis is Ozer Carmi’s narrative about 
relations between Britain and the Little Entente which somewhat surprisingly ends with 
the conclusion of the Italo-Yugoslav pact of friendship of 25 March 1937.3  
 There are also some works discussing the British attitude towards the individual 
Central European countries during the interwar period. Béla Király, Peter Pastor and 
Ivan Sanders’ edition of essays concerning the Trianon Treaty and post-war Hungary 
contains two contributions written from a British angle.4 The same applies in the case of 
                                                 
1 Gábor Bátonyi, Britain and Central Europe, 1918-1933 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999).  
2 Lojkó Miklós, Meddling in Middle Europe: Britain and the ‘lands between’, 1919-1925 (Budapest: 
Central European University Press, 2006).  
3 Ozer Carmi, Le Grande-Bretagne et la Petite Entente (Genève: Libraire Droz, 1972).   
4 Essays on World War I: Total War and Peacemaking, A Case Study on Trianon, ed. by Béla Király, 
Peter Pastor and Ivan Sanders (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).   
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the British outlook on Czechoslovakia which has been scrutinised in several essays 
included in the edition by Eva Schmidt-Hartmann and Stanley Winters.5 Another 
edition of essays on the founding father of Czechoslovakia, Tomáš Masaryk, contains 
one about British perceptions of him.6 The biography of Sir George Clerk by Gerald 
Protheroe throws light on its subject’s tenure at the Prague Legation and his endeavours 
to draw the attention of the Foreign Office to the possibilities offered by the 
Czechoslovak Republic for the establishment of British influence in the region.7 The 
aspect of British policy towards Prague which has received most scholarly attention is 
the view taken from London of the German minority problem and its treatment by the 
Czechoslovak government.8 An interesting insight into the tortuous British policy 
towards Austria and other Central European countries immediately after the war is 
given in Robert Hoffmann’s article.9   
 It is clear from this brief review of the existing literature that there is plenty of 
scope for new and innovative research on the subject. In particular, it seems that the 
British approach towards security issues in permanently troubled Central Europe calls 
for a more in-depth analysis. It is a purpose of this thesis to contribute to filling that 
void. The scope of the thesis was a decisive factor in determining the methodological 
approach. Since the Little Entente was a fairly big unit, its treatment by British 
diplomacy covered a number of aspects which were in practice often interlinked and 
mutually dependent. Apart from the question of relations with Hungary, which was the 
                                                 
5 Great Britain, the United States, and the Bohemian Lands, 1848-1938, ed. by Eva Schmidt-Hartmann 
and Stanley Winters (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1991).     
6 Harry Hanak, ‘British Attitudes to Masaryk’ in T. G. Masaryk (1850-1937), ed. by Harry Hanak, vol. 3 
(London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 125-148.  
7 Gerald Protheroe, Searching for Security in a New Europe: the Diplomatic Career of Sir George Russell 
Clerk (New York: Routledge, 2005); the same author also wrote ‘Sir George Clerk and the Struggle for 
British Influence in Central Europe, 1919-1926’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 12. 3 (2001), 39-64.   
8 Keith Robbins, ‘Konrad Henlein, the Sudeten Question and British Foreign Policy’, Historical Journal, 
12. 4 (Dec., 1969), 674-697; Johann Bruegel, Czechoslovakia before Munich: the German Minority 
Problem and British Appeasement Policy (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Mark Cornwall, 
‘A Fluctuating Barometer: British Diplomatic Views of the Czech-German Relationship in 
Czechoslovakia, 1918-1938’ in Britain, the United States, and the Bohemian Lands, ed. by Schmidt-
Hartmann and Winters, pp. 313-333.  
9 Robert Hoffman, ‘The British Military Representative in Vienna, 1919’, Slavonic and East European 
Review, 52. 127 (Apr., 1974), 252-271.   
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immediate concern and its raison d’être, the Little Entente constituted an additional 
complication in the context of Franco-Italian rivalry in Central Europe. Furthermore, the 
influence of other Great Powers, notably Germany and the USSR, which was especially 
apparent in the 1930s, and the interplay between more narrowly defined Central 
European and the Balkan politics had to be taken into account. For all these reasons an 
integrative method seemed to be best suited in a study of this kind as it brings out more 
clearly the inter-relation of different facets of British policy towards the Little Entente 
and Central Europe in general. It also lays a stronger emphasis on the underlying and 
broader motives of British policy and the common assumptions, perceptions and 
convictions which influenced and shaped it.   
 As for the primary sources, this study is based squarely on the Foreign Office 
records, the vast majority of which come from the General Correspondence series, and a 
few from Private Office Papers. These are supplemented by the papers of a number of 
British officials which are deposited in the Bodleian Library in Oxford and the 
Churchill Archives Centre in Cambridge. The attempt was made to make the best of 
these papers by concentrating on the private correspondence files as opposed to material 
which is duplicated in the National Archives. The most valuable documents, although 
not prodigious in quantity, were found in the collection of Professor Seton-Watson 
which is available in the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at the UCL. In 
addition, use was made of the archives in Belgrade to complement the account from the 
point of view of the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Little Entente. This was 
only possible to a very limited extent because of the state of the material in both the 
Archives of Yugoslavia and the Military Archives. The ravages of war left their mark 
on the most important collections of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry and the individual 
Legations. The only collection which has survived intact was that pertaining to the 
Yugoslav Legation in London. Nevertheless, Yugoslav sources have occasionally 
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provided the most useful complement to material from British archives. A detailed list 
of all the collections drawn upon for the purpose of writing this study is provided in the 
bibliography.     
 As the term ‘Central Europe’ is interchangeably used with that of Danubian 
Europe, its meaning, as usual, requires some explanation. Geopolitical difficulties make 
almost any definition open to criticism. The safest approach seems to be to apply the 
term to the countries which were formerly the main component parts of the Habsburg 
monarchy – Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Some British diplomats certainly 
tended to do so. On the other hand, there were smaller tracts of Austro-Hungarian 
territory which had been assigned to Yugoslavia10 and Poland; so this definition is not 
beyond reproach. The way in which the Foreign Office used to administratively group 
the Central European countries is not helpful either. Its Central Department was 
concerned with the most of the continent including Germany, Italy, Austria, Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia and the Balkan countries (except Turkey which was dealt by the 
Eastern Department).11 In 1934 the reorganisation of the Foreign Office took place and 
the above mentioned states, with the exception of Germany and Czechoslovakia, were 
assigned to the Southern Department. The latter two countries came under the 
jurisdiction of the new Central Department. Consequently, the term ‘Central Europe’ 
was often used in official correspondence to refer to so many states as to be devoid of 
any geographical meaning. The interpretation of Central European boundaries which is 
adopted here is determined by the topic of the thesis, but it also follows, as has been 
pointed out, the original terminology of the Foreign Office. For all practical intents and 
purposes it could be taken to be an equivalent of Danubian Europe – with the notable 
                                                 
10 The official name of the country until 1929 was the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. King 
Alexander’s dictatorship changed it to Yugoslavia (Yugoslav means a South Slav) in 1929 although that 
name had been used earlier to refer to the country of the South Slavs. Quite often the terms Serbs and 
Serbia were used as equivalents for the Yugoslavs and Yugoslavia in the same manner as the term Czechs 
was used instead of Czechoslovaks or, for that matter, English and England instead of British and Britain.   
11 For a brief period of time in 1919-1920 Romania had been grouped with Poland and Russia in the 
Northern Department.  
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exception of Germany. Indeed, the three Little Entente countries, Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia and Romania - as well as Hungary and Austria with which the alliance was 
primarily concerned - were all Danubian countries. The terms ‘South-Eastern Europe’ 
and ‘the Balkans’ are also fairly frequent and they are usually employed when it was 
necessary to convey a more precise geographical reference. The broad interpretation of 
Central Europe adopted here may also be justified on the grounds that Yugoslavia and 
Romania were not only ‘Central European’ countries in the same sense as Austria and 
Hungary, but that they were Balkan powers as well and, as such, deeply involved with 
the Balkan politics. Moreover, Italian policy, which was an important factor in both of 
these more narrowly defined regions, provides another justification for treating them as 
a single unit. Such considerations are amply evidenced in British diplomatic documents.  
 It is useful and necessary to say something about the relative place and 
importance of British policy towards Danubian Europe in the overall context of 
Britain’s foreign relations in the wake of the First World War. The peace brought in its 
tail a number of additional commitments across the world which a war-weary Britain 
found difficult to meet. The most pressing challenges did not rise on the European 
continent. The insurrection in Ireland was very close to home and that in Egypt the most 
critical from the point of view of Imperial communications. A peace settlement with 
Turkey was still far off and, with it, a final pacification and stability in the Middle East. 
As far as Europe was concerned, it was only natural that British attention would be 
riveted to the relations between Germany and France. Their precariousness, France’s 
quest for security against the Germany of tomorrow and the reparation issue were the 
chief reasons which prevented Europe from settling down to normal peace-time 
conditions. Soviet Russia was another source of instability with its ideological drive to 
export the Bolshevik revolution to the capitalist countries, and to India, to Whitehall’s 
great annoyance. Lloyd George’s ambitious attempt to bring her back into the 
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respectability of the comity of European nations through the agency of the Genoa 
Conference of 1922 ended in dismal failure.   
 In the circumstances it was not surprising that the Danubian troubles did not 
come anywhere near the top of the Foreign Office’s agenda. However, it would be 
erroneous to assume that Whitehall did not care about what was going on in that region. 
The memories of the war were too horrible and too vivid for policy-makers to forget 
what seemed to have been its main lesson, namely that a small and local conflict which 
could spark off in a distant region might easily spread into a conflagration of global 
proportions. And the region in question in 1914, as everyone in the Foreign Office 
recalled, had been the Balkans. This consideration alone would have sufficed for paying 
due attention to the situation in the smaller countries along the Danube. Moreover, 
Danubian conflicts often appeared to be a chief threat to European peace and stability. 
For British diplomacy, the main objective of which was the preservation of peace and 
the pacification of the continent, this was a compelling reason to keep a watchful eye on 
the political situation there and to become involved whenever – and the occasions were 
by no means rare – it looked like that local conflicts might get out of hand. This basic 
fact, which is demonstrated in the following pages, is often obscured by the 
conventional wisdom that Britain had no direct and particularly significant interests in 
the Danube region and was thus rather indifferent to its fate.        
 The span of the chronological coverage in the thesis also calls for some 
vindication. That 1919 is taken as the starting point is so natural that it needs no 
explanation. According to the initial plan, the intention was to bring this survey up to 
the effective dismemberment of Czechoslovakia by the Munich agreement of September 
1938. Indeed, that event signalled the definite disruption of the Little Entente and the 
establishment of unchallenged German mastery in Danubian Europe. Due to the space 
constraints of a thesis, however, it has become apparent that it was not possible to do so 
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in a satisfactory manner. Therefore, the Rhineland crisis of March 1936 was chosen as a 
suitable closing point. The reasons for this are fairly obvious: following the Abyssinian 
affair which had erupted in October 1935 and destroyed all prospects of a 
comprehensive Danubian security arrangement centred on Austria, the German re-
occupation of the demilitarised Rhineland zone fundamentally transformed the situation 
in Central Europe. In strategic terms, Germany’s position vis-à-vis the smaller 
Danubian countries was greatly strengthened, particularly when she fortified the 
Rhineland to protect herself from a French offensive. The region would soon be fully 
utilised for the objective of determined economic and political penetration in the 
countries in question. No one expressed the significance of the event more convincingly 
than the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Konstantin von Neurath, when he 
admitted to an American diplomat how it was viewed from Berlin: ‘As soon as our 
fortifications are constructed and the countries of Central Europe realize that France can 
not enter German territory at will, all those countries will begin to feel very differently 
about their foreign policies and a new constellation will develop’.12 It is a testimony to 
the truly global character of interwar international relations that two events which 
happened outside the confines of Central Europe – one in Africa and the other in 
Western Europe – could have had such a profound impact on the Danube region. The 
Rhineland crisis thus opened a new and much debated chapter in Danubian history 
which proved to be a prelude to the Second World War. In this respect the chronological 
span of this work tends to redress the proclivity of most scholarly works to focus on the 
years immediately after the Great War and those immediately before the outbreak of 
World War Two.             
 The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 analysis British dealings with 
the tumultuous situation created in Danubian Europe at the end of the war and the 
                                                 
12 Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. I, 1936, ed. by E. R. Perkins (Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1953), Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (William 
Bullit), 18 May 1936, no number, pp. 300-303.     
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conflicting views of the proper course for Britain to pursue in respect of the newly 
created successor states. The proposal of a Danubian confederation sent shock waves 
among the latter countries and it was dismissed out of hand, on that account, in London. 
The Foreign Office greeted the formation of the Little Entente as a stabilising factor in 
Central Europe, although it was not enamoured with all the complex reasons which 
animated Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia to close their ranks. The events surrounding 
the two abortive putsches of the ex-emperor Karl Habsburg brought about a distinct 
shift in the British perception of the security challenges in the region, namely of the 
confrontation between Hungary and the Little Entente. Chapter 2 looks at the British 
attitude towards the individual members of the Little Entente, and focuses on the view 
taken in Whitehall of their main security challenges. It is suggested here that this 
attitude was to a large measure determined by the overall impression of the internal 
solidity of the countries in question and their potential or lack thereof to contribute 
towards a permanent pacification of Central Europe. This facet of British appreciation is 
particularly visible in the view taken of Hungary-Little Entente relations. It will be also 
seen that British financial institutions had their share in the formulation of foreign 
policy. Another aspect of the British estimation of the Little Entente and its policy 
concerned the very friendly relations it maintained with France on the basis of the 
mutual championing of the territorial status quo. This chapter sheds light on the 
markedly negative British stance on the relations between Paris and the three smaller 
powers and, in particular, examines the reasons for the hugely exaggerated perception of 
these relations. A general discussion of the subject is followed by a close investigation 
of the British view of the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty of 1924 which works perfectly as 
an example. Chapter 3 surveys the British attempt to initiate a settlement on the Locarno 
pattern as a remedy for Danubian Europe, or rather two settlements dealing separately 
with ‘Central Europe’ and the Balkans. Following the failure of this endeavour, the 
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Foreign Office had to face and respond to the deterioration of the situation in the 
Danubian region which was part and parcel of the growing rivalry between Italy and 
France. Whitehall’s policy throughout this period was marked by a persistent approach 
based on the set of prejudices and fallacious premises which are scrutinised throughout 
the chapter. Chapter 4 enquires into the British outlook on the aggravating 
circumstances in Danubian Europe at the turn of decade – the growing signs of the 
restiveness of the revisionist countries and the corresponding closing of ranks of the 
Little Entente. The ambiguous attitude towards revision stemmed from the fact that, on 
its merits, the British deemed it necessary, to certain and undefined extent, but refrained 
from broaching it directly on grounds of its practical difficulties. It is also demonstrated 
by the Foreign Office’s distinct reservations about the capabilities of the Little Entente 
to uphold the security system it had created and guarded. Chapter 5 looks at the 
complexity of the security issues brought about by the Nazi pressure on Austria and the 
British endeavour to facilitate a comprehensive pact which would protect the 
independence of Vienna and, at the same time, resolve the conflict, on the one hand, 
between Italy and the Little Entente and, on the other, Hungary and the Little Entente. 
Different aspects of the British handling of the growing tensions between revisionists 
and antirevisionists which arose in connexion with Austria and in the Balkans are 
analysed with a view to pointing out the common threads of the Foreign Office’s 
thinking and action, or rather lack of action. Apart from the struggle for Austrian 
independence, the German threat was felt further down the Danube and Whitehall 
observed and approached it in connexion with Czechoslovakia’s precarious situation 
and the uncertain ultimate attitude of the Little Entente - with an odd mixture of keen 
appreciation and ineffective policy for the purpose of countering it. 
 British policy towards the region, the Little Entente and its individual countries 
shows certain permanent features insofar as it operated on a set of preconceived 
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assumptions and it manifested itself through recognisable and common patterns of 
diplomatic action. Looking at it from that perspective, one might trace some of the roots 
of that policy, usually referred to as ‘appeasement’, which under the guidance of Neville 
Chamberlain found its natural outlet in Munich in September 1938.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
A NEW EUROPE OR A ‘BALKANISED EUROPE’? THE BRITISH DILEMMA, 
1919-1921 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The changes in the map of Europe, particularly in its central and south-eastern parts, at 
the end of the Great War was the most fundamental redistribution of frontiers and 
political influence since the times of the barbarian invasions which had swept away the 
Roman Empire. The demise of the Habsburg Monarchy left behind a number of smaller 
states. Vanquished Austria and Hungary struggled to survive in their truncated state, 
uncertain of their external boundaries and riddled with a chaotic internal situation which 
threatened to turn into complete collapse. The successor states, essentially satisfied with 
the attainment of their national aims, were also confronted with serious domestic 
challenges. Enlarged or newly-created countries themselves represented multinational 
societies which were struggling to harmonise the different nationalities within their 
framework; the need for a new and efficient administrative system was urgent; and 
finally, the severance of traditional economic links among various provinces of the 
former Habsburg Empire had to be surmounted in order to provide a decent prospect for 
the whole region. The most illustrative example was that of Yugoslavia, which inherited 
and had to digest six different customs areas, five currencies, five railway networks and 
three separate banking systems.   
Along with the other victorious Entente Powers, Britain was called upon to 
mould the peace settlement in Paris and to determine not just new frontiers but the 
whole new outlook of the post-war Central Europe. The scale of the problems 
confronting policy-makers was reflected upon even before the end of the war, and a 
need to find a ‘constructive’ solution was clearly recognised. Leopold Amery of the 
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War Council noted: ‘Otherwise we shall simply have of the whole of Central Europe a 
reproduction on a larger scale of what the Balkans were after 1913.’1 The only guiding 
light in the search for a new arrangement was the principle of national self-
determination expounded by the American President Woodrow Wilson. Although 
seemingly offering a clear-cut solution, it proved to be much more complex and 
difficult to apply in practice. James Headlam-Morley, the Assistant Director of the 
Foreign Office’s Political Intelligence Department, observed: ‘I find people in an 
extraordinary muddle with regard to all these problems which have inevitably been 
created by the war and many of which have been very imperfectly formulated by 
Wilson.’2  
This chapter examines how British diplomacy reacted to the new political 
constellation and the challenges it brought in its tail. The first section of the chapter 
demonstrates how two divergent influences vied in imposing their views on the Foreign 
Office policy. The first was the so-called New Europe group inspired by the ideas of 
Professor Robert William Seton-Watson which was striving to promote the rise of 
successor states based on the national self-determination principle on the ruins of 
Austria-Hungary. The second one was a more conservative group of political and 
military officials who occupied posts in Central Europe. The movement for a Habsburg 
restoration was an obvious reaction of the old and defeated forces which endeavoured 
to obtain British support for its schemes of Danubian Confederation. This project, as is 
demonstrated in the second section, met with scornful rebuff in the Foreign Office 
which was prone completely to underestimate its strength and potential consequences. 
The third section analyses the British stance towards the creation of the Little Entente 
alliance between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. It will be seen how the British 
                                                 
1 Cambridge, Churchill Archives Centre, The Papers of Leopold Amery (hereafter AMEL), 2/1/1, Amery 
to Cecil, private, 21 October 1918.  
2 London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies (hereafter SSEES), The Papers of Professor 
Robert William Seton-Watson, Individual Correspondence Files (hereafter SEW/17), SEW/17/9/3, 
Headlam-Morley to Seton-Watson, private, 21 July 1919.   
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Ministers at Belgrade and Prague shrewdly perceived the powerful forces which 
determined the attitude of the two countries and their bitter opposition to everything 
that a Habsburg restoration stood for. London welcomed the alliance as tending to 
enhance stability in the region, although it did not fully appreciate the considerations 
pointed out by the local representatives. Finally, the fourth section outlines the two 
abortive attempts of the Austro-Hungarian ex-emperor to recapture his throne in 
Hungary and the marked impact they had on the Foreign Office in bringing home the 
full implications of the unsettled situation in Danubian Europe, and the great security 
risks involved, as well as a shift in the British perception of the tension between 
Hungary and the Little Entente.         
 
 
 
1.1. The Shaping of the New Europe 
 
The tremendous and unprecedented turmoil following the end of the war placed 
British policy-makers in a rather unenviable quandary. They were facing a situation 
which suddenly and rapidly developed in the field and for which they were ill-prepared. 
Indeed, during the war Britain was most reluctant to plump for a definite policy of the 
dismemberment of Austria-Hungary and decisions were mostly taken in response to 
changing circumstances.3 The mastering of the new map of Central Europe, not to 
speak of a mosaic of political intricacies, was not helped by the peculiar insular 
ignorance and indifference displayed by most Britons. It is interesting to note how two 
British diplomats who spent a number of years in Prague and Belgrade kept receiving 
letters, even those from official departments, addressed to a plethora of misspelled or 
blatantly wrong names of cities and countries.4 This confusion extended to the political 
                                                 
3 Kenneth Calder, Britain and the Origins of the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1976); Harry Hanak, ‘The Government, the Foreign Office and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918’, Slavonic 
and East European Review, 47. 108 (Jan., 1969), 161-197.     
4 Nevile Henderson, Water Under the Bridges (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1945), pp. 169-170; Robert 
Bruce Lockhart, Retreat from Glory (London: Putnam, 1934), p. 56; the latter gives more impressive list: 
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sphere as well. Robert Bruce Lockhart, a man who acquired a considerable experience 
of Central Europe while working in diplomacy and banking, recalled in his memoirs 
how a stream of visitors to Prague had held a vast variety of views on the remedy for 
the fragmented region:  
Some were pro-Czech and others anti-Czech. Their attitude was determined largely 
by the treatment which they received at the frontier station. Some saw the only 
hope of salvation in the restoration of the Habsburgs. Others demanded redress for 
Hungary. Others again were advocates of the Anschluss and were in favour of 
incorporating Austria in Germany. Later, when Mussolini came into power, there 
was a movement against the Balkanisation of Central Europe and in favour of 
giving a free hand to the Fascist Duce, even if it meant handing over the Dalmatian 
Coast to Italy. There were others – and they were the sanest – who advocated some 
form of economic federation, which would restore the economic entity of the 
former Austro-Hungarian monarchy.5
 
 In a medley of official and unofficial opinions two threads of thought could be 
distinguished. The first one was formed around the Scottish historian Seton-Watson 
whose views – which included the fervent championing of the right of self-
determination for the oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary - were voiced in the 
periodical The New Europe.6 Seton-Watson’s influence far exceeded that of an ordinary 
publicist for the contributors of his periodical comprised of a number of junior Foreign 
Office clerks for whom his liberal nationalist ideals presented a gospel of a novel order 
that should be brought about as result of the war. A number of disciples of ‘Scotus 
Viator’, as he was known to the readers of The Spectator, who laboured with him in the 
Intelligence Bureau of the Department of Information – Headlam-Morley, brothers Rex 
and Allen Leeper, Lewis Namier – were appointed to the Political Intelligence 
Department founded by the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, Lord 
Hardinge, which was to have such an instrumental role during the deliberations of the 
Paris Peace Conference. One of his admirers, Harold Nicolson, although not a member 
                                                                                                                                               
‘Prague, Czechoslavia; Prague, Yugoslovakia; Prague, Czechoslovenia; Prague, Vienna; and even The 
Prague, Poland.’    
5 Bruce Lockhart, p. 104.    
6 Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, The Making of a New Europe: R. W. Seton-Watson and the Last 
Years of Austria-Hungary (London: Methuen, 1981); Bátonyi, ch. 8; Harry Hanak, ‘The New Europe, 
1916-20’, Slavonic and East European Review, 39. 93 (Jun., 1961), 369-399.         
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of the PID, confessed that he was imbued with the doctrines preached on the pages of 
The New Europe and claimed that the younger echelon of British officials in Paris was 
primarily animated by the high ideals of the new order that was about to come into 
being through the consolidation of the new states.7 It has been alleged that Seton-
Watson’s friends on the territorial commissions of the conference, ignoring the grave 
reservations of the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, almost single-handedly pushed 
through the harsh peace settlement with Hungary - the Treaty of Trianon of 4 June 
1920.8 This allegation seems to be somewhat exaggerated as it does not make sufficient 
allowance for the basic fact that the final settlement was to the greatest extent 
predetermined by the actual situation on the ground.       
 The other forces tugging in the opposite direction are much more difficult to 
define for they were composed of individuals, important civil and military officials 
engaged in Central Europe, who were inimical to the new order but who did not act in a 
concerted manner and who were thus incapable of matching the New Europe group. 
Their common denominator could perhaps best be summed up as an inveterate 
predilection for the old social and political order which appealed to them on the grounds 
of their own upbringing and political beliefs, and, as leading Czechs were quick to point 
out, their Roman Catholic faith. Sir Thomas Montgomery-Cunninghame, Military 
Attaché at Vienna and Prague, was a typical example of a Briton who disliked the new 
and fledgling order in Central Europe. For him a country like Czechoslovakia was a 
creation ‘contrary to the lessons of history, geography, economics, morality and 
common sense.’9 There was a great deal of irony in the fact that it fell to Cunninghame 
to accompany the Czechoslovak President, Tomáš Masaryk, on his triumphant return to 
                                                 
7 Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919 (London: Constable, 1937, second edition), pp. 32-33.   
8 Thomas Sakmyster, ‘Great Britain and the Making of the Treaty of Trianon’ in A Case Study of Trianon, 
ed. by Király, Pastor and Sanders, pp. 107-129.     
9 Thomas Cunninghame, Dusty Measure (London: John Murray, 1939), p. 303.   
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Prague after the war. His recollection of that journey shows how every fibre of his being 
was aggrieved by the turn of events he was forced to promote:  
On looking back now I recognise that the Czechs made a poor choice in me. My 
underlying sympathies were not with their crusade. With the zealous young crowd 
of iconoclasts with whom I travelled I was spiritually at loggerheads. I respected 
their enthusiasm, but was antagonistic to its object. I was not a triumphant victor in 
this part of the world: I was a mourner for lovely things broken, for prosperity 
destroyed, thrown out with other Adams from a garden of comfort and ease to 
watch raw hands digging the foundations of a new and doubtful Paradise.10  
 
As will be seen later, Cunninghame’s feelings towards and estimates of the Czech-
dominated Republic were fully shared by other British representatives sent to Prague 
during 1919.  
 Another prominent Briton, Admiral Ernest Troubridge, arrived in the Danubian 
region in November 1918 with ‘very comprehensive powers, including all command of 
the allied forces on the Danube & the organisation of the traffic’.11 The Admiral’s Chief 
of Staff, Alfred Stead, characterised his arrival as a ‘most to be desired development of 
British prestige in S. E. & Central Europe.’ This glowing tribute was certainly not 
shared in Bucharest. Admiral Troubridge used to clash with the Romanian military 
authorities in occupation of the eastern part of Hungary whose stay in that country he 
considered inimical to British interests.12  
 There were also economic considerations prompted by the complete 
disorganisation of commercial intercourse due to the breakdown of the transport system 
and the protectionist high-tariff wall policies of the successor states which appeared to 
have militated against the viability of the new arrangements. The peace settlement had 
not yet taken its final shape when Headlam-Morley recognised a need to redress certain 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Churchill Archives Centre, AMEL 2/1/1, Stead to Amery, private, 6 November 1918.    
12 Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, ed. by Ernest Woodward and Rohan Butler (London: 
Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1947-), first series [hereafter DBFP, references in the first two chapters 
are to ser. I], vol. VI, No. 123, Troubridge to Balfour, 19 August 1919; No. 124, Rattigan to Curzon, 19 
August 1919; No. 148, Rattigan to Curzon, 30 August 1919; No. 157, Troubridge to Balfour, 2 September 
1919; The Bucharest Legation demurred from the Admiral’s opinion as to the detrimental effect of the 
Romanian occupation of the eastern parts of Hungary which was deemed indispensible for keeping order 
and preventing recrudescence of Bolshevism there. See No. 170, Rattigan to Curzon, 10 September 1919.     
 16
provisions: ‘what it seems to me that we want is a recognition that there must be a 
revision as to specific points in the economic and reparation clauses, but [we] should 
insist on it that this does not imply a general scrapping of the whole thing’ which meant 
‘an alteration of the political and territorial settlement.’13 He anticipated ‘great 
difficulties with Hungary.’ A month later Headlam-Morley was even more sceptical: ‘I 
will confess that I feel very doubtful about the [Trianon] Treaty; I do not believe it will 
be possible eventually to maintain it without far-reaching modifications.’14  
 To fully appreciate the working of all these powerful and divergent forces it is 
necessary to examine how they combined, clashed and ultimately shaped British policy 
in the Central European countries. In May 1919 Sir Francis Oppenheimer paid a visit to 
Vienna in his capacity as British Financial Commissioner and studied the situation on 
the spot. He embodied his observations in two memoranda which were remarkable for 
their foresight and masterly grasp of both the political and economic issues at stake. The 
basic assumption of Oppenheimer’s study was that the preservation of Austria, which 
was at the time barely surviving and in dire need of food, coal and other necessities, was 
well worth the Allies’ efforts in view of the overwhelming objective of keeping her 
away from Germany.15 The objective was presented as justified and highly desirable 
from both the internal and external political aspect. As far as the former was concerned, 
it was asserted that the majority of Austrian people did not want a union with Germany 
if any other feasible solution was available. In regard to the future peace of Europe the 
importance of preventing the Anschluss was outlined with a striking astuteness in view 
                                                 
13 Churchill Archives Centre, The Papers of Sir James Headlam-Morley (hereafter HDLM), 
Correspondence Bundles, box 37, Headlam-Morley to Malcolm, private, February 1920.    
14 Churchill Archives Centre, HDLM, Correspondence Bundles, box 37, Headlam-Morley to Young, 
private, 20 March 1920.    
15 DBFP, VI, Memorandum by Sir Francis Oppenheimer relative to the situation in Austria, 3 June 1919, 
and Memorandum prepared at the request of the Chancellor of the Exchequer relative to the situation in 
Austria, 20 June 1919, both enclosed in No. 25, Curzon to Balfour, 9 July 1919; the third enclosure in the 
above-mentioned document is Foreign Office to Treasury, 9 July 1919 in which Lord Curzon entirely 
endorsed Oppenheimer’s proposals from the purely political point of view and re-emphasised the fact that 
the fusion of Austria with Germany ‘would have a direct and unfortunate effect upon the position of the 
new States of Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia, whom His Majesty’s Government are morally bound to 
support.’      
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of its potential repercussions: it would dispose of the danger of Austria becoming the 
jumping-off ground for the renewed German Drang nach Osten; it would prevent the 
formation of a German bloc bordering on Italy which Rome might deem beneficial with 
a view to her ambitions in the Mediterranean which were likely to bring her into conflict 
with France and also her expansionist aims in the Danube region which would pit her 
against the newly created Slav countries, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, the Italian 
idea being that a liaison with Germany would help to keep her possible enemies 
separated; finally, Oppenheimer contended, an Austro-German union would endanger 
the existence of Czechoslovakia with her sizeable German population which would 
immediately strive to break away from Prague.   
Moreover, left to herself and faced with famine Austria and the whole of Central 
Europe could easily fall prey to Bolshevism which would then force the rest of the 
European countries, and probably the United States, to embark on some combined 
action in order to save Europe from utter destruction. Oppenheimer insisted that rather 
than saddling Austria with punitive peace terms and reparations it was necessary to 
frame the peace treaty in such manner so as to provide the best possible conditions for 
the speedy recovery of her industries. In the long run, however, the crucial prerequisite 
for the Austrian recovery was for Vienna to resume its role as the ‘clearing-house’ for 
the former component parts of the Habsburg monarchy. This could not be achieved 
without close economic intercourse between the successor states, which the Allies 
should press for, and which did not necessarily have to take the form of a Customs 
Union. To begin with, the Allies needed to exercise control over the administration of 
Austria on the pattern that Britain was exercising in Egypt and which the Austrians 
themselves were prepared to accept.  
 Oppenheimer’s views chimed with those of Headlam-Morley. While arguing 
that the new Austria had to be treated as a successor country – just like Czechoslovakia 
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– and not as a juridicially identical state with the old Austria, Headlam-Morley 
predicted that ‘it is quite probable, and I think desirable, that some economic union 
should in the future be established between the Danube states’ and that such a union 
would be much easier of accomplishment if it were clearly understood that the new 
Austria was not the heir of the old one.16 He was quite dissatisfied with the drafting of 
the Austrian treaty, the whole structure of which he found ‘merely ludicrous and 
stupid.’17   
Following on Oppenheimer’s memoranda and the discouraging attitude of the 
Treasury which wanted to refer the matter to the Peace Delegation at Paris, Charles 
Howard Smith, a member of the War Department of the Foreign Office, made a 
renewed attempt to present the case before the War Cabinet. Having pointed out the 
proposals put forward by the Austrian financial leaders in the meantime and the great 
opportunities which these afforded British enterprise, Howard Smith underscored that 
the potentialities of Austria, at present small in itself, would actually open up the 
markets of the whole Danubian region:   
If we obtain a strong position in Vienna we immediately strengthen our position in 
Bohemia, in Hungary and even in Jugo-Slavia. All these countries wish to trade 
with us, and we shall be able also to facilitate regular interchanges between the 
various States thus helping to solve one of the great problems of Central Europe 
while profiting ourselves at the same time.18  
 
In fact, by securing a firm footing at Vienna, the British could, Howard Smith believed, 
‘create a paramount position, commercially and politically, in Central Europe’, 
especially given the fact that ‘We are already allied with the Czechs and it is to our 
interests to support the Jugo-slavs against the Italians.’19 It was necessary to work for 
                                                 
16 A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference, ed. by Agnes Headlam-Morley, Russell Bryant and Anna 
Cienciala (London: Methuen & Co LTD, 1972), Note on the draft Austrian treaty, 26 May 1919, pp. 127-
129.    
17 Ibid. Extract from letter to Mr. [Percy] Koppel (F.O.), 30 June 1919, pp. 177-180.   
18 DBFP, VI, No. 112, Memorandum by Howard Smith ‘The advantages, commercial and political, of 
giving financial assistance to German-Austria’, 15 August 1919.   
19 Ibid.  
 19
the cooperation of the successor states and thereby promote their own true interests and 
British trade, a task that should not prove to be insuperable.   
 The urgency of the necessity to take action in order to ameliorate the economic 
position of Central Europe was most evident to British diplomats in Vienna where 
conditions had markedly deteriorated in stark contrast to the glorious pre-war days. 
Francis Lindley, High Commissioner and later Minister in that city, had no doubts as to 
the remedy for the deplorable conditions: ‘Looking it as a whole, I am convinced that 
the only way in which the various States, formerly forming part of the Empire, can be 
helped to extricate themselves from their ap[p]alling muddle is to take them all in hand 
and make them do what they are told.’20 Lindley had no qualms about intimating that it 
would be justified and even necessary to interfere in the internal affairs of the successor 
states ‘and to make all these people understand that they have got to live together as 
neighbours whether they like it or not.’ While relaying how he was approached by a 
representative of the Austrian monarchists who had enquired as to the British attitude 
towards the change of government, and more particularly towards the Habsburg family, 
Cyril Butler of the Inter-Allied Food Commission at Vienna expressed his personal 
conviction that some reunion between the successor states was inevitable in the next 
few years, probably starting with a reattaching of Austria and Hungary.21 Meanwhile 
the Austrian crisis did not abate. The new Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, repeatedly 
urged Treasury officials to immediately open a joint credit together with the other 
Allies in favour of the Austrian government.22 ‘Is anything to be done for Austria or 
Hungary except a continuance perhaps of the hand to mouth policy represented by relief 
in doles?’ – an exasperated Butler asked Lord Hardinge; but the reply, though 
                                                 
20 DBFP, VI, No. 265, Lindley to Curzon, private, 7 November 1919; also No. 296, Lindley to Curzon, 22 
November 1919; No. 356, Lindley to Curzon, 5 December 1919; No. 372, Lindley to Curzon, 13 
December 1919.       
21 DBFP, VI, two letters from Mr. Butler to Sir W. Goode of 4 September 1919 and a copy of 
questionnaire submitted by Butler’s Austrian interlocutor, enclosed in No. 171, Crowe to Curzon, 12 
September 1919.   
22 DBFP, VI, No. 278, Foreign Office to the Treasury, 12 November 1919.  
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sympathetic, was not reassuring in view of the considerable financial difficulties 
involved.23  
The convening of the Porto Rosa conference in 1921 for the purpose of 
facilitating the transport situation and economic inter-state intercourse in Central 
Europe seemed to have promised great possibilities. The Foreign Office was eager to 
push forward the scheme so as to attain ‘some reasonable and effective arrangement for 
trade between the “Successor” States.’24 However, the attitude of the latter did not 
augur well for the conference. Sir Alban Young, Minister at Belgrade, was told in the 
Yugoslav Ministry for Foreign Affairs that there was no use in attending conferences, 
the object of which ‘was to procure sacrifices which the S. H. S. [SCS] Government 
would decline to make’.25 It was also noted that Beneš ‘threw cold water on the Porto 
Rosa conference’ and claimed that Austria could not expect much in the way of 
assistance from the successor states.26 The Italians and Yugoslavs were expected to be 
most obstructive at the conference.27 Indeed, the conference paid lip service to the 
benefits of economic cooperation, but foundering on the mutual jealousies and fears of 
its participants, it remained bereft of any substantial results.     
Hungary presented another sort of difficulty for the country remained in political 
turmoil for a long time after the armistice. The leftist government of Count Mihály 
Károlyi held a promise of social and political democratisation by means of which it also 
hoped to maintain the integrity of the historical lands of the crown of St. Stephen, but it 
                                                 
23 DBFP, VI, No. 210, Butler (Vienna) to Hardinge, private, 13 October 1919; also No. 212, Butler 
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could not withstand the loss of substantial slices of territory occupied by the victorious 
Czech, Romanian and Serb armies. On 21 March 1919 it gave way to the communist 
dictatorship of Béla Kun which survived in power for 133 days during which time it 
posed not just the menace of spreading Bolshevism, particularly to Austria and 
Bohemia, but also put to the test the authority of the Allies whose inactivity would 
amount to a public profession of impotence.28 The Magyars readily enlisted Bolshevik 
armed forces due to the aroused national feeling and desperation caused by the 
mutilation of their country. For a while Slovakia was occupied by the Hungarian Red 
Army.   
According to Lloyd George, the Allied statesmen in Paris had a grand strategy 
to deal with the situation: ‘Policy of Allies was first to insist on retirement of Bela Kun 
from Czecho-Slovak territory, to be followed immediately by retirement of Roumania 
from Hungarian territory, after which peace negotiations with Hungary would 
commence.’29 Lloyd George was blaming the Romanians for the breach of the armistice 
and the refusal to comply with the demands of the Allies. Nevertheless, the Romanian 
army advanced into Budapest following the collapse of the Bolshevik rule. After a brief 
tenure of office by the Social Democrats the extreme right-wing government under 
István Friedrich took the reins of the country and installed the Archduke Joseph 
Habsburg as head of state. The accession of a Habsburg met with a distinct ill-feeling 
on the part of the Belgrade and Prague governments which were not in the slightest 
relieved when the Bolshevist downfall brought with it what was, to their mind, such a 
heavy price.30 The chaotic situation in Hungary, large tracts of which were under 
occupation while the rest of the country was stewing in social and political disorder, 
                                                 
28 DBFP, VI, No. 30, Balfour to Curzon, 9 July 1919; a number of reports reached the Foreign Office to 
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made it imperative to evolve a fairly representative government that would possess 
sufficient authority to restore a regular administration and make peace with the Allies. 
With this object in view, and not losing sight of the prior necessity to remove Romanian 
troops from the country, the Supreme Allied Council dispatched Sir George Clerk, a 
senior Foreign Office official, on successive missions to Bucharest and Budapest.31  
The reports of relentless requisitioning and plundering of the occupied parts of 
Hungary by the Romanians produced a profoundly unfavourable impression at the 
Peace Conference.32 Frank Rattigan, British Chargé d’ Affaires at Bucharest, pointed 
out that the Allied Generals in Budapest showed a distinct lack of friendliness and tact 
towards Romanians, a situation which was further aggravated by hostile reports they 
were receiving from their Hungarian agents.33 On his arrival in Budapest Clerk 
estimated that a Romanian withdrawal from Hungary was indispensible for the final 
stabilisation of that country despite the risk that such action would entail for the parties 
of the left which were apprehensive of the reactionary white terror.34 During his mission 
Clerk experienced difficulties with the Allied military representatives who were quick 
to accuse him of being pro-Romanian.35 For his part the envoy saw them ‘all very 
comfortably lodged in various palaces of Hungarian magnates, they are smiled over by 
all Hungarians, and they have about as much sense of political realities as a stuffed 
dog.’36 The most troublesome on account of his open pro-Hungarian stance was 
Admiral Troubridge. Clerk even believed that the Supreme Council would have to bring 
pressure to bear on the Admiral.37 Although acting on behalf of the Allies, Clerk was 
mindful of British interests. He urged Sir Eyre Crowe, the Assistant Under-Secretary of 
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State for Foreign Affairs, to resist to utmost the idea of a combined Czecho-Serb 
occupation of Hungary as it ‘would really be [a] French occupation’ given their closely 
knit connexions with the French military.38   
With Romanian evacuation taking place the second part of Sir George’s mission 
proved to be more of a challenge. In retrospect he would say that the goal ‘was to get rid 
of the Friedrich Govt., which the Supreme Council did not like, and to substitute for it a 
Government with which the Supreme Council would condescend to deal, though I must 
not in any way interfere with the internal affairs of Hungary!’39 Non-interference was a 
pure chimera. Clerk’s role was instrumental in bringing together the former 
Commander-in-Chief of the Austro-Hungarian fleet, Admiral Miklós Horthy, who was 
now in command of the only organised Hungarian armed force in the southern fringes 
of the country forged for the express purpose of fighting the Bolsheviks, and the liberal 
Social Democratic and Jewish elements in Budapest who were terrified at the prospect 
of being massacred in retribution for the atrocities of Béla Kun’s ‘Red Terror’. Clerk 
did try his best to ensure the safety of the latter and specifically asked for and obtained a 
written assurance from Horthy that he would impose discipline and self-restraint on his 
troops.40 Finally, a provisional government under Károly Huszár was formed and 
accorded formal recognition by the Supreme Council subject to the condition that it 
would hold free elections based on universal suffrage.41 This arrangement did not prove 
successful. Horthy’s special detachments executed a lot of real and alleged political 
opponents; and after the elections, which fell far short of democratic standards, the 
Admiral was elected Regent of Hungary on 1 March 1920. With that a durable regime – 
a peculiar amalgamation of the traditional conservatives and extremely militant and 
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rabidly anti-Semitic right-wingers - was established.42 Clerk later claimed that he was 
doubtful of how the arrangement that he had sponsored would be carried out and thus 
offered to return to Budapest at the time of the elections, a proposal which was rejected 
by the Supreme Council. However, his recollections did not tally with his professions at 
the time of the mission when he appears to have fallen, like so many others of his 
countrymen, under the spell of the Admiral’s personal charisma: ‘In fact my confidence 
in Horthy has not only been justified but increased. I have now little fear of political 
persecutions.’43  
Hungary settled down internally but remained a cockpit of Central European 
political intrigue. The attitude of the Entente Powers was not helpful in this respect. 
Horthy himself apprised Admiral Troubridge of the proposals made to him by the 
Italians which aimed at an exclusive predominance of Rome in Hungary with a view to 
disrupting Yugoslavia and completely ousting British political influence.44 In spring 
1920 an exchange of views took place between the Secretary-General of the Quai 
d’Orsay, Maurice Paléologue, and several prominent Hungarians with a view to 
rapprochement between their two countries.45 The general idea was to grant 
considerable concessions to the French company Schneider-Creusot which would make 
Hungary a French stronghold in Central Europe in return for which Paris would ensure, 
so the Hungarians hoped, substantial improvements in the territorial settlement of the 
peace treaty, the terms of which had become known early in January 1920.46      
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Rumours of Paléologue’s schemes had reached Seton-Watson and, as he wrote 
to Allen Leeper, had rendered him ‘speechless’. He was also relieved ‘that our own 
policy is sane and free from the Magyar infection.’47  The British delegation in Paris 
was not perturbed by the news: ‘The French-Hungarian intrigue does not worry me 
much: it can do us no harm – but it can do the French great harm’, Leeper wrote. 
‘Unfortunately it is typical of a certain side of French policy. I think the Reparation 
Committee will have something to say on all this shortly.’48 Replying to the reports of 
Franco-Hungarian dealings and commenting on suggestions for taking action Curzon 
instructed both Athelstan-Johnson, the Chargé d’Affaires at Budapest, and Lord Derby, 
the Ambassador in Paris, to refrain from making any sort of representations in their 
respective capitals.49 It was not before September that Lord Derby officially enquired of 
the French government about their negotiations with the Magyars and received a 
suitable assurance.50 British reserve proved to be fully justified as nothing came of the 
Franco-Hungarian negotiations, but, as will be seen later, the very fact of their taking 
place would have an important and lasting impact on Central European politics.   
In Prague, the British Chargé d’Affaires, Cecil Gosling, painted a distinctly 
gloomy picture of the situation in the fledgling country. He reported that the Republic 
was riddled with racial animosities, the blame for which was laid on the Czechs who 
had ‘succeeded in hostilizing not only their former enemies the German Bohemians, but 
also the Moravians and the Slovaks.’51 Gosling maintained that the latter two 
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communities, especially the Slovaks, desired autonomy as a result of the high-handed 
methods of Czech officialdom whereas the Jews were looked upon with extreme 
hostility in Bohemia and considered to be imbued with Bolshevism in Slovakia. In 
addition, the old Czech nobility was highly dissatisfied on account of sequestration of 
its property and its complete exclusion from public service. Gosling also deplored the 
anticlerical policy of the government and claimed that the indignities committed against 
the Roman Catholic Church ‘created a painful impression among the people of 
moderate views.’52 The Chargé d’Affaires was favourably impressed with the 
personality of Masaryk and ‘his high principles and qualities of heart and mind’, but 
thought him to be lacking in firmness and decisiveness in coping with the problems 
confronting him. The Cabinet Ministers were, on the contrary, ‘ignorant and narrow-
minded’, and they had ‘lost the confidence of the public’ due to their party bickering 
which affected ‘the whole fabric of the administration and is a permanent source of 
weakness.’53 In conclusion, Gosling doubted whether the Republic, faced with 
considerable internal difficulties, surrounded on all sides by enemies and exposed to the 
invasion of the Hungarian Red Army, could stand alone. He regarded French military 
support through the agency of General Pellé’s mission as very useful but probably not a 
sufficient prop for the preservation of Czechoslovak independence. Gosling deemed 
British financial assistance and expert advice in transport and other matters as essential 
for the achievement of that goal.   
The Hungarian Red Army withdrew from Slovakia, but, despite a fortunate 
ending of the hostilities for the Czechs, Gosling was left with a very unfavourable 
impression of their troops which had ‘proved bad and unreliable’, and had only 
managed to remain undefeated due to the skill and energy of the commanding French 
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officers and their staff. The Czechs demonstrated a marked unwillingness to fight for 
Slovakia whereas the Slovak peasants proved equally indifferent to the Czechs and the 
Slovak town-dwellers were in fact ‘for the greater part, frankly pro-Magyar’.54 
Gosling’s intention of visiting the ‘Sudetenland’ – the German name for the parts of 
Bohemia populated by Germans - with the object of collecting material for a report on 
the situation of the local population was not approved by Lord Curzon, in consultation 
with Arthur Balfour, for it was thought that the Prague government would look on such 
a visit with suspicion.55 In November, having heard from Beneš that the government 
was alive to the deficiencies of the administration and that it intended to tackle them on 
broad and liberal lines, Gosling recommended that Britain should facilitate such a 
policy by providing financial assistance in the matter of a loan which Beneš was about 
to try and float in London.56 However, dissatisfied with the lack of changes, Gosling 
reiterated his critical attitude towards Czechoslovakia in his last report before departing 
from Prague at the end of 1919.57 He assured Lindley, with considerable exaggeration, 
during the latter’s visit to Czechoslovakia, that the most backward of South American 
states in which he had passed some of his career ‘was run on more enlightened and less 
corrupt lines than is Czecho-Slovakia.’58 Lindley himself was appalled by the 
inefficiency of the transport system and did his best to impress that point on the 
Czechoslovak President; but he was disappointed to find ‘that Mazaryk’s [sic] hatred of 
Vienna has in no way abated owing to the change of circumstances’.59   
In February 1919 Seton-Watson was sent to Prague under the cover of Lady 
Muriel Paget’s humanitarian mission ‘with the sanction and approval of the Foreign 
                                                 
54 DBFP, VI, No. 36, Gosling to Curzon, 11 July 1919; also No. 134, Gosling to Curzon, 23 August 1919; 
No. 283, Gosling to Curzon, 16 November 1919; No. 332, Gosling to Curzon, 1 December 1919; No. 
400, Gosling to Curzon, 29 December 1919 with enclosures: Gosling to Masaryk, private, 2 December 
1919, and Masaryk to Gosling, private, 27 December 1919.       
55 DBFP, VI, No. 161, Curzon to Balfour, 6 September 1919, and No. 173, Curzon to Gosling, 13 
September 1919.   
56 DBFP, VI, No. 257, Gosling to Curzon, 6 November 1919.  
57 DBFP, VI, No. 402, Gosling to Curzon, 31 December 1919.   
58 DBFP, VI, No. 406, Lindley to Curzon, private, 1 January 1920.  
59 Ibid.  
 28
Office’ – and also in response to the express wish of the Czechs – where he was to 
‘watch the political situation’, supply London with reliable information and exercise 
influence on  the local authorities.60 His arrival was bound to lend some perspective to 
the highly critical reports coming from Gosling. Seton-Watson referred to his friend 
Masaryk’s presidential work in Czechoslovakia as ‘building one of the most essential 
parts of the New Europe’.61 His correspondence from Prague reveals the real nature of 
his activities. In the absence of a proper British Minister, Seton-Watson was filling the 
void. Yet he himself did not consider such a provisional arrangement to be adequate for 
the purpose and he strongly implored the Foreign Office to appoint an official 
representative: 
Meanwhile a certain period is likely to elapse when there will be no one here who 
has any pronounced Czech sympathies or can be definitely regarded as either 
actively friendly or well-informed. This is regrettable. I would urge you to make an 
effort to have some Slavophil (a man with Russian experience & of course 
progressive not tsarist would be best, as Czechophils are not in the diplomatic 
market) sent here as quickly as possible, showing our sympathy & also “keeping 
our end up” here.62
 
 Seton-Watson had no doubt about the importance of the newly-founded country: 
‘Prague is going to be the hub of Central non-German Europe & we must help on this 
process, not merely watch it platonically.’63 He warned about the detrimental effect of 
British officials who did not seem to understand their true role in the process: ‘In this 
connection Sir T. Cunningham’s activity in Vienna is highly mischievous & causing 
considerable uneasiness here.’64 It is interesting to note that even Gosling had had to 
reassure Masaryk in respect of Cunninghame’s activities and point out the services 
rendered to Czechoslovakia by the Colonel in opposing the Hungarian Bolshevist 
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movement.65 As Headlam-Morley soon confirmed, Seton-Watson’s informal letters 
were found to be very illuminating and useful among the Foreign Office officials.66   
Scotus Viator’s mission turned out to be as significant as it was inconspicuous. 
He discussed in detail the pressing matter of minority rights with President Masaryk and 
transmitted the latter’s views to the British delegation at Paris.67 The British had no 
intention of framing the national minorities clauses in such a way as to infringe on the 
full exercise of the successor states’ sovereign powers. Headlam-Morley described the 
minority rights convention as ‘rather generally worded clauses which will give 
Minorities the essential rights as to the use of their language in private intercourse, 
reasonable facilities in Courts of Justice and, where they form a considerable proportion 
of the population, the right to have their language used as the medium of instruction in 
schools.’68 In a frank exchange of views between the two trusted friends Masaryk gave 
an account of the sort of anxieties that troubled the Czechs as regards the vacillations of 
British policy in the region:  
The British policy here (Central Europe) is not yet quite clear… A small instance or 
proof of that unclearness is the fact, that your Government has sent here so many 
Catholics, that even the unpolitical public speaks about it & wonders , what it 
means. Mr Gosling (he left) was in connexion with our high clergy (and with the 
nobility); he intervened very often in various even private matters in the benefit of 
the clergy & their protegés. He took the part of the clerical party too decidedly; I 
liked him and we spoke of these matters openly, but I saw, he even did not suspect, 
that he worked for Rome. A Mr. Coulson, a military attaché, joined (here in 
Prague) the Roman Church (they say influenced by Mr. Gosling) & you can 
imagine, how our Clericals and the Nobility rejoiced in that… In Budapest Admiral 
Troobridge [sic] (if I am not mistaken, a convert also) goes every [Sunday?] to 
Mass & is indeed the influence of the Magyar “Christians”… and so in Vienna & 
everywhere your officials are apt to come under the influence of the nobility. It is 
natural, that they do not like our simplicity & rusticality; but accepting the 
hospitality of the nobility they accept by & by their views.69          
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In reply to Masaryk’s critical overview of British policy in Central Europe Seton-
Watson put forward his own – and quite realistic - view of the position:  
I of course entirely agree with all you say about our agents in Budapest, Bulgaria 
etc. There is however a tendency – very natural, I fully admit – on the part of some 
of your people, as also of the Yugoslavs and Roumanians, to draw altogether 
exaggerated deductions from these unfortunate facts. In reality it is, I am sure, quite 
a mistake to assume that Trowbridge [sic]-Gosling and others (now Lord Newton) 
represent in any way British policy. On the contrary, they are individuals who have 
been caught up in certain currents and are busily engaged in urging a policy of their 
own upon our government, but not with success… I can find no evidence of a 
serious nature to suggest that the Magyar intrigues have got any hold here in 
London. The real criticism against our people is a somewhat lordly indifference 
towards New States, alternating with reserve and a waiting attitude’.70  
 
 As for Czechoslovakia, Seton-Watson’s semi-official stay in that country was 
just the beginning of a change of diplomatic personnel which would see people of a 
truly ‘New Europe’ frame of mind coming into the British Legation. In January 1920 
Robert Bruce Lockhart, a Slavophil Scotsman who held Czech leaders in high esteem,71 
arrived in Prague to take up his post as Commercial Secretary with introduction letters 
‘of the greatest value’ from Seton-Watson.72 In two weeks time he was joined by 
George Clerk, the first British Minister to the Republic, whose arrival Bruce Lockhart 
eagerly expected ‘as we do not seem to be over-popular with the Czechs.’ Clerk’s 
appointment was an obvious choice: as the Head of the War Department at the Foreign 
Office during the war he had been, through the mediation of Seton-Watson, the first 
among British diplomats to have known and introduced to other officials Masaryk and 
Beneš among the other émigré leaders of the oppressed nationalities.73 The difference 
between the new British representatives and their predecessors, and the way in which 
they perceived and treated Czechoslovak circumstances, was profound. Bruce Lockhart 
later described Gosling as sympathetic to the ‘“Blacks”, the name we gave to the old 
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feudal aristocrats, who, Habsburg in sympathy and now shorn of their former glory, 
were to a man contemptuous of the Czechs, and it is not surprising that the Czechs were 
up in arms against him – not altogether without reason.’74 The military attaché, Basil 
Coulson, had also moved in aristocratic circles and, Bruce Lockhart added, ‘far more 
than Gosling, had exceeded the bounds of diplomatic discretion in his comments on the 
Czechs.’ Contrary to Gosling’s portrait of the Bohemian nobility as being willing to 
blend into the new Czechoslovak state only to find itself carefully ostracised by the 
authorities, Bruce Lockhart painted a picture of a decadent class indulging in futile 
sneering at the new rulers of the country.75 His chief, Sir George, tried to build a bridge 
between the aristocracy and democratic government officials by hosting a gala dinner to 
which both groups were invited, but his efforts ended in a fiasco.76    
 On his arrival in Prague Clerk confided his first impressions to Seton-Watson: ‘I 
find a curious atmosphere of restraint, fear, and suspicion. The Czechs prepared to find 
me monarchist and reactionary: the others regretting their avowed and fervently 
Catholic friend. And everyone expecting miracles!’77 The two men were of the same 
mind regarding the right line of British policy to be pursued in the region: ‘As you 
know, there is, and can be, no foundation for nervousness about Buda Pest as the centre 
of our policy. On the other hand, if Prague is to be that centre, it must qualify itself by 
becoming, as potentially it can become, the most advanced and stable of the new 
States.’78 Clerk was keen on having Seton-Watson in Prague for a while and being able 
to draw on his expert experience; he was consequently disappointed that his visit did not 
materialise:  
Quite apart from my personal regret, I do feel that it is very desirable that the few 
people, such as yourself, who really know this people, should see what sort of a job 
they are making of the difficult art of government. Not only is it just as well that 
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publicity should be given to their mistakes as well as to their successes, but I feel 
that a word from anyone like you, in whom they have complete confidence, is far 
more likely to make them see the error of their ways than anything else. And, as I 
have told you before, your appreciation of the position here would incidentally be 
of the greatest value to me.79  
 
The sanction of the ‘Big Five’ from Paris was not forthcoming and Seton-Watson did 
not want to join Clerk without formal authorisation.80   
Seton-Watson kept crusading nevertheless. His account of his activities in Paris 
where he was in close touch with the British – and even the American – delegation 
provides an illuminating sidelight into both his own lobbying for the cause of ‘the New 
Europe’ and the general atmosphere prevailing among British representatives in this 
question. At the conference he had a series of conversations with Balfour and his private 
secretary, Eric Phipps, who were in agreement with his views; he also spoke with 
‘J.W.H.M. [Headlam-Morley], H. Nicolson, Leeper, [Harold] Temperley, [Charles] 
Webster and others, and found that they did not need to be converted.’81 He was 
satisfied that Crowe and Sir William Tyrell, the Head of the Political Intelligence 
Department, were ‘solid in these views’ as well. However, Philip Kerr, private secretary 
to Lloyd George, ‘who has latterly come to count more with L. G. in foreign political 
questions than all the rest of the Delegation put together’ proved to be ‘even more 
doctrinaire and nebulous in his ideas than he used to be’ particularly in respect of Bela 
Kun’s communist dictatorship and Hungarian affairs generally.82 Seton-Watson was 
apprehensive lest Lloyd George might impetuously force a decision concerning 
Hungary and thought it necessary that ‘efforts had to be concentrated on preventing 
this’. As it happened, there was nothing to fear as the Prime Minister eventually 
acquiesced in the Foreign Office policy.     
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Romania had problems similar to those of Czechoslovakia. Like his colleague 
Gosling, Rattigan was also engaged in advocating the case of a minority – the large 
Hungarian population in Transylvania - and warning of the disrepute into which 
Romania could be brought by maladministration of her new provinces.83 Romanian 
Prime Minister, Ion Brătianu, was greatly dissatisfied with the treatment meted out to 
Romania at the peace conference and in particular with the minorities clause.84 His 
demeanour made him the most unpopular figure in Paris. Even Leeper, probably the 
most pro-Romanian Briton, was exasperated with such obstinacy: ‘There’ve been a 
good many difficulties too over the much misrepresented Minority Treaty: what could 
one expect with Brătianu and Pašić [Serb and later Yugoslav Prime Minister].’85 King 
Ferdinand of Romania expressed the hope that the minorities clause would be either 
dropped or modified in such a way so as not to contravene the sovereign rights of 
Romania.86 As it stood the clause aroused a great deal of indignation in the country and 
made it impossible for any government to accept it.  
Rattigan confirmed that the Romanian Liberal government headed by brothers 
Ion and Vintilă Brătianu were determined to establish a thorough government 
monopoly in the field of commerce and industry excluding foreign capital. The Minister 
thus believed that British enterprise should wait for the disappearance from public life 
of the Liberals and the worst forms of ‘corruption for which this country is so 
notorious.’87   
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 Having refused to sign the peace treaty of St. Germain with Austria containing 
the disputed minorities clause, Brătianu resigned and King Ferdinand struggled to form 
a new government. Rattigan recommended that the prospect of some modification of 
the minorities clause should be offered to the Transylvanian leader, Iuliu Maniu, so that 
he could accept the premiership and form a more reliable cabinet than his predecessor’s. 
Failing that the country might drift into anarchy and cease to be a bulwark against 
communism. The Foreign Office, however, declined to authorise his suggestion.88 
Leeper believed that Brătianu’s resignation had been undertaken for the purposes of 
domestic policy: discredited on account of his corrupt and tyrannical methods of 
government and the failure to obtain support for his proposals at the Peace Conference, 
he decided to try and recover his diminishing political standing by rallying popular 
nationalistic clamour behind him on the issue which he gauged as offering him a chance 
of scoring a victory over the Entente Powers.89 Thus, Leeper argued, contrary to 
Rattigan, that a firm attitude towards Brătianu which would face the Romanians with a 
clear choice between the acceptance of the principle of the protection of national 
minorities, on the one hand, and a definite break with the Allies, on the other, was more 
likely to swing the country at large in the desired direction and bring about the downfall 
of the Liberals. It was Leeper’s advice that prevailed not just in the Foreign Office but 
also in the Supreme Council at Paris. An ultimatum was duly delivered to Romania 
under the duress of which the Bucharest government gave way and attached its 
signature to the Austrian peace treaty.      
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1.2. Habsburg Restoration 
  
The ex-emperor of Austria-Hungary, Karl IV Habsburg, remained politically 
active even after he had been forced to relinquish the exercise of imperial power. His 
efforts centred on presenting a carefully argued case to the victorious Allies. In a 
lengthy conversation with Lord Acton of the British Embassy in Berne, Karl’s supporter 
and his last Chancellor, Professor Lammasch, mapped out a scheme for the creation of 
‘a loose confederation of neutral republics including Upper and Lower Austria, 
Salzburg, the Tyrol, the Vorarlberg, the German portions of Styria and Carinthia and the 
German portions of Hungary.’90 He showed a distinct sympathy for the former emperor 
but avoided mentioning his name in connexion with the plan he put forward. However, 
the Foreign Office was not impressed in the slightest with Lammasch’s arguments and 
passed on a harsh judgement: ‘Professor Lammasch’s statements are at the very best 
half true and his schemes seem fantastic.’91 Karl was fully engaged in the campaign 
himself and was reported to have stressed ‘that he constitutes sole possible link which 
could be utilised by Allies for the purpose of effecting an economic union between 
portions of former Austro-Hungarian Empire’.92 According to information received by 
the British, a good deal of the French Embassy’s staff was well disposed to 
recommending his utterances to their government.93     
In a secret political report from Vienna concerning the progress of the royalist 
movement on Austrian soil it was pointed out that headway had not been made, the 
general tendency being to await the restoration of a king in Hungary.94 Royalists were 
anxious to find out firstly what would be the attitude of the British government in the 
event of a Habsburg restoration, and secondly what the chances were of inducing a 
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British prince to accept the crown.95 Another secret report written only twelve days 
earlier revealed strong monarchical feeling among the officers of the Austrian Army, 
ardent adversaries of the present political and social conditions, who believed that the 
re-establishment of the Monarchy was about to happen in Hungary and would be 
followed by the march of the Hungarian Army into Austria in order to proclaim a 
monarchy there as well, a contingency they looked forward to and to which end they 
were willing to join their Hungarian comrades.96 An uprising in the Yugoslav province 
of Croatia was also expected as a result of resistance to being ruled by Belgrade. Having 
received these reports the Foreign Office’s official A. W. G. Randall dismissed the idea 
of any organised movement on the part of Austrian royalists.97    
Karl’s attempt to win over British support for his projected confederation got 
underway in the summer of 1920 when, acting on his behalf, the Marquis de Castellane, 
met the newly appointed British minister in Paris, Lord Hardinge, and suggested to him 
a secret meeting between the ex-emperor and some distinguished British representative, 
the object of which would be a discussion of the proposed union of the Danubian 
states.98 He handed over to Hardinge a paper written by Karl himself explaining the 
advantages of confederation, but this attempt to link the person of the ex-emperor with 
the necessity of facilitating commercial intercourse along the Danube turned out to be 
counterproductive:    
Economic agreements & regular co-operation between the different Danubian states 
may be most desirable & provision is made in the final version of article 207 of the 
Hungarian peace treaty for giving any such movements every encouragement. But 
the sort of pressure on our Allies the ex-Emperor suggests seems to me not only 
unjustified but the surest way to defeat the movement – all the more if these states 
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connected the name of the ex-Emperor with the plan which they would look on as 
an attempt to revive the Habsburg monarchy.99
 
The fact that Castellane did not receive an outright rebuttal sufficed for him to continue 
his advances and nearly two months later he was at the Embassy in Paris, again with the 
same proposals, this time thoroughly elaborated in several memoranda.100 The Marquis 
transmitted the papers which put forward the case for a Danubian Federation under the 
auspices of the ex-emperor, but the idea met with a frosty reception in the Foreign 
Office where it was deemed ‘undeserving of serious consideration’ not least as it 
seriously put to the test the patience of its reader.101  
The New Europe group could have been counted on to resist returning to the old 
and inopportune solutions. After referring to Seton-Watson’s article on Joseph 
Habsburg, the then Hungarian head of state, Leeper reassured him: ‘but don’t fear the 
danger from that side much. Pro-Danubians are very much at a discount.’102 Leeper 
zealously fought against pro-Habsburg intrigues at the Peace Conference and sent word 
to Seton-Watson: ‘I’m also having pretty good tussles over Hungarian & other things & 
if I can, as I’m now somewhat rashly trying, down & damn Habsburgism for good & 
ever, I can die happy!’103  
Leeper’s words were soon acted upon. It was with a view to the danger of an 
attempt to reinstate the Archduke Joseph that Lord Derby proposed a resolution, which 
would be accepted on 2 February 1920, unequivocally stating that the restoration of the 
Habsburg dynasty would be ‘neither recognised nor tolerated’ by the Allied Powers.104 
Italy and Yugoslavia reaffirmed this undertaking by their anti-Habsburg convention of 
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12 November 1920 which formed a part of the Rapallo Treaty setting down the frontiers 
between the two countries.105  
The underground activities of the ex-emperor’s adherents showed a marked 
persistence nevertheless. Cunninghame wrote a secret memorandum on 17 October 
1920 in which he drew attention to the Papal influence over Karl Habsburg and also 
pointed out French support of the latter.106 The Foreign Office did not take seriously 
Cunninghame’s warnings about French backing - Crowe discounted them as 
‘fantastic’.107 Time and again the Central Department resolutely pronounced itself 
against the Archduke Joseph or any other Habsburg.108 The real depth of the legitimist 
feeling in Hungary seems to have been difficult to gauge. Clerk observed from 
Budapest that, although the Hungarians were deeply imbued with the monarchical idea, 
the majority of thinking people fully realised that a Habsburg restoration would be 
neither practical nor desirable in light of the ill-feeling existing as a result of the recent 
past and the clear signs that the Entente Powers would not countenance it. He reported 
how a number of persons and deputations of various political persuasions had impressed 
on him  
with startling and almost embarrassing earnestness, that the ardent desire of the 
Magyar nation is that an English Prince should come here and reign as their King. 
England, they say, is the one country towards which they look with veneration and 
trust,  whose institutions and ideas they regard as fundamentally in harmony with 
their own, and on whose aid and sympathy they base all they hopes of moral and 
material resuscitation. With the aid of an English King, at whose hands they would 
gratefully accept and adopt English ideas, institutions and habits of thought, it 
would be possible, they maintain, for Hungary to emerge from her disaster and 
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despair, and become a corner-stone of England’s policy in Europe, a pillar of 
stability in Eastern Europe, and a faithful rampart against Germany, should she ever 
become strong enough once more to resume her policy of encroachment towards 
the East.109   
 
Clerk believed that Hungary could, after signing a peace treaty, really proceed to invite 
an English prince to fill her vacant throne. On the other hand, the High Commissioner, 
Athelstan-Johnson, was ‘reluctantly coming to the conclusion that the Hungarians are 
determined to have a Habsburg King, and that the only other solution is a Republic, 
which no one desires.’110 He considered that that king would not necessarily have to be 
Karl but some other member of the family.   
 In reply to Athelstan-Johnson’s admonition, Lord Curzon fully explained the 
reasons which to his mind heavily weighed against any such contingency:   
It appears to me that the chief hope for the future prosperity of Hungary lies in the 
abandonment of such dreams as Hungarian political parties seem freely to indulge 
in of recovering the position that Hungary formerly held in Central Europe which 
was symbolised by the Habsburg Dynasty. While much may depend on the attitude 
of Hungary’s neighbours, the Hungarian people themselves, by turning from these 
impossible aspirations to the reconstruction of their country and the renewal of 
relations with their neighbours, can best work for the renewal of their prosperity. 
For these reasons, and in the general interests of peace in Central Europe, it appears 
essential that His Majesty’s Government and the Allied Powers should not relax the 
ban they have pronounced on the Habsburg Dynasty, for the restoration of this 
dynasty could not fail to ruin all prospects of future cooperation between the 
Danubian States.111
 
 
 
 
1.3. The formation of the Little Entente 
 
While the campaign of the ex-emperor was underway the successor states 
arduously worked to counter what they saw as reactionary developments. The Yugoslav 
Defence Ministry submitted a memorandum to the Cabinet arguing for a rapprochement 
with Czechoslovakia as early as November 1919 and instructed its Military Attaché at 
Prague to convey a message to the Czechoslovak Defence Ministry to the effect that 
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Yugoslavia would gladly accept an initiative on the part of the Czechoslovak 
government for closer collaboration.112 When, early in 1920, the question of kingship 
was acute in Hungary they joined forces to bring pressure to bear on the Conference of 
Ambassadors, an inter-allied executive organ of the Entente after the war, and obtained 
the resolution of 2 February.113 In fact, the Yugoslavs, Romanians and Czechoslovaks 
wanted all dynasties which had waged war on the Entente Powers and the smaller allies 
to be explicitly forbidden from taking the reins of government.114   
 The determined opposition to a Habsburg restoration on the part of the successor 
states stemmed from deep-rooted reasons. Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia 
had sizeable Magyar and German national minorities that would be naturally attracted to 
a Habsburg monarchy to which, after all, they had pledged their allegiance for centuries. 
This ethnic divide between the once oppressed and once dominating nations was 
compounded by the social differences and antipathies felt between the ruling aristocratic 
Hungarian class and the democratically-minded leadership of the successor states which 
originated from peasant masses. For the latter Habsburg rule embodied all that the 
former stood for.   
British diplomatic representatives, or at least those who were sympathetic 
towards the new states, captured those sentiments and understood their force in a way 
that was perhaps difficult for anyone who did not reside in a successor country. When 
the resolve of the successor states came to be tested in 1921, the British Minister in 
Belgrade was very explicit in this respect:  
It seems incredible that a virile race like the Serbs should really be so nervous in 
regard to the Habsburgs and the [concealing and smuggling of] arms of a 
reactionary Hungary, but perhaps one does not take into sufficient account the 
sullen suspicions of a relatively ignorant peasant state. What the Serbs would like 
to see would be the Establishment of a social-democrat Government at Budapest. 
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They cannot bear to think of Hungarian magnates exercising their influence 
amongst the governing circles in the west.115  
    
Clerk almost mirrored that appreciation from Prague: 
 
In the first place, it is necessary to realise that both Czechs and Hungarians have an 
exaggerated fear of each other’s iniquitous designs. The average Hungarian regards 
every Czech as a Bolshevik, and the Czech Government as animated by the sole 
desire of upsetting the existing régime in Hungary and setting up a new Bela Kun 
Government in Budapest. The average Czech looks on every Hungarian as an 
irredentist reactionary who does nothing but conspire against this country and will 
not rest content until Czechoslovakia is once more under the domination of a 
Habsburg sovereign, carefully controlled by Hungarian magnates. Such an 
atmosphere is not conducive to a calm and objective consideration of events, but it 
has to be taken into account.116  
 
Against such a background any sign of leniency towards Hungary on the part of the 
Great Powers was viewed with suspicion and barely concealed displeasure. ‘How 
frequently have I not reported to your Lordship that at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
in Belgrade the favourite phrase is that we are the dupes of the Magyars!’, exclaimed 
Young who went on to express his fear that dangerous consequences could spring from 
such frame of mind. ‘And I must confess that the pronounced pro-Hungarian views 
acquired by our officials, travellers and business men have always alarmed me lest the 
Succession States should feel it their urgent interest to have it out with Hungary before 
this latter had had time to consolidate this sympathy into a closer connection.’117   
On 14 August 1920 Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia signed a defensive treaty 
directed against Hungary, thus initiating the alliance which came to be known as the 
Little Entente. When Beneš stated that it was directed against the policy of reviving the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire in the form of a Danubian Confederation, Phipps found it to 
be a clear indication ‘what the Czech & Serb attitude would be’ towards the project 
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advocated by the Marquis de Castellane.118 Young took a speech made by the Yugoslav 
Prime Minister, Milenko Vesnić, on the occasion of the banquet given in Beneš’s 
honour, to be as much directed against French flirtations with Hungary as against 
Hungarian revanchism itself.119 His report brought out a complexity of motives and 
considerations which had animated the signatories. Wary of the sudden and unwelcome 
initiatives on the part of the Great Powers, the alliance should, in general terms, render 
them stronger and thus more independent of the Western Powers, while in its literal 
scope it should ensure the strict execution of the Trianon Treaty by resisting 
modifications which the Principal Allies themselves might be prepared to condone.120 
Another great incentive for the treaty was to guard the economic independence of the 
succession states which, if compromised, might open the way for the imposition of the 
feared political solutions - the French capitalists’ action in Hungary being a compelling 
example. In this connexion Young pointed out the British role in arousing these sort of 
anxieties: ‘The tendency of our own men of affairs to expect the Yugo-Slavs to enter 
into business combinations of which the headquarters are at Vienna or Budapest has 
doubtless had its influence in preparing the ground for a joint resistance to any 
restoration of Austrian or Hungarian economic domination.’121   
Young’s observations made little impression in the Foreign Office. In fact, it 
was expected that, along with the improved stability, the Little Entente understanding 
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might have beneficial effects on economic relations in Central Europe.122 Curzon was 
hopeful that following the entry into force of the Treaty of Saint Germain the successor 
states would be inclined to adopt a friendly attitude towards Austria, particularly in 
commercial matters. He noticed that Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia did not view 
Austria with the suspicion they showed towards Hungary and thought it possible ‘that if 
the Austrian Government adopt the line of policy which I permitted myself to 
recommend to Baron Franckenstein [the Austrian Minister in London], Austria ought 
even before long to be invited to enter the Little Entente.’123   
 On the whole, the British took a favourable view of the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav 
treaty. ‘There could be no better or more justified reply to French & Italian intrigues in 
S. E. Europe’, Leeper averred.124 Moreover, by way of commenting on Rattigan’s 
account of the critical remarks made by one of the Romanian opposition leaders, 
Alexandru Marghiloman, about the inception of the Little Entente and the figures 
behind it, Lord Curzon impressed on the Minister that Marghiloman should not ‘be 
encouraged to describe as a farceur so able and so loyal a friend of Great Britain as M. 
Beneš.’125 Curzon defined the British attitude in the following terms:  
For your guidance in any future conversation on similar subjects  with Roumanian 
politicians, I have to inform you that, in general, the policy described as that of the 
‘Little Entente,’ so long as it is purely defensive in character and based on the 
maintenance of Treaties of Peace, meets with the full approval of Her Majesty’s 
Government, more particularly as it provides safeguard against the dangerous 
intrigues to which both the French and Italian Governments appear to have lent 
themselves in the course of the past year.126  
 
 There was another important consideration which seems to have contributed to 
the British approval. The Little Entente’s coming into being coincided with the climax 
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of the Soviet-Polish war which saw the Red Army at the gates of Warsaw. As opposed 
to the French policy of supporting the Polish war effort to the extent of toying with the 
desperate idea of arming the Hungarian forces in order to make a stand against the 
Soviets at the Carpathians - Lloyd George favoured a negotiated piece. Prague and 
Belgrade fully sympathised with the British point of view on grounds of both an intense 
dislike of any combination that could benefit Hungarian rearmament and an ardent 
desire to keep out of the conflagration.127 No wonder then that Maurice Hankey, the 
secretary to the cabinet, after having discussed the position with Masaryk in Prague, 
noted with satisfaction in his diary that the President’s opinions entirely corresponded to 
his own.128     
Rattigan voiced the only doubt as to the virtue of the Little Entente; and that on 
the basis of its likely demoralising effect on Budapest: ‘I cannot help thinking that it is a 
mistake to force Hungary into the position of a pariah, even though it may be largely her 
own fault.’129  
 Romanian participation was hanging fire for the time being due to internal party 
bickering.130 In his conversation with Lloyd George in London the Romanian Foreign 
Minister, Take Ionescu, spoke of an agreement between Romania, Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia and Greece and even of the inclusion of Poland in the Little Entente.131 Off 
the record, however, he admitted that he was pessimistic as to the inclusion of Poland, 
but that he had to make the attempt nevertheless for reasons of domestic party 
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politics.132 The British Prime Minister was hostile to the accession of Poland as he 
entertained the gravest apprehension in respect of the dangerous policy of Marshal Józef 
Pilsudski. At about the same time, Beneš confirmed Clerk’s impression that Romania 
was far from joining the Czecho-Yugoslav alliance and that she was more inclined 
towards Poland.133 The dilemma of Romania’s adherence to the Czechoslovak-
Yugoslav alliance was to be resolved in connexion with the dramatic events of the 
following year.  
 
 
 
1.4. Two Abortive Karlist Putsches  
 
 On 24 March 1921 Karl Habsburg sneaked out of his exile in Switzerland and 
reached Hungary via Austria.134 The next day a long dramatic meeting between Horthy 
and his sovereign took place during which the former refused to accept Karl’s 
assurances concerning the alleged French backing for his venture and declined to hand 
over the reins of government.135 The Regent persuaded the ex-emperor to leave 
Hungary which the latter, after having stayed in the countryside for another week, 
eventually did under the protection of the officers of the Entente Powers. The escapade 
was met by a firm attitude on the part of Hungary’s neighbours who threatened to use 
force in order to evict Karl from the country.    
 Sir Thomas Hohler, the High Commissioner and later first British Minister in 
Hungary, vigorously expounded the case of the Hungarian government which, he was 
convinced, had had no previous knowledge of Karl’s intentions and had been faced with 
extremely difficult situation on the latter’s arrival in the country. In his view Horthy had 
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acted with the utmost correctness throughout the crisis, a stance which was fully 
accepted and appreciated in London.136 Young, on the other hand, stressed the 
determination of Hungary’s neighbours to ensure the strictest observance of the Trianon 
Treaty which would keep Hungary in her enfeebled state and thus provide the only 
guarantee of dealing effectively with any similar attempts at restoration.137 The Entente 
Powers stood by their smaller allies but the militant reaction in Prague and Belgrade 
caused some anxiety in London. Although he admitted that the Little Entente’s 
insistence on the exclusion of the Habsburgs was unobjectionable in itself, Alexander 
Cadogan of the Central Department thought that ‘their action is certainly unnecessary 
and probably injudicious.’138 Having received contradictory information as to the 
complicity of the French in the putsch139 - even the Prime Minister Aristide Briand was 
mentioned in this respect - the Foreign Office was inclined to believe the authenticity of 
the ex-emperor’s allegations.140  
 The episode had an important and lasting consequence. Romania joined the 
Little Entente and rounded up the process of its formation: she signed the agreement of 
alliance with Czechoslovakia just eighteen days after Karl’s expulsion from Hungary. A 
similar agreement between Romania and Yugoslavia followed on 7 June 1921. Back in 
Switzerland the ex-emperor did not abandon his hopes of regaining the crown. Colonel 
Cunninghame warned that the Habsburg bid for the recapture of the crown of St. 
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Stephen was by no means ended, but his admonition was discounted in the Foreign 
Office.141  
 The final act of Karl’s drama took place on 21 October 1921 when he and Zita 
flew into Hungary, gathered some loyal troops in the town of Sopron and descended on 
Budapest. Horthy showed himself prepared to react with force and the ex-emperor was 
stopped after a minor skirmish on the outskirts of the capital. The Little Entente reacted 
even more decisively than in March and mobilisation was ordered and implemented in 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, though not in Romania.  
 Hohler was adamant that the Hungarian government was in no way responsible 
for Karl’s second adventure.142 He took a leading part in handling the crisis. Horthy 
deferred to Hohler’s advice, approved by Curzon, not to undertake mobilisation in order 
to meet any eventual attack by the Little Entente forces.143 In consultation with the 
British and other Entente Ministers, the Budapest government decided to place 
themselves entirely in hands of the Allies.144 Such a reasonable attitude could not have 
failed favourably to impress Whitehall.   
 On the other hand, seeing that the Little Entente countries, particularly 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, were continuing their military preparations against 
Hungary, the Foreign Office instructed its Ministers in Prague, Belgrade and Bucharest 
to impress strongly on the respective governments that any action would, in the view of 
the Entente Powers, place them in the wrong and alienate the sympathy of the world.145 
When the Little Entente’s demands were officially submitted to the Conference of 
Ambassadors, the latter accepted only that which called for the forfeiture of the crown 
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by whole of the Habsburg dynasty and requested the Little Entente to demobilise.146 
Acting on strict instructions Young had a frank interview with the Yugoslav Deputy 
Prime Minister Trifković. Having been met with the ‘usual jibe that we are ever friends 
of Hungary’s’, Young replied ‘that [the] sight of three strong States descending on [an] 
unarmed country which was trying to carry out its obligations under difficult 
circumstances would effectually give reality to this imaginary sympathy.’147 In his 
analysis of the reasons behind Belgrade’s determination to deal drastically with what 
was perceived to be Hungarian defiance, Young remarked that  
opinion seems to be growing amongst governing classes of the West that situation 
created by treaty of Trianon cannot endure. Serbs are aware of this and feel the 
necessity for giving a knockout blow to the centres from which these hopes radiate. 
Names of personages who composed Charles’ Government caused almost a bigger 
shock to the Serbs that the return itself.’148  
 
 The Ambassadors’ Conference tried to strike a balance between Hungary and 
her neighbours by issuing simultaneous notes to the former requesting her to declare all 
the Habsburgs to have been barred from wearing the crown of St. Stephen and to the 
latter to refrain from military measures. At the beginning of November the Hungarian 
National Assembly passed a law which excluded the House of Habsburg from the 
throne and undertook to arrive at an understanding with the Great Powers before 
making a decision as to the kingship question. The Conference of Ambassadors 
arranged for the former sovereign to be removed from Hungary on a British vessel. He 
was later interned on the Portuguese island of Madeira where he died in April 1922.    
                                                 
146 DBFP, XXII, No. 435, Curzon to Hardinge, 27 October 1921; No. 458, Hardinge to Curzon, 29 
October 1921; The rejected demands were: the invalidation of the Venice protocol of 11-13 October 1921 
signed by Austria and Hungary with Italian mediation by the terms of which the latter country retained 
through means of plebiscite a part of the Burgenland province apportioned to the former by the original 
provisions of the Trianon Treaty which was intensely disliked by the Little Entente as being a breach of 
the original peace treaty; the official Little Entente’s participation in the Commission of Control for 
Hungarian disarmament; indemnification by Hungary for costs of mobilisation.     
147 DBFP, XXII, No. 472, Young to Curzon, 29 October 1921.   
148 DBFP, XXII, No. 441, Young to Curzon, 28 October 1921; the estimate in the last sentence seems to 
have been confirmed by the report which Milojević sent to Belgrade at the time of the first putsch. See 
AJ, Budapest Legation, 396-19-40, Milojević to Ninčić, 30 March 1921, confidential no. 461. Hohler 
seized Young’s dispatch to express his own doubts – and his French colleague’s – as to the durability of 
the Trianon settlement. See TNA, Hohler to Curzon, 28 October 1921, C 20748/180/21, FO 371/6107; 
also DBFP, XII, No. 78, Hohler to Curzon, 1 February 1920.      
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 The unwillingness of Prague and Belgrade to disband their massed troops 
caused a high pitch of annoyance in the Foreign Office. Nevertheless, Hohler’s 
intimations about their sinister designs were deemed too alarmist: ‘It is ridiculous of 
Czechs and Yugoslavs with their vast armies to pretend that they are now in any danger 
from Hungary, and their attempts to precipitate a crisis, after declaring themselves 
satisfied with solution of Habsburg succession question… are dishonest.’149 Karl’s 
second attempted putsch aroused among British diplomats a keener appreciation of the 
serious security challenges involved in the Danube region. From his observation point 
in Vienna, which had not been directly affected by the exciting events of 1921, Lindley 
appears to have spoken everyone’s mind when he concluded:   
The somewhat melancholy fact remains that, three years after the end of the great 
war, the governing factor in the situation in Central Europe is universally 
recognised as being, not right or justice, but the possession of stout-hearted troops 
ready and willing to take the field in any cause. I submit that this state of things 
makes it the more incumbent on Great Britain, whose most vital interest is the 
return of peaceful and normal conditions, to keep a watchful eye on this important 
region, and to guard against the idea gaining ground that the proceedings of 
Balkanised Europe are of no vital importance to us.150
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 British policy towards Central Europe in the aftermath of the war was 
conspicuous in lacking well-defined objectives. The only undisputed view was that it 
was indispensible to promote economic cooperation between the successor states of the 
defunct Austria-Hungary which was a precondition for their own well being as well as 
beneficial for British trade. The first necessity was to stabilise the new order which was 
threatened by the unsettled internal conditions in the individual countries, most notably 
Hungary, and to ameliorate the tensions between them arising from the peace settlement 
which pitted Hungary against her neighbours. The New Europe group of British 
                                                 
149 DBFP, XXII, No. 505, Hohler to Curzon, 7 November 1921; No. 507, Hohler to Curzon, 8 November 
1921; No. 516, Curzon to Hardinge, 10 November 1921 [quoted].  
150 DBFP, XXII, No. 538, Lindley to Curzon, 24 November 1921.     
 50
diplomats, inspired by Seton-Watson’s views, was predominant in the British 
Delegation at Paris and favoured supporting the successor states. It was challenged by 
certain political and military officials deployed in the region who took a poor view of 
the new order but those were unable to alter the policy of the Foreign Office. The latter 
was to a great extent determined not just by the number of officials favouring the ‘New 
Europe’ policy but also by the actual situation on the ground.   
 Hence, the Central Department disliked suggestions of a Danubian 
Confederation which, if connected with the person of the ex-emperor Karl Habsburg, 
were bound to fail however commendable the objectives of such a confederation might 
be. A determination to resist the imposition of a Danubian Confederation which sprang 
from a plethora of interlinked motives, the common denominator of which was a 
resolve to secure economic and political independence, accounted for the formation of 
the Little Entente alliance between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia which would later 
be joined by Romania. It met with a favourable reception on the part of the British who 
deemed it an adequate response to French and Italian intrigues and a suitable means of 
stabilising Central Europe. It was even hoped that it might serve as a stepping stone for 
a broader cooperation among the Danubian countries in accordance with British 
recommendations. 
 Be that as it may, the Little Entente was soon to face the test for which it had 
been forged and it successfully opposed Karl’s repeated attempts to reclaim the 
Hungarian throne. The dramatic events of 1921, however, brought about a visible shift 
in British perceptions of the region’s security. The Horthy regime proved itself, in the 
Foreign Office’s eyes, to be loyal, correct and pacifist whereas the Little Entente’s 
actions in threatening to use force of arms constituted a real danger to peace. This 
perception would be a lasting feature and have a profound impact on British security 
policy in Central Europe in the years to come.        
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE ATTITUDES AND CALCULATIONS DETERMINING BRITISH POLICY 
TOWARDS DANUBIAN EUROPE, 1921-1925 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Emerging victoriously from the battle against the Habsburgs, the Little Entente had 
proved that it was a force to be reckoned with. British diplomacy now had to deal with 
new aspects of international politics introduced by the establishment of the alliance. In 
devising and conducting a policy towards the Little Entente countries, and addressing 
the security issues of Central Europe that were involved, the Foreign Office operated on 
a variety of perceptions, prejudices and convictions that ultimately influenced and 
shaped its decisions.   
This chapter sets out to examine the origins and nature of the main factors which 
determined British attitudes and contributed to the formulation of foreign policy. In 
order to do this in a clear and comprehensive manner the theme is broken down into 
five sections. The first section will look at how British policy-makers perceived the 
security problems concerning each individual country of the Little Entente. It is argued 
here that perceptions of what was and was not conducive to peace and stability in the 
region stemmed from a general impression of the domestic solidity of the respective 
governments and their leading personalities as well as from the usual geo-strategic 
considerations pertaining to each country. In the second section, special attention will 
be given to the Foreign Office’s views of the vexed relations between Hungary and the 
Little Entente that cemented solidarity among the latter’s three members. The third 
section of the chapter will analyse the interaction of different government departments 
in the formulation of foreign policy towards Central Europe. More specifically, this 
section aims at demonstrating the powerful and overwhelming influence that British 
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financial institutions - namely the Treasury and the Bank of England - exerted over the 
Foreign Office and the War Office in questions of security and foreign affairs.  
Apart from its antagonistic relations with Hungary, the Little Entente presented 
a bloc of sufficient strength and importance to be considered as a significant factor in 
terms of its bearing on the broader European situation. The unsettled conditions of post- 
war Europe offered a few indications of the course that the development of the alliance 
might take. From the British perspective the alliance enjoyed special relations with 
France which were viewed with disfavour. This chapter suggests that the unfavourable 
attitude of the Foreign Office was not dictated by any specific anti-French policy, but 
was rather the result of certain vastly exaggerated views of the position and policies of 
the Little Entente countries in regard to France and vice versa. The fourth section of the 
chapter will outline the basic assumptions entertained at the Foreign Office about the 
relationship between the Little Entente and France, and analyse the reasons behind 
misapprehensions in that respect. Finally, the fifth section will outline a case in point - 
the British attitude towards the conclusion of the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty of 1924.    
 
 
2.1. The Little Entente Countries: the British Perspective 
The three Little Entente member-states each had, apart from the Hungarian 
danger, and, in the case of Yugoslavia and Romania, a potential threat from Bulgaria, 
separate and differing sets of security problems. To understand and analyse British 
policy towards the alliance in broad perspective it is first necessary to grasp the Foreign 
Office’s views on the chief security challenges and position of each country.  
Of all the successor states Czechoslovakia was the most consolidated in respect 
of both her internal and external standing in the immediate years after the war. To a 
large extent her relatively secure situation was due to the fact that she was not menaced, 
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unlike her two allies, by her big and powerful neighbour. To be sure, Germany was ever 
present in the minds of Czechoslovak statesmen as a worrying factor in the not so 
distant future when that country had regained its strength and recovered its status as a 
Great Power. At the time, however, this threat was not conceived of in terms of the 
imminent disintegration of the Czechoslovak state through the separation of the 
substantial German minority living in Bohemian lands. In addition to Germany’s 
weakness in the wake of the war, which precluded her from pursuing an aggressive 
foreign policy, the demand for the union of Bohemian Germans with the Weimar 
Republic had never actually materialised in the mayhem of post-war Europe. 
Historically, they had never belonged to the German Reich but to Austria, and all the 
resistance to their incorporation in the newly-created state, in itself not too energetic, 
was manifested with a view to staying under the rule of Vienna.1 Having established 
correct relations with Poland and Austria, which, even if it left something to be desired 
in the economic and political sphere, at least did not entail security risks from those 
quarters, and with allied Romania at her flank, the attention of Prague was primarily 
riveted on the intransigent Hungarians.  
The British Minister in Prague, Sir George Clerk, left a strong imprint on the 
way in which Prague’s policy was received and interpreted in the Foreign Office. In 
Clerk’s opinion Czechoslovakia had established herself ‘as a serious and responsible 
factor in the settlement of Europe’ due to the broad humanitarian principles Masaryk 
stood for and through the ‘sober and steady’ direction of the foreign policy commanded 
by Beneš.2 His unequivocal praise of the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister was justified 
by the latter’s unwavering pursuit of ‘promoting friendly relations with the 
                                                 
1 Bruegel, ch. 2; F. G. Campbell, Confrontation in Central Europe: Weimar Germany and 
Czechoslovakia, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 48-55; for a detailed account of the 
British views of Czech-German relations within Czechoslovakia see Cornwall, ‘A Fluctuating 
Barometer’, pp. 313-333.     
2 TNA, Annual Report on Czechoslovakia for 1921, 13 March 1922, C 4106/4106/12, FO 371/7392; for 
British perceptions of Masaryk see Hanak, ‘British Attitudes to Masaryk’, pp. 125-148.  
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neighbouring States, encouraging their political, economic and financial co-operation 
and reaching agreements with them.’ The one and only blot on this admirable picture of 
foreign policy was relations with the Hungarians, but this was no fault of Beneš. 
Whitehall endorsed such a view. The foreign policy of Czechoslovakia was regarded as 
a personal triumph of Beneš and his chief achievement was held to be the creation of the 
Little Entente which enabled ‘the three countries to speak with one voice in the allied 
councils.’3 It was principally through Beneš’s able guidance that the Little Entente 
acted as ‘a solid element of stability in central and eastern Europe.’4 ‘Czechoslovakia, 
which had its own dangers to face, is greatly strengthened by its two allies, and the 
latter are often restrained and guided into the paths of moderation by Dr. Benes’ wise 
councils’, Alexander Cadogan explained. Clerk tended to overrate the span of 
Czechoslovak policy insofar as he assumed that Beneš aspired to form a strong Central 
European bloc, including Poland, capable of holding its own between a revived 
Germany and Russia.5  
With all her comparative advantages, not least her sound and democratic 
government, Clerk was a firm believer in Czechoslovakia’s future. The Minister saw it 
as ‘the lynch-pin of Central Europe’ and thought that one day the Czechoslovak state 
would be ‘our best bridge into Russia’.6 For the same reasons he also considered that 
country to be best suited as a potential fulcrum of British policy in Central Europe. The 
Commercial Secretary at the Prague Legation, Bruce Lockhart, who fully shared Clerk’s 
views in regard to Czechoslovakia, advocated unequivocal British support for Beneš’s 
economic policy not only as the first step towards a gradual improvement of the 
economic life of Central Europe but also as ‘the surest guarantee against any attempts 
                                                 
3 TNA, memorandum entitled ‘Outstanding questions between His Majesty’s Government and certain 
foreign countries’, 7 November 1924, C 16914/16914/62, FO 371/9719. 
4 TNA, Memorandum by Cadogan, 18 October 1923, C 18727/437/12, FO/371/8575. 
5 DBFP, XXIV, No. 69, Clerk to Balfour, 25 May 1922; TNA, Annual Report on Czechoslovakia for 
1921, 13 March 1922, C 4106/4106/12, FO 371/7392.  
6 TNA, Clerk to Lampson, 5 September 1923, C 15698/56/12, FO 371/8572. 
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by Germany to build up again a German Mittel-Europa.’7 In October 1921 Clerk 
wholeheartedly supported the signature of the agreement founding the Anglo-
Czechoslovak Bank in Prague and personally lobbied for the Czechoslovak government 
loan to be raised in London in April 1922. In his view it was worth while for Britain to 
prop up Czechoslovak economic independence through direct financial connections 
with London as a precondition – as Beneš used to say - for that country’s political 
independence.8  
Yugoslavia provided most cause for concern about the maintenance of peace in 
the region. Her perennial conflict with Italy appeared to be the most dangerous hot-spot 
in post-war Europe. The dispute over the town of Fiume (Rijeka) was settled by an 
agreement concluded at Rome in January 1924 and accompanied by the Pact of 
Friendship that was supposed to usher in an era of good neighbourly relations. That was 
not to be the case. Albania provided a permanent stumbling block in these relations as it 
remained the arena of fighting between the parties sponsored by the Adriatic rivals. In 
the minds of the policy-makers in Belgrade Italian entrenchment in Albania was nothing 
short of the repetition of the unfortunate experience with the Austro-Hungarian mandate 
and the overt annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 1908, an analogy they never 
failed to draw to the attention of the representatives of ‘big’ allies ever since the Paris 
Peace Conference.9 They did not doubt for a moment that Italy intended to use that 
country as a springboard for further penetration in the Balkans. From the strategic point 
of view the Yugoslavs were frightened of the peril of the Italians ‘joining hands’ from 
Albania with the Bulgarians across the Vardar valley in Serb Macedonia, thus cutting 
                                                 
7 TNA, Memorandum by H. M. Commercial Secretary on the draft agreement concluded between the 
Czecho-Slovak Government and the Bank of England, enclosed in Clerk to Curzon, 14 October 1921, C 
19833/13400/3, FO 371/5786. 
8 TNA, Clerk to Curzon, 14 October 1921, C 19833/13400/3, FO 371/5786. 
9 Jugoslovenska država i Albanci, ed. by Ljubodrag Dimić and Djordje Borozan, 2 vols (Beograd: 
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Wilson [American President], undated; Jugoslovenska država i Albanci, II, No. 12, The position of the 
Yugoslav delegation in relation to the memorandum of 9 December 1919, 8 January 1920.  
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off the vital Belgrade-Salonica railway in much the same fashion as the Bulgarian army 
had actually done in 1915.10 The stance on the Albanian question was formed 
accordingly. The Yugoslav delegation at the Paris Conference plumped for the 
independence of Albania in her 1913 frontiers as sketched by the London Conference 
after the First Balkan War under the slogan ‘the Balkans for the Balkan peoples’.  
The British, however, did not recognise as defensive the stance taken by 
Belgrade and suspected that Yugoslavia was often more guilty than the Italians of 
stirring up trouble in the neighbouring state. The Central Department firmly believed 
that Yugoslavia, at least up to 1925, professed a desire for an independent Albania with 
a view to the elimination of Italian preponderance in that country and the establishment 
of her own dominance.11
In the Balkans the British judged Yugoslav-Bulgarian friction to be most 
troublesome. The bone of contention between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was the 
province of Macedonia.  Possession of the province, liberated from the Turkish rule 
during the First Balkan War in 1912 by the common effort of all Balkan states, gave rise 
to the Second Balkan War the following year. Serbia won a decisive victory against 
Bulgaria and had her way. The Bulgarians entered the First World War on the side of 
the Central Powers mainly to redress that bitter defeat, but failed once again.  
In the contest to vindicate two competing claims regarding the majority Slav 
population of Macedonia two theses clashed. The Serbian, later Yugoslav, thesis was 
that the Macedonians were part of the Serbian nation inhabiting the southern parts of 
their medieval empire. Sofia, however, regarded Macedonians as pure Bulgars and 
continued to demand that they should be recognised as such and granted minority rights 
in newly-founded Yugoslavia. The question was an exceptionally vexed one as the 
indigenous Slav inhabitants were akin to both nations who, after all, had so much in 
                                                 
10 Jugoslovenska država i Albanci, II, No. 14, Dr Trumbić’s [the Foreign Minister] expose at the meeting 
of the allied Prime Ministers on 10 and 12 January 1920. 
11 TNA, Minute by Sargent, 29 June 1931, C 5007/475/90, FO 371/15146.  
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common themselves in terms of origin, language, religion and culture. Belgrade 
vehemently denied the Bulgarian claim and argued that Macedonians could not be 
regarded as an ethnic minority according to the criteria set by the Covenant of the 
League of Nations.12 The senior Central Department officials acknowledged that there 
was a lot of legal force, at least on technical grounds, in this contention and deprecated 
the prospect of thrashing the question out before the League in vain.13   
Having made a tour of southern districts, the military attaché at Belgrade, 
Lieutenant-Colonel James Blair, concluded that the rank and file of the population was 
neither pro-Serb nor pro-Bulgar but was desirous of peace and ‘would be pro-any 
Government that governed them well.’14 King Alexander of Yugoslavia privately 
admitted the truth of such a view.15 In the final instance the British attitude was 
determined by practical considerations. Both the Ministers at Belgrade and Sofia, and 
their superiors in Whitehall, concurred that the assimilation of the Macedonian 
population within Serbia afforded ‘the best hope of permanent peace in the Balkans’ as 
it was believed that the terrorist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation’s 
(IMRO) demand for autonomy was only envisaged as the first step towards a union with 
Bulgaria which could thus bring about ‘an almost certain cause of future conflict.’16 
Belgrade was repeatedly advised to improve the administration in the southern province 
as the best means of facilitating a fast assimilation of the local population.  
The Bulgarian government was suspected of using the trouble instigated by 
IMRO to internationalise the Macedonian imbroglio as they nurtured a hope that their 
aspirations in regard to Macedonia might be realised at some more favourable juncture 
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13 TNA, Minute by Nicolson, 28 February 1924, C 3138/195/7; Minute by Nicolson, 5 March 1924; 
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15 TNA, Young to Macdonald, 24 January 1924, C 1558/195/7, FO/371/9659. 
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in the future.17 On the basis of its intelligence the Foreign Office deemed that the action 
undertaken by Sofia in order to discourage the comitadji raids was calculated mainly for 
the sake of appearance.18 On the other hand, the Bulgarian government was thought to 
be powerless against a well-organised Macedonian movement which had infiltrated the 
whole administrative apparatus of the state. In addition, it was believed that IMRO’s 
activity was welcome to the authorities as it provided them with a strong case to argue 
that the military weakness imposed on Bulgaria by the Neuilly Treaty was the sole 
reason for their inability to maintain order on their own soil.  
The Yugoslav envoy at London presented his superiors with a fairly penetrating 
analysis of British policy towards the Macedonian problem:  
It would be wrong to surmise that London is more favourably disposed to Bulgaria 
than to us; it is equally indifferent to both of us, and more sympathy is even 
extended to us. But English foreign policy wants peace both in Europe and in the 
Balkans, and for that reason wants good relations between Belgrade and Sofia, and 
sees only two solutions: either for us to grant a certain autonomy to Southern 
Serbia, or at least the schools, church and language, and thus disarm the Internal 
Macedonian Organisation and help the Bulgarian government to rid themselves of 
the Macedonians and establish good relations with us, which is all undoubtedly the 
thesis of the Bulgarian government, or that we, being a stronger party and a state 
which had obtained everything it could have expected on that side, calmly and 
patiently endure  the outrages of the Macedonian action until the latter dies out on 
its own. In anticipation of one or the other solution, and wanting to prevent the 
possibility of larger conflicts in cases of frontier and other incidents, although it 
knows to warn us as to the possibility of opening the Macedonian question anew, 
the Foreign Office gives advice of moderation prepared in advance both to Sofia 
and Belgrade, and views our mutual incriminations, as was written by the Times, as 
throwing stones on the neighbour’s glass house.19
  
 Given the bitter feeling existing between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria it was all the 
more surprising that some of the Central Department clerks believed that the only thing 
that could bring the two countries together was their common ‘desire to push Greece out 
of her new Aegean coastline’.20 Others were more sceptical. Sir Eyre Crowe, the 
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Permanent Under-Secretary of State, dismissed the idea out of hand: ‘There is no such 
policy in Serbia’.21 British perceptions of the likelihood of Yugoslav descent down the 
Vardar valley on the port of Salonica were heavily influenced by a deep mistrust and 
antipathy towards the veteran Prime Minister, Nikola Pašić, and his People’s Radical 
Party. The First Secretary of the Central Department, Harold Nicolson, was a 
mouthpiece of such views: ‘Mr Pašić is a danger to Europe. Old, obstinate, venerable 
and ingratiating he combines all the futilities of a Balkan politician with the appearance 
and prestige of an elder statesman. The only hope for Jugo Slavia is that he should 
disappear.’22 Even when other dire preoccupations of domestic and external policy 
seemed to have rendered the design on Salonica highly unlikely, the doubts were still 
alive, for ‘with M. Pasic one never knows!’23 This prejudice appears to have distorted 
the outlook on the true disposition of Yugoslav political factors in respect to ‘Vardar 
policy’. There is no compelling evidence of Pašić’s expansionist drive southwards and 
the British Minister in Belgrade, Sir Alban Young, was reluctant to take it seriously.24 
On the contrary, Vojislav Marinković, one of the leading figures of the Radicals’ rival 
Democratic Party and a future Foreign Minister (1927-1932), who was liked and 
respected by the British diplomats as a more enlightened and progressive statesman, 
was the one who contemplated a more assertive policy towards Greece. In his notes on 
the general tasks of Yugoslav foreign policy he included a need to ‘reduce Greece to her 
real ethnographic frontiers’.25  Young, on his part, hinted at ‘Mussolini’s 
encouragement to the Yugoslavs to extend to the Aegean’ as a possible source of all 
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rumours.26 If Yugoslavia channelled her alleged expansion towards the Aegean the 
Italians would gain an unchallenged mastery of the Adriatic.   
It is most exemplary of the endless and almost fantastic echoes of Balkan 
intrigue reverberating in London that in mid-1924 it was suspected, and later denied, 
that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, with the tacit support of Rome, had reached an agreement 
to gain access to the Aegean by joint action against Greece and seizure of the ports of 
Salonica, Dedeagatch and Kavalla respectively.27 When on 17 November 1924 
Belgrade denounced the Greco-Serbian alliance treaty of 1913, presumably to bring 
pressure to bear on Greece so as to make her more accommodating in providing railway 
facilities for the transport of goods from Yugoslav Macedonia to Salonica and force her 
to drop the minority convention concluded that September between her and Bulgaria,28 
new doubts arose among the Foreign Office officialdom. ‘Is this another manifestation 
of the anti Greek policy of Italy acting through a secret pact with Serbia?’ - wondered 
John McEwen, the Third Secretary of Central Department.29 Young’s report on the 
surreptitious dealings of the Italian Minister at Belgrade, General Bodrero, was not 
conducive to allaying the suspicions.30 It was even suspected in the Foreign Office that 
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General Bodrero was so influential with King Alexander after the conclusion of the Pact 
of Rome as to obtain the retention of Pašić’s radicals in office.31  
After Mussolini had repudiated the charge of encouraging Serbian 
adventurism,32 the Italian factor was quickly discounted and the Central Department 
went back to the issue of whether Yugoslavia, in a likely combination with Sofia, had 
cast her eye on the Aegean coast. As had been the case earlier, the Foreign Office 
diplomats could not agree in their assessment of the situation. While Eyre Crowe found 
the alleged designs rather speculative, Nicolson was convinced that what the Serbs 
wanted was ‘not the smooth running of the transit agreement through Salonica, - but 
Salonica itself’, and, moreover, he was sure that ‘one day they will get it.’33 Failing to 
make up his mind about what was really going on, the Chief of the Central Department, 
Miles Lampson, found it easiest to fall back on a not too ingenious gibe: ‘The average 
English mind is not so constituted as to be able to fathom the depths of Balkan 
intrigue.’34  
Nicolson supposed that a rapprochement between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, in 
spite of the burden of the past, might eventually lead to the formation of a formidable 
union of all the South Slavs. In his view such a union would not only be fraught with 
grave danger for Greece but also inimical to British interests: a powerful Slav state in 
possession of the Aegean littoral would likely fall within the Russian orbit when that 
country had recovered and might upset the naval balance in the Eastern Mediterranean 
without being susceptible to British naval pressure due to its large hinterland.35 The new 
                                                 
31 TNA, Minute by Bateman, 27 May 1924, C 8457/123/92. 
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33 TNA, Minutes by Crowe and Nicolson, 16 December 1924, C 18796/17537/19, FO 371/9897; After 
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question of how passing of Salonica to Yugoslavia would affect British strategic interest in the Eastern 
Mediterranean was taken up by the armed services. Both the Admiralty and the Air Ministry expressed 
preference for the maintenance of the status quo but were rather indifferent to the consequences of 
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Secretary of State, Sir Austen Chamberlain, and the rest of the Central Department did 
not share Nicolson’s concerns, but his thinking apparently made an impression as nearly 
two years later the belief still existed that Yugoslavia’s main aspiration was the creation 
of the great Slav Kingdom; and Foreign Office officialdom even predicted that after the 
Macedonian problem was settled ‘a Serb-Bulgar confederacy will become more 
feasible.’36     
 Aside from the insurmountable resentment of Pašić there was another 
consideration that raised mistrust in relation to Yugoslavia’s conduct of foreign affairs. 
It was widely known that the conspiratorial officers’ organisation called the White Hand 
wielded significant influence over the Yugoslav army, but the exact extent of its impact 
on the internal and external policy of the country remained a secret for the British 
military attaché.37 Of course, the very existence of such an underground and 
unpredictable influence did not fare well for the Foreign Office’s perception of 
Yugoslavia’s contribution to security and stability in the region. It also deepened a 
fundamental misunderstanding between the two countries. Yugoslavia was genuinely 
nervous in regard to the possibility of a general uprising of the defeated nations, a 
nervousness which was compounded by the unsatisfactory state of her military 
preparedness. The Central Department officials were prone to read into Yugoslav 
professions ulterior motives and a willingness to pre-empt perceived dangers by 
decisive military actions.38  
                                                                                                                                               
potential seizure of the port by Yugoslavs. See TNA, Lord Beatty’s [Admiralty] remarks, 5 June 1925 and 
Trenchard [Air Ministry] to Hankey, 8 June 1925, C 7798/798/19, FO 371/10767.   
36 TNA, Memorandum respecting the Balkan Problem and British Policy in the Balkans, 4 December 
1925, C 15882/8243/62, FO 371/10700.  
37 TNA, Annual Report on Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom for 1923; the French military authorities were 
similarly at sea in gauging the real influence of the White Hand and one of their reports simply stated that 
although its nature was an unknown quantity it nevertheless seemed quite influential. See Mile Bjelajac, 
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Srbije, 1994), p. 244.  
38 TNA, Minutes by Le Rougetel and Cadogan, 17 and 18 January 1923 respectively, C 749/72/92, FO 
371/8902. 
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 On the Yugoslav side that lingering suspicion was duly registered and 
comprehended chiefly in terms of time-honoured and deep-rooted notions of British 
policy towards the Slav populace of South-Eastern Europe. At the end of 1930 Foreign 
Minister Marinković expounded British reluctance to his friend, the Yugoslav envoy in 
Rome, Milan Rakić.  It was a result, he believed, of:  
innate distrust [towards the Yugoslavs] due to the difference in our characteristics 
and conceptions and long-standing prejudices against our people. For the whole 
century English policy was so orientated that we were always a nuisance whether as 
opponents of Turkey, or opponents of Austria, or opponents of Bulgaria. In such an 
old and traditional state that means a lot.39  
 
 The key feature of Yugoslav foreign policy, in Young’s view, was its inherent 
fluctuation in relation to the domestic struggle between pre-war Serbia and the old 
Austro-Hungarian provinces:  
In a sense the internal conflict is itself one between a Balkan and mid-European 
policy. Old Serbia is herself of the Balkans, and the struggle for the hegemony of 
Belgrade is a manifestation of the Serbian will to found the United Triune Kingdom 
on the Balkan rock rather than on the Danube sands. King Alexander, who is the 
guardian of the main lines of the foreign policy, has more than once emphasised to 
me that he can afford no loosening concessions to South Serbia, as it is there that 
the roots of the kingdom lie, and he has added that it is over those lands that the 
Serbians look towards the sea - a “Vardar” policy which requires little 
encouragement from the Italians…40
 
In Young’s analysis this dichotomy of Yugoslav foreign (and internal) policy could 
have a profound influence on the further development of the Little Entente. If the 
Belgrade government were to turn their eyes to the Balkans then the Central European 
policy would be purely defensive and strictly limited to the maintenance of the integrity 
of the peace treaties. But things could turn out differently: ‘the critical condition of 
                                                 
39 Milan Rakić Papers [property of the family], Marinković to Rakić, private, 30 December 1930, quoted 
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Slavs for the sake of Austria, not for the sake of Slavs.’39 Although pro-Austrian sentiment had been 
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Britain for March 1930 (Purić to Kumanudi, 1 April 1930, confidential number 210).   
40 TNA, Young to Chamberlain, 4 March 1925, C 3370/3066/62, FO 371/10699. 
 64
Austria and the consequent revival of the idea of the Danubian Confederation may 
possibly so develop as to drag Serbia out of her absorbed contemplation of the Balkans 
and to infuse fresh interest into her relations with the other members of the Little 
Entente’.41  
The uncertainties and dilemmas surrounding Yugoslavia made it prodigiously 
difficult for the Central Department to chalk out any defined and positive policy. It 
appeared abundantly clear that any prospect of maintaining peace and order in the 
Balkans, if not the whole of Central Europe, hinged upon the role of Yugoslavia whose 
position as a regional power south of the Danube was fully recognised. ‘It would be safe 
to give countenance to her authority in the Balkans if she were not given to sabre-
rattling and to administrative corruption’, read a typical reflection on the Yugoslav role 
in the region.42 At the same time Yugoslavia was believed to be the only country in the 
region with both a vested interest in the preservation of the status quo and a capacity for 
stability.  
Romania was endangered by Soviet Russia because of the dispute over the 
province of Bessarabia. Romanian troops had occupied it towards the end of the Great 
War as a matter of military expediency and a provisional Bessarabian Assembly of 
doubtful legitimacy and in doubtful circumstances then declared union with Romania.43 
In a comprehensive analysis prepared by the Historical Adviser of the Foreign Office, 
James Headlam-Morley, it was admitted that the Soviets had a strong case in regard to 
their refusal to recognise the validity of the severance of Bessarabia.44 In addition, it 
was admitted that Romanian possession of that province had been agreed on as means 
of offsetting some other matters, namely the evacuation of Hungary and the acceptance 
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43 For a detailed account of Bessarabian question see TNA, Memorandum by Headlam-Morley, 4 June 
1924, N 4852/493/38, FO 371/10486.  
44 TNA, Observations on the Memorandum by M. Rakovsky of April 30 about Bessarabia (written by 
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of minority treaties, with which Bucharest had had to comply. ‘There was something in 
a nature of a bargain, and for this reason we shall have to be very careful not to let the 
Roumanians down.’ Thus the Bessarabian situation was ‘rather awkward’ for the British 
and ‘the less we say or do the better’ policy seemed to be the best, if not only, course of 
action.45   
The only hope for a solution, Headlam-Morley asserted, lay in a direct 
agreement between the two parties that would acknowledge Romanian sovereignty over 
Bessarabia. While the Historical Adviser recommended that Britain should make every 
effort to facilitate such a settlement, the other Foreign Office officials could not see how 
that recommendation might be carried out.46  Headlam-Morley also pointed out to his 
colleagues in the Foreign Office that Britain could not afford for Bessarabia to be seen 
by other powers as a legal precedent, given the implications such a policy might have 
for the situation in Egypt, India or Ireland.47  
The position of Bucharest in an eventual military conflict with the Soviets was 
regarded as hopeless. The military appreciation was that the Soviets could take central 
and southern Bessarabia at will.48 In September 1922 the British General Staff was of 
the opinion that only Soviet military unpreparedness precluded an attempt to attack 
Romania.49 The Romanian hold on Bessarabia was deemed precarious as a large part of 
the population was dissatisfied owing to the military restrictions employed in the 
province and the Romanian government’s Bessarabian policy was characterised as high-
handed and oppressive. Given the circumstances the Foreign Office was relieved that 
the Bessarabian treaty sanctioning Bucharest’s possession of the province was not 
technically in force. The feeling was amplified as it was Britain that had ratified it in the 
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48 TNA, Memorandum compiled by Major F. A. Sampson, formerly Military Attaché at His Majesty’s 
Legation, Bucharest, 1 March 1932, C 2413/2413/37, FO 371/15992.   
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absence of other Great Powers. Romania’s confrontation with her mighty neighbour 
also burdened relations with her allies. Indeed, Nicolson thought that the Little Entente 
might founder on the Bessarabian question.50  
 Nevertheless, Romania’s problem with Hungarian irredentism was deemed to be 
far worse as there were nearly a million Magyars living in Transylvania alone who 
would ‘form a great danger to Romania for many years to come.’51 In a more 
favourable estimation for the Romanians it was said of the situation in Transylvania that 
‘if one could really get at the truth of the matter one would find that the fault lay very 
largely on both sides.’52 A more critical appreciation of the Romanian administration of 
the province led to an almost complete shift of responsibility onto Bucharest, whose 
ineptitude at conciliating the large Magyar minority was frowned upon.53  
 In addition, Romania had to be on her guard against Bulgaria for ‘filching’ the 
Dobrudja region in 1913 and there was no doubt in the Foreign Office that if the latter 
country regained her strength at some point recovery of the province would be a 
priority.54   
 The internal solidity of Romania was deemed by far the most precarious of all 
the successor states. Howard Smith gave expression to a unanimous opinion in 
Whitehall when he stated: ‘The Roumanians are corrupt and inefficient and have the 
worst army in Eastern Europe.’55 Similarly to Pašić’s government in Yugoslavia, the 
ruling methods of the Romanian Liberal Party, led by Brătianu and ‘honeycombed with 
dishonesty and corruption’, were considered a source of instability not just at home but 
in foreign affairs as well:  
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By creating a new Jugo Slavia and a greater Rumania, the Powers may have 
balcanised Central Europe, but they hoped that they had europeanised the Balkans. 
This expectation was at least premature. Both in Jugo-Slavia and in Rumania we 
have seen a cleavage widen between the old and the new provinces, and the 
divergence of culture and ideas which is the cause of this cleavage is so extensive 
and so profound that it is bound to form the main element not only in the internal 
but also in the external policy of the two countries. Neither M. Pasic nor M. 
Bratianu can bridge the gulf which has opened between the old and the new 
conceptions: until they both disappear, there can be no national foreign policy for 
either country, - there can only be the personal policy of M Pasic and M. Bratianu.56
 
 
 
 
2.2. Which Hungarian Government makes for stability?  
 
 The prospect of procuring any sort of détente between Hungary and the Little 
Entente resembled an attempt to square a circle. The government of Count István 
Bethlen, personal friend and close associate of Regent Horthy, who formed a cabinet 
following the second putsch of Karl Habsburg, though willing to drop the irksome 
kingship question, was neither willing nor able to abandon the sacred goal of restoring 
the Kingdom of St. Stephen. Nor could the Magyars’ neighbours have been expected to 
entertain the possibility of even the slightest change of the territorial status quo. How 
then was the deadlock to be broken? 
 The Little Entente countries quickly came to the conclusion that the matter was 
unsolvable as long as the ruling class of Hungarian magnates remained in control of the 
country’s foreign policy. By virtue of their upbringing and their traditional role in 
society they were completely imbued with the idea of a Great Hungarian Kingdom and 
it was illusory to expect any substantial change of policy while they were in charge.57 
Therefore, a radical departure in Hungarian policy required a radical change of regime. 
But conditions did not augur well for any such development. The leading opposition 
leaders, such as Count Mihályi Karolyi and Oszkár Jászi, who had been in power for a 
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short period of time after the armistice, and who later, under the strains of internal and 
external pressure, had handed the government to Bela Kun’s communists, were 
dispersed abroad. They had had to leave the country under the threat of the White Terror 
vigorously conducted by Horthy’s forces in the wake of Bela Kun’s downfall. Settled in 
the Little Entente countries, they did not count for much in Hungary.58 After the 
commotion of communist rule Britain herself contributed, particularly by means of the 
diplomatic mission headed by George Clerk on behalf of the Allied Supreme Council, 
to the consolidation of the government under Horthy, who soon came to be referred to 
as ‘our creation’.59 His rule was deemed indispensable if any semblance of order and 
stability were to be obtained in a country riddled with anarchy.   
 The domestic politics in Hungary and the attitude of neighbouring countries 
became a matter of dispute between the British Legations at Budapest and Prague. 
Surprisingly, it was the Commercial Secretaries who, in a manner most unusual for their 
posts, first broached the subject of the nature of the Hungarian government in relation to 
the prevalent enmity between the two states. In an ostensible attempt to explain the 
economic reasons behind Czechoslovak resistance to a Habsburg restoration, as well as 
the Little Entente’s insistence on disarmament, Richard Humphreys of the Budapest 
Legation embarked on a political analysis which concluded that the ultimate Czech goal 
was the imposition of a Socialist government on Hungary which could be made 
subservient to Czechoslovakia.60 His counterpart at Prague, Bruce Lockhart, felt 
compelled to refute such an analysis. Although confessing that Professor Masaryk, 
being ‘a Democrat and a Republican’, naturally preferred a less reactionary government 
to deal with, he ridiculed the idea:  
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I have some personal knowledge of the men who are responsible for the policy of 
the Czecho-Slovak state, and it is difficult to take seriously the idea of President 
Masaryk, as a bellicose and hot-headed statesman, plotting in the recesses of his 
library the overthrow of the Horthy régime in order to instal in Budapest a Socialist 
Government which would be amenable to the dictates of the Prague Imperialists.61     
 
At the beginning of 1924 Beneš intimated to Clerk his profound mistrust of the 
Hungarian regime and his preference for a government comprised of ‘opposite 
numbers’ of the ruling aristocracy, but he denied the allegations of active interference in 
the domestic affairs of another country.62 The British envoy was convinced that the 
Czech was sincere, believing that his political intelligence would discourage him from 
‘any such foolish and adventurous game as to intrigue with or subsidise the opposition 
leaders of a neighbouring country.’    
 Whatever had been the case at the end of 1921, when the question of the 
Hungarian reconstruction loan was raised two years later the Little Entente countries 
found that to be a good opportunity to exact a change of regime in Budapest. The 
initiative actually came from the leading Hungarian émigrés Karolyi, Jaszi and Béla 
Linder, who personally handed an aide-memoiré to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry in 
which a suggestion was mooted to connect the issue of the reconstruction loan with a 
change of government; the aide-memoiré was then forwarded to Prague and Bucharest 
with a recommendation to ‘support together the action of Hungarian emigration in this 
sense.’63  
 Still, for this scheme to have any chance of success a benevolent attitude on the 
part of the Great Powers was necessary and of that there was no sign. Britain, in 
particular, was averse to doing anything that might upset the Horthy regime. Goodwill 
towards the Hungarian government stemmed from the emphatic views tirelessly 
repeated by Sir Thomas Hohler, Minister at Budapest, renowned for his pro-Hungarian 
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bias,64 which was presumably reinforced by his long-standing friendship with Horthy, 
and by the high esteem in which he held Prime Minister Bethlen. In a frank and plain-
spoken letter to Lampson, Hohler wrote: 
But if he [Bethlen] or Horthy thought they could save their country by relinquishing 
their places, I’m sure they’d do it without hesitating. Only they certainly don’t think 
they would do any good by making room for Carolyi & Co. Nor do I: and I go 
further: I have a pretty strong personal liking and respect for both these men, but 
not by any means such as would blind me to their defects: but I think they are far 
the best men for their jobs that I know, men of character and honour and no little 
ability.65
    
Hohler also drew attention to the danger that the fall of the current government might 
bring about a more right-wing regime of the anti-Semitic Gyula Gömbös, which would 
spell disaster for Hungary herself and for peace in the region, rather then a pacifist 
cabinet of socialists. This argument weighed heavily in the mind of the Chief of the 
Central Department: ‘if Bethlen fell, Gombos would probably succeed him and the fat 
would then be well in the fire’.66  
In addition, the Minister at Budapest drew a rather black and white picture of 
relations in the Danubian region in which Beneš was cast in the role of a villain bent on 
the destruction of Hungary. As one of the Foreign Office clerks succinctly put it: ‘Benes 
is Mr. Hohler’s King Charles’ head in annual reports, dispatches & letters always 
appearing with distorted features.’67 Hohler’s assessment of the insidious schemes 
hatched in Czechoslovakia was diametrically opposed to that which was coming from 
the most competent quarter – the British Legation at Prague. According to Clerk, Beneš 
was ‘by streets the most intelligent of Central European statesman’ and Czechoslovak 
aspirations ‘approach more nearly to common-sense and offer more hope of stability 
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than those of any of the country’s possibly more attractive, but certainly even more 
idiotic, neighbours.’68     
 The Foreign Office was not impressed with Hohler’s ambition to pose as an 
authority on the rights and wrongs of Czechoslovak foreign policy. Lampson warned 
him to be wary of exposing himself ‘to the accusation of encroaching on the preserves 
of others [George Clerk].’69 The Central Department’s Chief took the opportunity of 
informal communication with the Minister at Budapest to spell out rather bluntly the 
outlook on Central European politics held in his office: 
Clerk is of course our first authority on Benes; if we believed that the latter is quite 
as black as you make him out we should also need to believe that Clerk was a soft-
headed imbecile – and that we know he is very far from being. Benes sees quite 
clearly – at least we believe and hope he does – that markets have got to be kept 
open for the products of Czech workshops (they have suffered a lot in the past from 
the fall of the Austrian crone), but whether he always acts up to what he sees is 
another matter; and whether he can always bring pig-headed Czechs, Roumanians 
and Serbs into line is yet a third.70  
 
 Although Lampson backed Clerk’s judgement about Beneš, he essentially 
accepted Hohler’s views regarding the admirable qualities of the leading Magyar 
statesmen and the advisability of their remaining in power. He also agreed that it was 
highly likely that the real aim of the Little Entente was to get rid of the Bethlen 
government.71 When the Hungarian premier, whether sincerely or for tactical reasons, 
advanced the prospect of his inevitable resignation following a temporary setback to the 
procuring of  a loan in May 1923, he was officially discouraged from doing so and 
promised British support for a renewed appeal to interested Powers, including the Little 
Entente.72  
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 Other members of the Central Department were far more suspicious of the Little 
Entente’s intentions than Lampson. The Second Secretary, John Le Rougetel, predicted 
that the overthrow of the present regime in Hungary would be only the first step 
towards the partition of the country. Alexander Cadogan went so far as to suggest that 
the Little Entente countries ‘have come to the fatal conclusion that they may be able to 
solve the problem once for all by attempting to assimilate the remaining pure Magyars 
in what is left of Hungary.’73  
 Such panicky predictions were a response to Young’s news about the activity of 
Professor Seton-Watson, who happened to arrive in Belgrade in April 1923 and who 
was associated with attempts to install a democratic government in Budapest which, in 
Young’s opinion, could not stand on its legs.74 Seton-Watson had already made his 
stance known when he had vehemently protested against the Foreign Office’s decision 
to allow Count Bethlen’s reception by King George V as tending to facilitate the 
floatation of the Hungarian loan.75 The answer of Allen Leeper, formerly one of Seton-
Watson’s closest adherents, showed what a substantial change of mood the Foreign 
Office had undergone in the meantime: ‘There is hardly a nation in the world for which 
I feel less affection than the Magyars. Moreover I dislike their present Govt. but I 
disagree with you in this that I strongly disapprove of any British interference in the 
internal affairs of other countries.’76 Both Cadogan and Lampson deprecated the 
possibility that Seton-Watson’s visit to Belgrade might have encouraged the resistance 
offered by the Little Entente. Young was hurriedly instructed to convey a warning to 
Seton-Watson to desist from any meddling, ‘highly mischievous’ as it was thought in 
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the Central Department, in Hungarian domestic politics. Such action, the Professor was 
warned, would be strongly resented by HMG.77  
 British suspicions could have only been aggravated when Ninčić alluded to the 
connection that should be made between financial aid for the reconstruction of Hungary 
and a change of the Horthy regime.78 Realising the line Hungary’s adversaries were 
taking, Hohler emphatically denied the charges against the rule of ‘feudal counts’ as not 
corresponding to the actual complexion of the Hungarian government.79 He was unduly 
concerned about the effect such an argument could produce in London. As far as the 
charge of an anachronistic form of government was concerned, it was actually 
considered that a ‘modest’ development of democracy in Hungary ‘may be better 
proportioned to the present social and political phase of that country’ and that it was, in 
any case, her own affair.80 Reviewing again the question of the Little Entente’s wish for 
the overthrow of regime in Budapest, Lampson was adamant: ‘It is a policy with which 
we can have no truck.’81 A year later Arthur Ponsonby, the Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs appointed under the Labour government of 
Ramsay MacDonald, submitted a memorandum drawing attention to the ‘counter 
revolutionary methods’ of the Bethlen government which had further curtailed the 
franchise and civil rights of its citizens.82 His suggestion of a forward British initiative 
in Budapest with a view to rectifying this state of affairs was frowned upon in the 
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Central Department which found that such a step would hopelessly entangle it in 
Hungarian internal matters for which there was no sufficient legal basis.83 The matter 
was consequently allowed to drop.  
 Contrary to the Little Entente’s hopes, London was taking an increasingly 
favourable view of the Horthy regime which approached almost a patron-like attitude. 
Nothing was more revealing in this respect than the French franc forgery scandal which 
took place in December 1925. A few Magyar nationals were arrested in Holland after 
counterfeit bank notes had been found in their possession. The fact that those arrested 
were prominent members of the irredentist Awakening Hungarians society and that the 
tentacles of the affair reached some persons belonging to Admiral Horthy’s entourage 
caused a storm of protest, particularly at Prague. The initial reaction of the Foreign 
Office confirmed the unswerving trust vested in the Hungarian leadership. Lampson 
spoke his mind in a private letter to the Minister Plenipotentiary at Paris, Eric Phipps, in 
no uncertain terms:          
Frankly, I remain completely sceptical as to there being any official backing by the 
Hungarian Government behind it. It is quite incredible that anyone outside a lunatic 
asylum should take up such a fantastic scheme. It is true, as we all know, that many 
Hungarians are not quite normal when it is a question of recovering Hungary’s lost 
domains, or of re-establishing the Crown; but I repeat that I refuse to believe that, 
even allowing for this national lack of balance, either Bethlen or any other 
responsible Hungarian (I of course include Horthy) can have had anything whatever 
to do with this madness.84   
 
 Chamberlain instructed Clerk and other Ministers accredited to the Little 
Entente countries to state British confidence in the correct attitude of the Hungarian 
authorities and in Bethlen’s will to see the judicial procedure being carried out. In his 
defence of the British attitude he was emphatic that ‘it is hardly open to question that 
Count Bethlen is the only statesman in Hungary with any breadth of outlook, and his 
fall might well be disastrous, not only to his country, but to the prospects of the re-
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establishment of good relations between Hungary and her neighbours.’85 Chamberlain’s 
estimate was strongly supported by information supplied by the Legation at Budapest. 
Hohler’s successor, Colville Barclay, credited Bethlen with a sincere desire to suppress 
the Awakening Hungarians and hoped that he might triumphantly emerge from the 
crisis, notwithstanding the earlier indulgence of the authorities towards the irredentist 
society which had been enjoying the support of the Regent himself.86 The Minister 
made full allowance for the fact that the premier lacked the strength directly to attack 
the Awakening Hungarians who had intended, in his opinion, to bring about a coup 
d’état and put Albrecht Habsburg on the throne.87 In the light of such a reading of 
Hungarian politics Barclay’s appreciation of its central dilemma seems to have been 
somewhat contradictory:  
Some say that as long as Horthy is Governor there will be constant trouble from the 
Awakening Hungarians, constant complaints from the Little Entente and 
consequently no peace in Central Europe. Personally I cannot agree with this view. 
Horthy with the aid of Awakening Hungarians restored order out of chaos and has 
kept it for over five years. If this combination were broken up the Awakening 
Hungarians would certainly be more troublesome than ever.88  
 
 Barclay’s views were wholeheartedly endorsed in the Central Department. The 
Prime Minister’s decision to treat the forgery affair as a purely criminal incident without 
a political background was exonerated as the right one bearing in mind the strength of 
the irredentist organisation and its close connection with the Regent; after all, that was 
the only policy which would keep both Hungarian leading men in charge.89 
Consequently, the Little Entente’s sharp reaction to the scandal and the peril it entailed 
for the maintenance of the current Hungarian regime was detested in Whitehall:  
The Little Entente was undoubtedly out for Bethlen’s blood (1) because as a general 
principle they fear Hungary and consequently don’t want a strong man there, (2) 
because they want to promote chaos in Hungary & hence talk of “democratising” 
her – a perfectly mischievous proposal and not even genuinely meant. I hold our 
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proper policy to be discreet support of Bethlen and a deliberate announcement to all 
our foreign visitors of the categorical assurances he has given us.90
 
Having heard of the stiff note being sent by the French government to Budapest, the 
Central Department was most anxious to forestall such an action and decided to urge 
Paris to ‘go slowly over Hungary’.91 The British were worried lest the forgery business 
would arrest and prevent a speedy winding up of the remaining issues concerning 
Hungarian disarmament and the withdrawal of the Control Commission from that 
country. When the forgeries trial started in May 1926 the accumulated evidence pointed 
to connivance on the part of the government and went a long way to justify all the 
accusations coming from Prague and Paris. The occasion made the Permanent Under-
Secretary, William Tyrell, lay bare the attitude of the Foreign Office towards the 
Hungarian regime: ‘It is quite clear that Count Bethlen is sufficiently to blame, if there 
is in any quarter a desire to involve his responsibility. Our role should be to advise all 
and sundry that in the general interest of peace & settlement it would be wise not to 
upset him over this affair.’92     
 Given the Foreign Office’s perception of the Hungarian situation it was hardly 
surprising that the Little Entente’s fears and admonitions were regarded as unfounded. 
The opinion of Lampson seems to have been illustrative of the British stance on the 
smouldering conflict between Hungary and the Little Entente:  
My own opinion is that no Nation [sic] in its senses could, situated as Hungary is 
and disarmed as she is (as the War Office tell us), even contemplate any aggression 
against the Little Entente. It would be sheer suicide for Hungary, ringed in as she is 
by Serbia, Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania. I do not believe that Count Bethlen or 
any other responsible Hungarian statesman would be so mad as to launch his 
country on anything in the nature of an offensive against any of her very jealous 
(and frightened) neighbours. The idea is so inherently improbable that I cannot 
believe there is any truth in these stories. But this does not mean that, not only 
possibly but even probably, Hungary is endeavouring as far as she can to escape the 
effects of the treaties. I have no doubt she is: for that is the natural attitude of a 
high-spirited nation, reprehensible though it may be. So that we must watch her, 
and, when she throws difficulties in the way of our Military Control Officers (as 
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she has recently done) we must jump on her. But I deprecate our doing more. After 
all, the War Office, who must be our authority on military matters, are perfectly 
calm with regard to all these tales: and I think that we must be guided by what they 
tell us.93
 
The War Office, to whose attitude Lampson referred, shared the opinion that Hungary 
was effectively disarmed notwithstanding some violations of the military clauses of the 
Trianon Treaty. Those were believed to be silly manifestations of national pride and not 
part of a deliberate and systematic policy on the part of Hungarian government.94
As it was a basic assumption that the Magyars were not posing a genuine threat 
to their neighbours the logical conclusion was that the latter were to blame for existing 
tensions. There was ‘the general belief entertained by the surrounding states’ that 
Hungary was an implacable enemy whereas, in reality, such beliefs greatly exaggerated 
the real state of affairs and, moreover, ‘might at any moment provoke a rash act on the 
part of one of her neighbours either as a result of a particularly acute attack of nerves or 
as a means of distracting the attention of their own public from difficulties at home.’95 
To be sure, there was a very real problem of Hungarian irredentism. The War Office 
particularly drew attention to the lax attitude that the government was displaying 
towards irredentist organisations, the activities of which accounted for a justifiable 
apprehension among the Little Entente countries. Nevertheless, the existence of such 
societies was found to be ‘a grave danger to Hungary as they may form an excuse for 
military action by the Little Entente.’96 The Foreign Office concurred with such views. 
As Cadogan put it, Hungarian irredentism could not disturb the peace as long as the 
Little Entente countries were not embroiled in troubles and Hungary remained unarmed 
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and impotent. But he also warned against any lenient interpretation of the peace treaty 
which would amount to revision and might commit the British government to 
something that ‘is for the moment presumably out of the question.’97  
 
 
2.3. Security and Money Diplomacy 
Early in 1923 Hungary’s economic situation was steadily deteriorating, closely 
resembling the plight of Austria in the previous year. Budapest invited Sir William 
Goode, ex-chairman of the Vienna section of the Reparation Commission and Director 
of Relief Missions in Hungary, to lend his expertise in an attempt to save the country 
from complete financial ruin. Having investigated the actual position, Goode came to 
the conclusion that Hungary simply could not pay reparations and had to receive 
external financial help if she were to stand any chance of recovery. In order to be able to 
float a loan in the first place, Goode advised the Hungarians to appeal to the Reparation 
Commission to waive their liens on certain assets mortgaged as a guarantee for the 
payment of reparations.98 The Foreign Office approved of Goode’s suggestions as it 
was deemed that ‘it cannot be to British interest that yet one more State should go under 
financially.’99 From that point on the Foreign Office and the Treasury embarked on a 
tedious process of consultation and hammered out an exact course of action that 
Budapest was to be advised to pursue.100  
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The decisive role of British diplomacy in the question of the Hungarian 
reconstruction loan has already been noted.101 But the episode also provides a striking 
example of how Foreign Office policy-making in relation to security problems such as 
the disarmament of Hungary was influenced by the Treasury and the Bank of England. 
The Foreign Office, together with the War Office which was naturally consulted in 
disarmament matters, bowed to the agenda of financial institutions.      
The envisaged financial help to the Hungarians was made difficult to realise on 
account of their obstinate resistance to fully observing the limitations imposed by the 
military clauses of the Treaty of Trianon. Not surprisingly, the Little Entente countries 
were perturbed by such a persistent obstruction that foreboded future trouble with their 
intransigent neighbour. In his conversation with Young, Ninčić fulminated against 
Hungarian breaches and, in particular, the secret import of weapons from Italy.102 The 
British diplomat suspected that Yugoslav complaints were no more than a pretext to 
advance a request for the Little Entente’s active participation in the disarmament control 
of Hungary, an opinion the Foreign Office shared.103 Thus, from the outset the loan was 
perceived as a security concern as much as it was an issue of economic rehabilitation of 
Central Europe. There was also a cardinal difference of view between Britain and 
Hungary’s neighbours in that respect. The Third Secretary of the Central Department, 
Nevile Butler, plainly explained the divergence of views: ‘the Little Entente decline to 
make any concession to Count Bethlen’s alleged chauvinist government whereas we 
incline to regard it as the only alternative to chaos in Hungary.’104 While compiling his 
yearly report for Yugoslavia at the time when the loan became a reality Young went 
even further in his hope that a successful denouement of the League of Nation’s 
rehabilitation scheme might have the desirable effect of loosening ‘the ties of the only 
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interest common to the ill-assorted trio of Jugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and 
Roumania.’105 Hence, in case of success it was to be hoped not just that a stabilisation 
of Hungary would be effected, but also that the Little Entente, with what the British 
viewed as its unhealthy fixation on Budapest, might disintegrate.  
The Foreign Office was not sure what to make of the reports confirming a 
persistent obstruction of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control’s activities by 
the Hungarians. As Cadogan put in, it was hard to ascertain ‘whether this comes from 
the fact of their having anything to conceal or whether it is due simply to the natural 
stupidity of the Hungarians.’106 Acting Military Attaché at the Budapest Legation, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Selby, compiled a report on the military situation in 
Hungary in the light of accusations from her neighbours of violations of the military 
clauses of the Trianon Treaty and preparations to launch a revanchist war to reoccupy 
lost provinces. The investigations of the Commission of Control, the report stated, 
revealed steadfast obstruction on the part of the Hungarian authorities in complying 
with the treaty and providing facilities to control organs to execute their duties.107 The 
list of offences comprised nurturing and subsidising irredentist organisations such as the 
Awakening Hungarians, applying compulsory methods of recruitment in the army, the 
earmarking for military service of men of military age, and preparing schemes for 
mobilisation. Still, it was ‘the considered opinion of the Commission of Control that 
Hungary could not at present take the field with an organised and equipped force of 
strength much beyond that authorised by the treaty.’ That was not to say that the 
prognosis for the foreseeable future was optimistic. Certified militarist tendencies of the 
country were sufficient ‘to indicate that if the control is removed too soon and all 
surveillance by the Entente Powers over her armed forces raised, Hungary will rapidly 
revert to militarization of the country and the fears of the Little Entente as to the menace 
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which Hungary constitutes for them will thenceforth be well-founded.’108 The report 
was received in the Foreign Office with a great deal of equanimity. Lampson found it 
rather predictable: ‘You cannot permanently suppress a nation – certainly not of 
Hungarians’, he wrote.109  
Further news from Budapest was somewhat disquieting. Colonel Selby sent 
another report on clandestine arms imports and mobilisation preparations and admitted, 
although in guarded terms, that after all there might have been some substance to the 
accusations brought against Hungary.110 Hohler, characteristically, did not believe the 
reports and maintained his assessment of the Bethlen Government’s peaceful intentions; 
he was sure that the only impetus that might actually drive the Magyars into some 
military adventure could come out of their desperation over the reparation question.111 
The Foreign Office was not as single-minded as its envoy but the prevalent mood was 
not to allow unpleasant reports to interfere with economic plans for Hungary. Cadogan 
recalled how it had been suggested ‘on another file’ to use the Hungarian appeal for 
relief as a lever for inducing the Hungarian Government to be reasonable about military 
control. ‘But that would not necessarily be inconsistent with supporting the Hungarian 
point of view at this stage’, he quickly added, explaining that the matter was to be 
examined before the Reparation Commission from the purely economic point of 
view.112   
In May 1923 the Little Entente managed to thwart the acceptance of the 
Hungarian loan through the unfavourable decision by the Reparation Commission. 
Though the latter did not decline a scheme in principle, a demand to use a part of loan 
proceeds for reparation payments effectively buried it. Such an epilogue would not have 
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been possible if it had not been for French support as opposed to Anglo-Italian backing 
for Budapest. France had her own motives. Posing as a champion of the Little Entente 
was in step with Poincaré’s policy of rapprochement with the alliance. More 
importantly, the whole Hungarian loan business overlapped with the Ruhr crisis and 
France was anxious not to allow any precedent in relation to reparation matters which 
could be invoked against her in her dealings with German defaults. The Little Entente 
formulated conditions under which it was ready to support the floating of a Hungarian 
loan: (a) a part of loan to be appropriated for reparations, (b) Hungarian disarmament 
and observance of military clauses of peace treaty, (c) a loyal attitude to neighbouring 
states, and (d) Little Entente participation in control of a loan.113  
The Foreign Office and the Treasury had hitherto acted in unison. After the 
rebuff at the hands of the Reparation Commission the latter wanted to press even harder 
to reverse the outcome and argued that strong diplomatic representations should be 
made to France and the Little Entente in support of the Hungarian appeal to the League 
of Nation’s scheme for reconstruction on the pattern of the Austrian case.114 In addition, 
the Lords Commissioners recommended a tougher approach to the Little Entente 
countries which could be forced to comply by the financial pressure at British disposal. 
Seton-Watson spoke of  
the attitude of certain financial circles in the City, who in their desire to bolster up 
the present regime in Hungary, virtually tried to blackmail Benes when he was here 
in the summer. They even obtained the Treasury’s approval for the suggestion that 
unless he agreed to the proposed scheme, the City would refuse to pay to 
Czechoslovakia the next instalment of the loan concluded with her two years ago in 
the ordinary way of business – in other words would repudiate its own 
obligations!!115  
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Diplomats in the Central Department adopted a cautious attitude. They preferred to wait 
for further steps by the Bethlen government and wished to dispel a ‘tendency to look 
upon us as the sponsors of Hungary.’116  
Although the Treasury did not show signs of displeasure with such a stance, it 
seems to have disagreed with the Foreign Office’s political priorities. Instead of 
continuing polemics, the Controller of Finance, Otto Niemeyer, proceeded with a semi-
official diplomatic initiative through the offices of William Goode in Budapest. He 
forwarded a letter from the latter that strenuously tried to play down the breaches of 
military control and emphasised Bethlen’s efforts in rectifying the misdeeds of other 
Hungarian officials.117 At the same time Goode underscored, in words that could have 
easily been said by Niemeyer, the errors of British policy:  
Personally, as I have told Hohler, I think it is dangerous to make measures which 
are presumably for the economic good of the whole of Europe, and particularly for 
the British Empire, conditional upon Hungary agreeing to do something or other 
which has very little relation to the main issue. It seems to me to be mixing issues in 
a way which is likely to be taken advantage of by other Powers on far less 
reasonable grounds.118  
 
Niemeyer himself expressed the hope that the Foreign Office would be satisfied 
with ‘something of this sort’. The urgings of Goode and Niemeyer provoked an 
immediate reaction. Only a week later Lord Curzon, acting as had been suggested by 
Treasury officials from the beginning, instructed his Minister at Paris to make strong 
representations to the French Government to accept a renewed Hungarian appeal to the 
Reparation Commission that should ultimately lead to the League of Nations taking up 
the question.119   
The Treasury did not act alone in its endeavour to harness diplomats to achieve 
its aims. Montagu Norman, the influential Governor of the Bank of England, was also 
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involved in this classic exercise of financial diplomacy. For Norman the issue of a 
Hungarian loan, following the success of the Austrian reconstruction scheme, was 
envisaged as a second stage of a larger enterprise to consolidate the whole of Central 
Europe. His ambitious plan was to ‘establish one by one the new parts of old Austria, 
and then perhaps the Balkan Countries’ so that at the end ‘the ultimate solution for 
Eastern Europe, viz. an Economic federation to include half a dozen countries on or 
near the Danube free of customs barriers, etc’ would be achieved.120 He instructed the 
Baring Brothers Bank to let Prague know that the second tranche of the loan granted to 
Czechoslovakia in 1922 through that bank would not be issued unless her government 
changed its negative attitude towards the Hungarian loan.121 It was a measure of the 
relations between the Foreign Office and the Bank of England in the conduct of 
financial diplomacy that Norman did not find it necessary to inform and ask the former 
for their support before he exerted pressure on the government of a foreign state. Yet 
there was a complete harmony of views in this case. Sir Eyre Crowe, wholeheartedly 
welcomed the Governor’s initiative and, almost apologising, stated that a similar action 
would have been undertaken had it not been for ‘a tiresome case of obstruction by 
Hungary of the work of Military Control’.122   
 The War Office still adhered to the opinion that there was not much to be 
worried about in the Hungarian matter and was consequently opposed to the Little 
Entente’s demand to obtain a permanent representative to the Military Mission of 
Control at Budapest.123 In mid-August 1923 Selby recommended that the idea should be 
rejected since it would be impossible to implement due to implacable Hungarian hatred 
towards the Little Entente which would inevitably provoke an absolute obstruction of 
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the Commission’s work.124 In a broader political context the proposition was 
undesirable on the grounds that it would embarrass and further aggravate the position of 
the Hungarian government, grave as it already was on account of a rapidly depreciating 
currency and related economic difficulties.  
However, only two weeks later Colonel Selby had rather different and disturbing 
news to report. He deplored the unsatisfactory progress of military control and 
particularly pointed out irrefutable evidence in his possession that the authorities were 
systematically compelling civilians to enlist in the army.125  A report early in September 
was couched in yet more decided and assertive terms and went all the way to confirm 
the accusations brought against the Hungarian government. On the basis of personal 
investigations and representations made by the Military Attachés of the Little Entente, 
supported by strong evidence, Selby notified his superiors of the Military Operations 
and Intelligence that ‘we have experienced a most unfortunate retardation and even a 
set-back.’126 Compulsory recruitment and increased obstruction to control kept the 
IAMCC ‘completely in the dark in respect of the strength of the Army’. Having 
admitted that the problem of compulsory recruiting had heretofore been considered 
secondary to the essential question of the actual strength of the army, the Military 
Attaché suggested that that approach would have to be rethought:  
In the light of recent experience, however, I think that the question of compulsory 
recruiting is now just as important as the question of recruited strength, for on the 
former may directly depend the latter; and since it is unquestionable that the latter is 
the more difficult question on which to practice an effective control, we may, by 
bringing pressure to bear to suppress compulsory recruiting, go far to prevent the 
authorised limit of cadre strengths from being exceeded.127  
 
Selby went on to say that he had impressed on the senior Hungarian Liaison 
Officer ‘the suicidal folly’ of such behaviour that might put at risk the prospects of 
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desperately needed economic reconstruction for the sake of something as unsubstantial 
as ‘splitting hairs’ over military control. ‘But the Hungarian is a soldier first and a 
diplomat second and it seems difficult to make them see in which way their own best 
interests lie’, Selby despondently and somewhat condescendingly concluded.128  
The information transmitted to Whitehall produced a bad impression. The 
Foreign Office had for some time been uncomfortable with the Treasury’s insistence on 
championing the Hungarian cause in spite of an unsatisfactory position in regard to 
military control. The Central Department informed Hohler that it was disinclined to 
back Budapest in the matter of reparations and a loan unless the proof had been given of 
its loyal discharge of its military obligations under the Peace Treaty.129 This stand was 
also made clear to the Treasury.130 Though being in full sympathy with the Treasury’s 
objectives, the Foreign Office was more concerned about detrimental security 
implications lest something was done to coerce the Hungarians into line. Butler thought 
that, after all, it was more in British interests to uphold the fulfilment of the Treaty 
obligations by Hungary than to prevent inflation in that country.131 This message was 
emphasised in the letter Lampson sent to Hohler:   
In any case, please be quite sure that in the case of the Hungarian loan it is the 
emphatic view of His Majesty’s Government that the only wise policy for Hungary 
is to conciliate the Little Entente in general and the Czecho-Slovak Government in 
particular. Anything you can do towards this is so much to the good. The Hungarian 
Government must face the fact that they fought on the wrong side and were 
beaten.132
 
Three months later, after Selby’s latest report had been received, the situation 
seemed to be worse than ever. The Foreign Office decided to take resolute action. In a 
letter addressed to the War Office the suggestion was put forward to arraign the 
Hungarian government before the Conference of Ambassadors for its violation of the 
                                                 
128 Ibid.   
129 TNA, FO to Hohler, 20 June 1923, 10379/942/21, FO 371/8863. 
130 BDFA, vol. 2, Doc. 29, Foreign Office to Treasury, 21 June 1923. 
131 TNA, Minute by Butler, 16 June 1923, C 10481/942/21, FO 371/8863. 
132 TNA, Lampson to Hohler, private, 15 June 1923, C 10159/942/21, FO 371/8863. Emphasis in original.   
 87
military clauses of the Trianon Treaty and to threaten the Hungarians that they would 
not be afforded alleviation in the matter of reparations.133  
The War Office vigorously took up the suggestion. The Army Council thought it 
necessary to instruct Colonel Selby to request the IAMCC to prepare a formal 
complaint, backed with all available evidence, and forward it to the Allied Military 
Commission at Versailles.134 It intended to order the British representative to the latter 
body to press energetically for the matter to be drawn to the attention of the Conference 
of Ambassadors. If the Allied Military Commission at Versailles showed itself reluctant 
to transfer the case for deliberation by the Conference, the War Office suggested that 
the British Ambassador in Paris should do so supported with a list of Hungarian defaults 
that the IAMCC was to compile. The forward action recommended by the military 
authorities left no doubt about the serious view they took of Hungary’s violations of the 
Peace Treaty.      
At this juncture the Treasury intervenened. Otto Niemeyer was concerned about 
the effect that a reference to the Conference of Ambassadors might have on the ongoing 
project of floating a Hungarian loan.135 In order for a loan even to be contemplated it 
was necessary to obtain a temporary release from the shackles of reparations.136 Since 
Hungary had been obliged to mortgage certain assets to guarantee an indemnification of 
her former enemies, the latter had to release liens on such assets. That meant that the 
goodwill and cooperation of the Little Entente countries were preconditions for any 
progress of the envisaged scheme. The conversations to that effect had already been 
underway at Geneva and, moreover, the British hoped that it would be possible to 
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‘induce the Little Entente to consent to such release, in principle, by the end of this 
month [September 1923].’137   
There lay the crux of the problem. British optimism aside, the relations between 
the Magyars and their neighbours had been severely strained since the war and did not 
offer too much hope for a swift and smooth understanding. Moreover, a generous stand 
was expected from the Little Entente at the very moment when their intransigence was 
running high due to the obvious and flagrant violation of the Peace Treaty on the part of 
Hungary. The Yugoslav Minister in Budapest, Milan Milojević, dismissed the prospect 
of establishing closer and more loyal relations with the Hungarians whose government, 
he was adamant, did not want any rapprochement as it was intent on the restoration of 
Great Hungary.138 Therefore, the Minister found that Hungary remained a serious 
adversary and advised his government accordingly: ‘The weaker she is economically, 
the less [of an adversary] she would be.’139 Milojević believed, along with his 
Romanian and Czechoslovak colleagues and the French Chargé d’ Affaires, that in the 
case of a Hungarian loan materialising full liberty of action should be demanded for the 
work of the Control Commission.140 That done, he thought that the intelligence services 
of individual Legations would be enabled, to a certain extent, to perform their duties. 
Yugoslav exasperation was further augmented when the General Staff supplied a report 
on clandestine arms imported into Hungary by the Italians.141  
 Thus, the advanced stage of the Hungarian loan negotiations at Geneva 
coincided with the Little Entente’s furore in connexion with the substantial breaches of 
the military clauses of the Trianon Treaty. The success of a reconstruction scheme must 
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have looked highly unlikely in the circumstances. At this critical point Niemeyer’s 
interference, undertaken for the sole reasons of financial policy, had a decisive impact 
on the course that events regarding the loan would take. Niemeyer admonished Cadogan 
that any ventilation of the Hungarian case before the Conference of Ambassadors would 
be fatal at that moment.142 In his view, ‘after the release en principe there will be ample 
opportunity for investigating these troubles before we are finally committed to 
anything.’143 The Treasury had its own agenda but did not want to give an impression of 
acting in contravention of Foreign Office policy. On the contrary, Niemeyer presented 
his request as striving to achieve a common goal as ‘the only real corrective is to 
encourage Hungary to turn her swords into ploughshares.’144 The Treasury official had 
yet another entreaty: he proposed that Lord Robert Cecil, the British representative to 
the League of Nations, should use the occasion of a personal meeting with Bethlen in 
Geneva to impress upon the latter, whom Niemeyer trusted to be entirely against the 
devastating blunders of his compatriots, the absolute necessity of a change in attitude to 
the Control Commission. ‘The thing [the violation and obstruction of military control] 
must stop immediately and once and for all or we must give up’, Niemeyer declared, 
summarising the position in a way he knew would be pleasing to Cadogan and his 
colleagues.145  
 At this crucial moment the Foreign Office fully deferred to Niemeyer’s 
demands. Cadogan replied that he was ‘writing to Paris [to Crewe, the British Minister, 
who communicated with the Conference of Ambassadors] to go easy and to take no 
initiative for the present in raising the military question’ and also endeavouring to have 
Cecil talk to Bethlen along the lines proposed by Niemeyer.146 The War Office was also 
asked to conform to Whitehall’s new stance brought about by Niemeyer’s intervention. 
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They were ‘not to instruct the British representative on the Allied Military Committee 
of Versailles to press for immediate consideration of the [Selby’s] report.’147 The final 
decision concerning the appropriate time to raise the Hungarian case was to rest with 
Lord Curzon. The Foreign Office’s definite submission to Niemeyer’s perseverance 
marked a decisive moment in the development of British diplomacy and consequently 
the whole loan affair.      
 From this point on all energies were directed towards the attainment of the 
rehabilitation scheme for Hungary under the auspices of the League of Nations. British 
support was unconditional as the subject of Hungarian infringement of the military 
clauses was not to be brought up any more. As far as the Little Entente was concerned, 
the main effort of HMG had already been focused on Beneš and through him the other 
members of the alliance to force them into a more amenable frame of mind.148 Britain 
had at her disposal a powerful lever of financial pressure. The Czechoslovaks were 
anxious lest they would be denied the second tranche of their loan floated the previous 
year. Likewise, the Romanians were given to understand that they could not count on 
the goodwill of the City of London to obtain money unless they stopped putting spokes 
into Hungarian wheels. The Little Entente had to cave in and the reconstruction loan 
was finally adopted at Geneva on 13 March 1924. For good measure, Bethlen’s 
government was made to pay lip service to a preservation of the status quo.     
 
 
2.4. The Little Entente and France: a View from Whitehall 
 
The Foreign Office appreciated the need to review the complicated relations 
existing among the states of Central Europe soon after the war, especially in the light of 
the formal agreements that had been concluded between some of them. An analysis in 
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April 1922 exposed some outstanding features of the view of the Little Entente taken in 
Whitehall. The Czechoslovak-Polish, Romanian-Polish and Czechoslovak-Austrian 
treaties of 1921 were all erroneously viewed as closely related to the agreements 
binding on member states of the alliance and as constituting ‘a first step towards 
bringing Poland and Austria within the system.’149 In fact, neither Poland nor Austria 
were never likely to join the Little Entente, the former because of her often troubled 
relations with Prague, the latter because of  her resolve to stay outside any combination 
exclusive of Germany or even potentially inimical to her. As another illustration of 
vastly exaggerated notions, Central Department officials believed that Poland was 
prepared to provide military aid to Romania in the event of a Hungarian or Bulgarian 
attack. Even the exchange of notes between Beneš and Carlo Sforza, the Italian Foreign 
Minister, in February 1921 in the wake of the Rapallo Treaty signed by Italy and 
Yugoslavia was looked upon as a further extension of the Little Entente. Germany 
regarded the alliance as a part of the French system designed to enchain her, and her 
Foreign Minister, Walther Rathenau, handed over to the British Ambassador at Berlin, 
Lord Edgar D’Abernon, a diagram showing the political treaties, agreements, alliances 
and relations in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe that was supposed to prove 
that point. However, D’Abernon found that it failed to do so as it could not display ‘any 
direct agreements or treaties which bind the Petite [Little] Entente to France.’150 The 
Germans also suspected the existence of military conventions, although they lacked any 
positive knowledge; in fact, military conventions did not exist.   
The same British unrealistic view in regard of the Little Entente’s scope and 
political objectives was steadfastly maintained nearly three years later when another 
comprehensive analysis of the security questions in Central and South-Eastern Europe 
was undertaken. The assessment of the three above mentioned treaties, though it was 
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admitted that they were not couched on ‘the same lines as the Little Entente 
Agreements’, was repeated in almost identical terms.151 The reason for such 
misperception lay in the overwhelming tendency of the Foreign Office to view any 
grouping or formal understanding between countries of Central and South-Eastern 
Europe in the light of their connection, real or imaginary, with France. Thus, under the 
heading of ‘French connection with Little Entente’ the specialists of the Central 
Department included three countries: Czechoslovakia, which at the time had an anodyne 
political treaty with France without a military pact; Yugoslavia, which did not have any 
formal agreement with France; and Poland, which was not a member of the Little 
Entente at all but had a military pact with France.152 The third member of the Little 
Entente, Romania, was not as much as mentioned under the same heading, presumably 
because she was not suspected to have contracted a military agreement with Paris.  
The Pact of Rome of 1924 between Yugoslavia and Italy and the Italo-
Czechoslovak treaty of 5 July of the same year whereby Prague adhered to the former 
instrument were also considered as a sort of understanding between Italy and the Little 
Entente as a whole. This was even more surprising as Italian animosity towards the 
alliance was common knowledge in Europe. It was a mistaken belief that the pact of 
Rome was ‘supplemented by some secret agreement regarding “spheres of influence” in 
the Adriatic and the Balkans’ that accounted for such a blunder.153  
The reflections of Lord D’Abernon succinctly expressed the whole outlook of 
the Foreign Office on the position and role of the Little Entente in post-war Europe: 
Russia and Austria have practically disappeared, and a new factor has grown up in 
the shape of the Petite Entente, which may have a decisive influence upon the future 
of European history. The French have laid themselves out to secure the Petite 
Entente as vassals or tied partners, and they have gone a long way to achieve 
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success. It would be easy to criticise English policy as having been negligent in this 
matter, but I do not see that we could do much to counteract French influence.154  
 
Britain never seriously intended to compete with France for the favours of the three 
allied countries or other small countries in the region. D’Abernon himself made an 
ostensibly convincing case for abstention from pursuing a more ambitious policy which 
would involve challenging the alleged French preponderance. In the first place, the 
Ambassador contended, France was much better equipped to exert influence in those 
countries for a number of reasons. Her military missions in the countries concerned 
provided an overpowering position for French diplomatic representatives and could not 
be matched by a Britain unwilling to dispatch its own officers in similar missions.155 A 
naval power such as Britain lacked the French military glamour which appealed to non-
maritime states. There were also certain social affinities, and even racial ones in the case 
of Romania, drawing those countries to France. Finally, Paris had already been 
established as a centre to which the states of Central and South-Eastern Europe were 
accustomed to turn in order to replenish their finances. D’Abernon was against ‘heavy 
expenditure or undue risk in the form of loans’ that would have to be undertaken for the 
purpose of a forward policy. Therefore, the Ambassador concluded, Britain should 
concentrate her diplomatic attention upon countries with an extended sea-coast and a 
prosperous maritime commerce - and since the countries in question did not fit that 
description even the greatest effort would not produce a tangible result.156 In short, 
D’Abernon asseverated that an absolute French control over the Little Entente states 
was a foregone conclusion and that there was no point in challenging it. Nicolson 
confirmed this rigid view when portraying the Little Entente system as being on the 
whole ‘with Poland as its umbilical cord… linked and integrated under the Quai 
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d’Orsay’ and vividly recalled how Lord Curzon regarded it ‘almost as a personal 
affront.’157 Such excessive notions of relations between Paris and the three smaller 
countries led to the formulation of a sweeping and far-reaching strategic assessment that 
aggression was more likely to come from France and the Little Entente than from 
Germany, the former two being regarded as the strong side and the latter as the weak 
one and thus incapable of causing trouble.158  
 The attitude of the Foreign Office and popular feeling in Britain were so 
unbending that they left a strong imprint on the historiography. It is no coincidence that 
Edward Carr, himself a high-ranking diplomat in the Southern Department of the 
Foreign Office during the thirties, set a tone with his contention that by 1924 the Little 
Entente and France had formed a ‘modern counterpart of the Holy Alliance’ which has 
been repeated time and again ever since.159 The allegation rests on two assumptions. 
Firstly, it presumes that the Little Entente countries had attained a high level of 
coordination of their policies and were capable of presenting a common front in all 
major political questions, not only those pertaining to Hungary; and secondly, that with 
this being so, France was in a position to subordinate and direct their foreign relations to 
suit the policy makers at the Quai d’Orsay.  
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 On closer examination both premises prove to be untenable. In his parliamentary 
exposé Beneš was adamant, in order to convince his audience of perfect solidity and 
unanimity among the Little Entente states, that he had been informed in detail by his 
colleague Ninčić in respect of the preparations and intentions of the Yugoslav 
government in the matter of Italian treaty as early as September 1923 during the session 
of the League of Nations. Likewise he claimed to have taken Ninčić into his confidence 
concerning his own agreement with France.160 There is, however, compelling evidence 
to the contrary. When President Masaryk met with the Yugoslav and Romanian envoys 
in London in the course of his state visit of October 1923, he signally failed to mention 
the main purpose of his journey, namely the ongoing talks with a view to the impending 
alliance with France; on the contrary, Masaryk insisted that his visit ‘as well as the 
visits to France and Belgium’ were ‘an act of courtesy to those countries and without 
any special political goal’.161 Ninčić actually heard of the Czechoslovak treaty for the 
first time from Beneš on the eve of its signature during the Little Entente conference at 
Belgrade and confessed to Young that it had come as a complete surprise to him.162  
 There were other political issues over which Belgrade and Prague did not see 
eye to eye. As early as 1922 Živojin Balugdžić, Yugoslav Minister at Berlin and King 
Alexander’s favourite, professed the opinion that it was all very well for Beneš to centre 
the Little Entente activities around Prague, which incidentally accorded to French 
interests in Central Europe, but that the thrust of Yugoslav policy lay in the Balkans and 
that therefore it was imperative for Yugoslavia to facilitate a political organisation of 
the peninsula, perhaps some sort of extension of the Little Entente,  in which she would 
naturally play a leading part.163 Furthermore, Yugoslav and Czechoslovak foreign 
policies differed considerably in their attitude towards Germany, particularly over the 
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prospect of Anschluss, and over the advisability of establishing official relations with 
Moscow.164 Nor were relations between Belgrade and Bucharest friendly and close 
enough to allow for concerted action, having been severely strained as a result of their 
conflicting standpoints in regard to the Bulgarian putsch of 9 June 1923 against the pro-
Yugoslav Prime Minister Alexander Stambuliyski, instigated and carried through by 
IMRO and revanchist elements within the army, and the delimitation and minority 
issues that came to surface the following year.165  
 As for the French dominance over the Little Entente countries, it was as far from 
coming into being in 1924 as ever. For Young, the transfer of the French Minister at 
Belgrade Clément-Simon shortly after the conclusion of the Pact of Rome was an 
unmistakable sign of the umbrage taken in Paris at the manner in which the treaty had 
been concealed from the French authorities.166 Indeed, in April 1924 King Alexander 
had solemnly to assure the French that there were no plans between his country and 
Italy directed against Greece and that the sole object of the recent agreement, as far as 
he was concerned, was to keep the Italians at arm’s length from the Balkans.167 Both the 
Pact of Rome and the Czechoslovak-Italian treaty, which was deprived of any real 
content and only served Beneš to align his policy with that of Ninčić for the sake of 
appearances, were raising serious misgivings in Paris concerning the conduct of the 
Little Entente. The French government tried unsuccessfully to stop Beneš from signing 
a pact with Mussolini before France had come to an agreement with Italy, and 
particularly with Yugoslavia, so as not to give the impression that France was being 
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ousted from Central Europe.168 Another proposal emanating from Paris for the 
conclusion of a tripartite Franco-Yugoslav-Romanian treaty met with rebuff in Belgrade 
where there was an unwillingness to jeopardise the fruits of the pact with Rome and 
even more alarm at the prospect of getting drawn into an armed conflict with the 
Russians for the sake of Bessarabia.169  
  To understand how the Foreign Office’s view of the Little Entente states came 
to be inextricably interwoven with and almost solely judged by their perceived relations 
with Paris the conditions prevailing in 1923, when Raymond Poincaré’s cabinet made a 
sustained effort to reach rapprochement with the alliance, have to be borne in mind. In 
the wake of the Ruhr crisis brought about by firm action to punish the Germans for their 
default in reparations, Poincaré was resolved to strengthen his position vis-à-vis a 
defiant Germany and an increasingly hostile Britain by aligning the smaller East-Central 
European states within the French security system.  France had long endeavoured to 
take the posture of a sole defender of Yugoslav and Romanian interests in reparations 
matters.170 During 1923 Poincaré had further recourse to economic levers and offered 
credits for the purchase of different goods and material in France, including military 
equipment, to Yugoslavia and Romania as well as to Poland, the monies amounting to 
300, 100 and 400 million francs respectively.171 The British Treasury resented the 
French granting loans to Central European countries until the latter had met their 
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obligations in respect of their own debts to Britain.172 The Lords Commissioners were 
particularly annoyed with the fact that the money earmarked for warlike material was 
going to be spent for non-productive purposes. They suggested taking a strong line with 
the three borrowing countries and addressing a direct question to them as to the 
financial obligations about to be undertaken towards the French and the possible 
consequences they could have in regard to the prior claims due to the British 
government. The suggestion was taken up by the Foreign Office and notes to that effect 
were handed to the Romanian, Yugoslav and Polish representatives.173 Nevertheless, 
following the vote by the French Senate, Yugoslavia and Poland accepted the offer in 
January and April respectively while Romania refused, apparently piqued at the greater 
enthusiasm displayed in Paris in granting the credits to the two other countries.174  
 The fact that the French overtures to the Little Entente (and Poland) were 
instigated in order to gain support for a policy which met with resolute British 
opposition had a corollary effect of prejudicing the whole Foreign Office’s outlook on 
the inherent merits of the Little Entente’s policies. The tendency to exaggerate the pro-
French leanings of the three allied states was manifest in the manner in which all the 
reports coming in from the most competent quarters – the British Legations at Prague, 
Belgrade and Bucharest – testifying to the contrary were invariably ignored. In Prague, 
Sir George Clerk had the distinct impression that the French hold on Czechoslovakia 
was waning, as witnessed by the marked hostility displayed towards the French military 
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mission, whose members were accused of financially exploiting the country, and the 
dissatisfaction of industrial and financial circles with the raising of the tariff on 
exporting goods in contravention of a recently concluded commercial treaty.175 He 
pointed to Beneš’s strong hints that he would like ‘a definite understanding whereby our 
and his economic policies would run on the same lines’ which would enable him to take 
a more independent course in dealing with France. The Minister believed it was in 
British interests to act and warned: ‘Well, if we don’t come in, we leave the Czechos no 
alternative but to go the whole hog with France.’176 To prove how shaky were the ties 
that linked Czechoslovakia with her French ally, Clerk adduced the distrust of the latter 
in regard to Beneš’s efforts to include Bohemian Germans in the government on 
account of the detrimental impact that such a move would have on the military role of 
the French mission in the Czechoslovak army and the general military cooperation 
between the two countries. Contrary to that contention, but instructive of the false 
impression of solidarity between France and the Little Entente, he discerned ‘Jugoslav 
suspicion of Czechoslovak dependence on France’ which had, in his opinion, brought 
about the Pact of Rome.177   
In Belgrade Young witnessed an even more determined Yugoslav desire not to 
be completely swayed by Gallic influence. Although in 1921 the Minister considered 
Yugoslavia as belonging ‘within the French orbit’, he found her no more willing to 
make any political or industrial sacrifice to her than to any other Power.178 Three years 
later the impression of a Yugoslavian wish for full emancipation from France had 
grown stronger and the Yugoslavs appeared to the Central Department ‘quite prepared 
to look to us for friendship.’179 On the eve of the conclusion of the Pact of Rome Young 
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received new confirmation of this political trend: ‘Both Roumania and Yugoslavia were 
loath to bind themselves prematurely to a French policy and I am told by various 
officials that M. Pasitch was particularly insistent that there should be as little 
appearance as possible of the policy of the Little Entente being directed against 
England.’180 Similarly, Herbert Dering affirmed from Bucharest that the Romanian 
Foreign Minister, Ion Duca, ‘set even more store by the lead of Great Britain than by 
that of France’, despite the incomparably greater propagandist effort maintained by the 
French.181   
The Little Entente’s professions of an independent policy and a balanced stance 
towards the two great Western Powers were not insincere. Although the unequivocal 
and persistent French championing of the integral maintenance of the status quo as 
established by the peace treaties was bound to appeal more to the countries whose very 
existence had been based on the peace settlement of 1919-1920 than a somewhat 
ambiguous and uncertain British attitude, they nevertheless understood that the 
endurance of the peace settlement itself depended on the prolonged entente between 
France and Britain. A rupture between Paris and London could shake the foundations of 
the European edifice and open once again the Pandora’s box of territorial and political 
arrangements on the continent. It was in this strain that Beneš described the general 
European situation to Clerk and insisted on Czechoslovakia’s inability to throw in her 
lot with one or the other great ally.182 Before the French army occupied the Ruhr, 
Ninčić had earnestly hoped that Paris would not impose sanctions on Germany on its 
own.183 Once the crisis came to a head Young averred that both the government and the 
people were loath to have to take sides between Great Britain and France and regarded 
with alarm the growing divergence between those two countries in regard to the 
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question of Germany.184 But no report that put relations between France and the Little 
Entente states into a more realistic perspective seems to have made any impression 
whatsoever in the Foreign Office.   
There was another aspect of security policy in which Britain was not directly 
involved. From the early days of the interwar period the Foreign Office clearly saw that 
Italy was bent on domination in the Danubian-Balkan region and was pitted against the 
Little Entente for that reason, always assuming that the latter was an instrument of 
French policy utilised in order to thwart her ambitions. The Central Department clerk 
John Troutbeck interpreted the whole Adriatic controversy as a manifestation of Italy’s 
desire to turn that sea into an Italian lake for strategic purposes so that she could 
eliminate the possibility of being on guard against a future Yugoslav fleet and thus 
‘have all her naval forces available on the other side for use against France.’185 In 
Central Europe Austria became a focal point of the Italo-Little Entente animosity, the 
more so as her precarious economic state rendered the prospects of her independence 
uncertain. In conversation with the British Ambassador in Rome, Sir Ronald Graham, 
the Italian Foreign Minister, Carlo Schanzer, underscored his government’s sincere 
perturbation over the likelihood of the ‘Czechs and Serbs’ entering Austria in the event 
of her break-up, and made it plain that Italy would be bound to follow suit.186 Schanzer 
was at pains to commit Britain to ‘his policy of Austria for the Italians’ to counter 
Beneš’s efforts to establish Czechoslovak influence at Vienna.187 However, the 
Yugoslav envoy in London, Mihailo Gavrilović, was relieved to inform Belgrade that 
although Italy had been striving for more than two months to convince London and 
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Paris that the only solution to the problem was a customs union between her and 
Austria,  her efforts were meeting with ‘the utmost reserve’ in Britain.188  
As the Austrian crisis overlapped with a renewal of the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav 
treaty on 31 August 1922 it had a profound impact on the further consolidation of the 
Little Entente. In the view of the Foreign Office the new treaty was chiefly designed to 
prevent the danger of Austria being taken over by Italy and was thus directed against 
Italian influence on the Danube.189 The Yugoslav Minister at Rome, Vojislav 
Antonijević, believed that the Italian government, aided by the Vatican, had offered 
economic help to Austria in return for a pledge not to adhere to the Little Entente, as 
was envisaged by some influential French political circles, and had also endeavoured to 
promote an alliance consisting of Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria.190 But the most 
disquieting feature of this manoeuvre, Antonijević reported, were Italian attempts to win 
Britain over to their policy. The Austrian crisis was, however, overcome by means of 
the League of Nations’ loan largely due to British initiative, and Austrian independence 
was preserved and reaffirmed through the so-called Geneva protocols of 4 October 
1922.  
An episode that was symptomatic of the propaganda warfare waged between 
Rome and the three allies occurred when the news of Lloyd George’s irritation with 
Beneš on account of the latter’s alleged disloyal dealings with the Soviets during the 
Genoa Conference of 1922 reached the Central Department. Responding to that 
accusation of bad faith, an annoyed Second Secretary and assistant private secretary to 
Lord Curzon, Allen Leeper, assured Eyre Crowe that such stories were no doubt ‘spread 
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by the Italians & the Vatican both of whom are anxious to discredit Czechoslovakia & 
break up the Little Entente.’191   
Thus, British diplomacy was faced with different aspects of the Italo-Little 
Entente conflict which was rendered more intractable as it formed part of the even more 
entangled and hostile Franco-Italian relationship. Dealing with such a problem 
presented a great challenge, and, as Nicolson’s review suggested, there were few 
feasible courses of action:                    
The Little Entente, and especially Czechoslovakia and Romania are at present 
within the French orbit. Their feelings towards Great Britain are a mixture of 
respect and regret that we do not intervene more persistently (or consistently) in 
continental affairs. They do not like France in the least, but cannot, in view of the 
hostility of Italy, reject her overtures. If we come to an agreement with Italy, I fear 
that, whatever we may feel or say in London, this agreement will be interpreted 
abroad as an abandonment of France in favour of Italy. We may be right in thinking 
the continent of Europe very silly so to misinterpret our policy, but the fact remains 
that they will think it: that both France and Italy, for different reasons, will 
encourage them to think it: and that when we take steps to disabuse them of the 
impression, we shall once again be hailed as “perfide Albion”. Nor, in this case, 
would the continent of Europe be as wrong as we may wish to suppose… Nor 
would I advocate for a moment that we should enter into closer relations with the 
little entente. All that I would wish to suggest is that, in the present stage of 
international relations, (which is to say the least transitional) we should adopt a 
negative attitude of reserve, and not commit ourselves to any positive policy of 
foreign entanglements.192
 
The problem persisted and was aggravated as the 1920s went on, constituting a danger 
to European peace as the Locarno agreements of 1925 seemingly pacified tension 
between Germany and France. Britain became increasingly involved with this dispute 
hoping against hope to bring about some sort of settlement that would stabilise Central 
and South Eastern Europe.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
191 DBFP, XXIV, No. 72, Clerk to Vansittart, 4 June 1922, footnote 4 containing minute by Leeper, 6 
June 1922; the letter sent from Sir Edward Grigg to Robert Vansittart on 15 June 1922 shows that Lloyd 
George had a grievance against Beneš because of the latter’s ‘constant communication’ with Wickham 
Steed, the editor of the Times and a fierce critic of the Prime Minister.  
192 TNA, Minute by Nicolson, 16 June 1922, C 8573/2791/62, FO 371/7442.  
 104
2.5. The Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty  
  
The most formidable French bid for associating the Little Entente countries with 
their policy was envisaged through the conclusion of formal treaties. French attention 
was first focused on Czechoslovakia as her adhesion, in addition to the iron-clad 
military agreement that had been reached with Poland in 1921, would consolidate the 
anti-German bloc in the east. France already had an unrivalled influence to build on, 
particularly in Prague’s newly formed armed forces. French General Eugéne 
Mittelhauser had been the Chief-of-Staff of the Czechoslovak army since the war and 
remained so until 1926, while other French officers occupied the higher command 
posts. Therefore, military cooperation between the two countries had already been 
established on the basis of a written technical agreement. 
Marshal Ferdinand Foch was the first to broach the idea of a formal alliance 
during his stay in Prague in May 1923, on which occasion he invited President Masaryk 
to pay an official visit to Paris. Masaryk was disinclined to go on account of his deep 
reservations about aggressive French policy in the Ruhr, but the invitation could not be 
ignored.193 To dispel any impression of exclusive support for Poincaré, it was decided 
in Prague to extend the scope of visit of the President and Foreign Minister so as to 
include London and Brussels.  
French advances towards Czechoslovakia were viewed at the Foreign Office in 
the context of the potential Anglo-French rupture that might have ensued in connexion 
with the Ruhr crisis. The Daily Express correspondent in Paris, Pollock, who was 
considered ‘highly reliable’ by Sir Eric Phipps, had a conversation with Beneš which he 
understood, though the Czech did not actually say so, as meaning that his country ‘if 
driven to choose between England and France, would, although it would be with bitter 
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regret, in the last resort remain faithful to France.’194 The same point was made to 
Pollock in regard to the whole Little Entente by another unidentified individual from 
‘another state of that group’. When the information was relayed to Whitehall the Central 
Department’s officials were not taken by surprise. For both Nevile Butler and Lampson 
the news only confirmed what had hitherto been believed.195 Lampson found that 
Czechoslovak subordination to the French, despite a slight restiveness, was inevitable as 
the latter were in complete control of the Czechoslovak army. The Chief of the Central 
Department was convinced that the other Little Entente allies would also side with 
France, which made that alignment a trend of her policy in Central Europe. For the time 
being Clerk reported from Prague that there was no reason to suspect that the 
government intended ‘to commit themselves to a hard and fast Military Convention 
with France.’196 On further enquiry the Minister learned that Masaryk and Beneš would 
seek a guarantee in Paris against any German attack, undertaking on their part to 
maintain the Czechoslovak army at full strength but without accepting any further 
obligations.197 According to Clerk, Czechoslovak leaders were to ask for the same kind 
of guarantee in London. Sir Alexander Cadogan, the First Secretary of the Foreign 
Office, dismissed the suggestion out of hand observing that it would not be possible to 
accommodate Masaryk.198  
Cadogan expatiated upon his views in a memorandum written in preparation for 
the pending visit of the Czechoslovak statesmen covering all aspects of Prague’s home 
and foreign politics.199 A tribute was paid to Beneš’s able guidance of Czechoslovak 
foreign policy and that of the whole Little Entente, which stood for peace and stability, 
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and his appreciation of the mutual interdependence of all the states of Central Europe. 
The praise for the Little Entente’s constructive role in the region was by no means a 
mere personal view of Cadogan. In March 1923 Curzon strongly advised the Polish 
Foreign Minister, Count Alexander Skrzynski, to establish friendly relations with 
Czechoslovakia without delay and stated that the Little Entente, ‘of which Poland ought 
to be a prominent member, was an element of stability in Central Europe to which His 
Majesty’s Government attached the greatest significance.’200 No doubt Curzon 
preferred to see Poland associated with the Little Entente rather than left on her own and 
exposed to French influence alone. Yet this favourable view of Prague’s role in the 
region did not affect in the slightest the attitude towards the prospect of undertaking any 
concrete pledge of military assistance from Britain: ‘What we have so far refused to do 
for France, we cannot do for Czechoslovakia.’201 Having stressed again Czechoslovak 
dependence on France in defence matters, Cadogan pointed out Masaryk’s and Beneš’s 
different point of view pertaining to some aspects of European policy, particularly the 
Ruhr affair, and their desire ‘to be freed from French leading strings’. What did they 
then expect from the talks in London?  
They may think they can obtain something from us that would put them in a 
position of greater independence: they probably wish, if that is impossible, to justify 
their subservience by explaining their dependence on French support… But if he 
[Masaryk] thinks the time is coming when he may have to declare openly for one 
side or the other, he may wish to explain to us that he is not at liberty to follow his 
own inclinations. That, rather than the hope of really obtaining any “guarantee” 
from us, is probably the explanation of his raising this point with us.202
 
While Cadogan was writing his memorandum the Czechoslovak statesmen were 
already in Paris. They proved to be reserved as to the terms of a political agreement, and 
most resistant to the conclusion of a clearly defined military convention: French 
proposals were met with rather general and platitudinous drafts of Czechoslovak 
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provenance.203 A military alliance was distrusted for a number of reasons: Beneš did not 
like the idea of being dominated by France in the way he thought Poland was; he was 
apprehensive at the prospect of Czechoslovakia being dragged into an armed adventure 
by French jingoism; and finally, the alliance would have been seen as designed to 
encircle Germany and would appear to reinforce Poincaré’s hard line approach in Ruhr, 
which was precisely what Beneš wanted to shun.204 The French played an economic 
card by promising their help to get the Czechoslovaks out of their troubles stemming 
from the forthcoming payment of the ‘costs of liberation’, a form of reparation that 
burdened the successor states.205 The Czechs stood their ground and left Paris without 
signing any document.  
The negotiations lingered on throughout the winter until a compromise formula 
had been found. That was facilitated, from what the Czechoslovak Minister at Berlin 
told his British colleague, by the change of heart on the part of Marshal Foch who was 
‘not too well pleased with the results of the Military Agreement with Poland.’206 Instead 
of having a proper military convention the Foreign Ministers of the two countries 
decided to exchange interpretative letters that provided for permanent contacts between 
the general staffs.207 On 25 January 1924 Beneš and Poincaré signed the treaty of 
friendship in Paris which was soon followed by the exchange of the secret letters.208 
The signatories evoked their will to maintain the peace and international order as 
established on the basis of the peace treaties and for that purpose declared that they 
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would act in unison whenever their security and common interests were at stake. More 
to the point, three specific instances of infringement of the existing order were clearly 
defined by terms of the agreement (articles 3-5) - Anschluss, and Habsburg or 
Hohenzollern restoration. The two countries undertook to submit their mutual disputes 
to the Permanent Court of International Justice for arbitration. They also agreed to 
communicate to each other all treaties previously concluded concerning Central Europe 
and to consult before signing any new agreement.  
The last provision demonstrated a measure of Czechoslovak diplomatic success. 
Prague not only avoided anything of a military character to which exception had been 
taken during the prolonged negotiations, but also prevailed in terms of shaping the 
treaty to its own liking. Beneš asserted to Clerk that the agreement was the best means 
to obtain final security in regard to Hungary and Poland which was vital to the peaceful 
development of his country, and the Minister found these assurances perfectly genuine: 
‘After all, there is little doubt that the Hungarians had good grounds for believing in 
French sympathy, or at least a benevolent neutrality that success would have turned into 
active sympathy, at the time of the Karl “Putsch”, and Dr. Benes quite naturally wishes 
to eliminate any such possibility in the future.’209 Indeed, in return for mere 
consultation among the army commanders the Czechoslovaks exacted a high price in 
the realm of Central European policy which had been their chief concern. France 
practically denied herself the right to pursue her own policy in the Danube valley and 
subscribed to playing second fiddle to Prague. Moreover, the Czechs could plausibly 
argue that they now had a legal basis from which to influence French policy towards 
Germany along more moderate paths.210  
 The reception that was meted out to the treaty abroad was in stark contrast to its 
actual provisions. Before the signing took place a wave of rumours had been put in 
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motion. As Clerk pointed out, it was all too easy for his colleagues to argue ‘that there 
was no crying need to regularise a perfectly patent situation, namely, the common 
interests of France and Czechoslovakia against Germany, by a formal treaty, and that 
therefore there must be some far-reaching ulterior motive.’211 The Italian Chargé d’ 
Affaires in Prague, Francesco Barbaro, contended that the real reason was to present a 
common front of France and the Little Entente against Italy and prevent the latter from 
aspiring to preponderance in the Mediterranean.212 He also suspected that Beneš would 
offer his mediating services to bring about a rapprochement between France and Russia, 
and thus ‘earn a handsome commission from both.’ The Italian was adamant that he 
knew from reliable sources, the origin of which Clerk put down to the Polish Military 
Attaché, about the existence of a clandestine military agreement between France and 
Czechoslovakia.213 There was nothing else left for Italy, Barbaro continued, but to work 
for a counterweight grouping consisting of Poland, Hungary and Romania under Italy’s 
wing.  
The Czechoslovak Minister at Rome, Vlastimil Kybal, always an ardent 
supporter of good relations with Italy, did his best to dissipate the belief regarding an 
alleged military treaty, but to no avail. Having heard his solemn assurances to the 
contrary, Mussolini plainly retorted that no one would ever believe that there were no 
hidden military provisions.214 In his conversation with the British Minister, Sir Ronald 
Graham, the Duce declared that, according to his information, one of the military 
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clauses provided for the secondment of the French military advisers to the 
Czechoslovak army.215  
The Germans also believed in the myth of a military convention and their 
Foreign Minister, Gustav Stresemann, circulated that information to the principal 
missions abroad.216 At the end of February the Austrian Social Democratic politician 
Fritz Adler handed over to the British what purported to be a summary of the alleged 
secret Franco-Czechoslovak military agreement.217 Neither Nicolson nor Cadogan took 
it seriously. Another version of the convention, somewhat different and ‘less 
impossible’ than that supplied from Vienna, was forwarded to D’Abernon by the 
German military authorities.218 It did not fare any better among the Foreign Office staff 
than the Adler’s document, but it was nevertheless decided to ask the War Office for its 
opinion of both versions. Before those views could be received the whole controversy 
became a public matter. On 18 March 1924 the Berliner Tageblatt, evidently supplied 
with documents by the government, published the full text of the alleged military 
agreement, causing a great sensation in the diplomatic world. When the expected 
analysis from the military finally reached the Foreign Office it did not help to lay to rest 
the lingering suspicions. Having carefully investigated the content of the documents, 
and having admitted that ‘they should be viewed with considerable suspicion’, the War 
Office could only ‘regret that so far they have not been enabled to come to any definite 
conclusion.’219 The Army Council believed that the papers truthfully presented what 
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was in the French military mind but was doubtful as to whether the Czechoslovaks 
would be willing to commit themselves so heavily.  
Amidst all negative reactions to the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty it was the 
asperity of the British response that most perturbed the government in Prague. The bad 
press that the agreement received in Britain was initiated by an article published in The 
Times on 1 January 1924 in which Czechoslovakia was accused of adhering to what 
‘seems to belong to dispensation wholly unconnected with the League of Nations and 
with that ideal of European unity which Czechoslovakia has hitherto professed to 
serve.’220 The accusation relating to the League concerned the spirit of its Covenant 
rather than the actual terms as the treaty in question was to be duly registered at Geneva. 
In his significant parliamentary speech on 6 February 1924 Beneš reverted to this point 
and went out of his way to prove that what had happened merely a fortnight before was 
not ‘again the old pre-War policy of forming groups and blocs, the policy of 
provocations, the old policy of secret diplomacy’.221 As for the claim that fending for 
security should take place exclusively within the machinery of the League, which had 
been ‘of late the main argument of several English critics’, Beneš adduced a number of 
arguments that went a long way to demonstrate that the institution at Geneva, despite its 
considerable moral force, could not be entrusted with the effective protection of the 
Republic. This sort of criticism was later to be levelled again in Britain against the other 
agreements concluded between France and other members of the Little Entente.   
The Czechoslovaks did their best to dispel the misinterpretation of their policy. 
Their envoy at London, Vojtech Mastný, conveyed a message from his government to 
the Permanent Under-Secretary Crowe explaining that the treaty was exactly on the 
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lines expounded by Masaryk and Beneš in their recent interview with Lord Curzon.222 
As if that was not enough, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister himself arrived in 
London and had a long interview with Curzon, who availed himself of the opportunity 
to impress upon Beneš ‘a good deal of suspicion about the treaty, which was looked 
upon in some quarters as a still further illustration of the militaristic policy of France, 
seeking to encircle Germany by a chain of States committed to her interests.’223 Having 
been asked if there was ‘any sort of undertaking, understanding, pledge, or promise, 
with regard to military matters’ or any stipulation for ‘joint consultations between the 
military staffs of the two Powers’, Beneš emphatically denied that this was so. 
Furthermore, he assured Curzon that he was bent on dissolving the French Military 
Mission in Prague by withdrawing one half of it next year and the rest gradually later 
on.224 In that way the extent of military cooperation would be reduced in the course of 
time to the level of military attachés. However, all the solemn assurances given by 
Beneš, the Foreign Secretary admitted to Clerk, ‘did not quite remove every trace of 
suspicion’ from his mind.   
Although Beneš realistically explained the Czechoslovak point of view, his 
mission was a distinct failure as he did not manage to justify his policy in British eyes. 
The Franco-Czechoslovak treaty was above all seen in London as an unqualified 
success for Poincaré, and the annoyance with the Czechoslovaks was conspicuous. Even 
Clerk, usually the one to be most sympathetic to the Czechs, was palpably irritated 
when commenting that the bad British press extended to them ‘merely increases the 
feeling of self-importance of this conceited and provincial-minded people, while their 
sensitiveness to criticism drives them closer to their French allies.’225 Nothing appears 
                                                 
222 TNA, Note by Sir Eyre Crowe, 3 January 1924, C 364/41/12, FO 371/9673. 
223 TNA, Curzon to Clerk, 16 January 1924, C 882/41/12, FO 371/9673.  
224 Ten days later Clerk reported from Prague about the appointment of Czech General Jan Syrový as the 
Deputy Chief of the Czechoslovak General Staff which he considered ‘to bear out the assurances given to 
Lord Curzon’. See TNA, Clerk to MacDonald, 25 January 1924, C 1551/41/12, FO 371/9673. 
225 BDFA, vol. 2, Doc. 51, Clerk to Curzon, 10 January 1924.  
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to have suffered more than the reputation of Beneš and nobody at the Foreign Office 
was more annoyed than the Chief of the Central Department. To Lampson, Beneš was 
‘far too specious and plausible’ and ‘too much of a busy-body’.226 The Yugoslav envoy 
in London Gavrilović drew the attention of his government to this pronounced 
dissatisfaction in Britain where a feeling that France had become the unrestricted master 
on the Continent gained ground and a very few people, personal friends of Masaryk, 
belittled the significance of the agreement, maintaining that it was in keeping with the 
requirements of the League and that it had merely served Poincaré for election 
purposes.227     
 
 
Conclusion 
After a turbulent year when Hungary and her neighbours had been in turmoil 
over the Habsburg restoration, Central Europe from 1922 was in dire need of 
pacification and stability. In its appreciation of the most suitable ways to contribute to 
peace and order in the region British diplomacy worked on certain basic assumptions. 
These were formed as a result of an overall perception of the foreign policies pursued 
by the individual member-states of the Little Entente and their adversary – Hungary. It 
was the former rather then the latter that caused considerable disquiet in London. 
Among the three states Czechoslovakia was seen as sound and reasonable in her 
conduct of foreign affairs. To a large extent this impression was derived from a trust 
placed in her statesmen, Masaryk and Beneš. They inspired confidence and were 
counted on to do their best in order to preserve a fragile peace along the Danube. On the 
other side, Romania, and particularly Yugoslavia, were decried as unsettled countries 
riddled with internal frictions which, in turn, created an environment conducive to 
                                                 
226 TNA, Minutes by Lampson, 12 January 1925, C 256/256/12 and 5 March 1925, C 3050/256/12, FO 
371/10674.  
227 AJ, London Legation, Gavrilović to Ninčić, 1 January 1924, without number.  
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foreign adventure. For the most part the British blamed the current regimes in two 
countries, embodied in the Prime Ministers Pašić and Brătianu, for their unpredictable 
behaviour in relations with their neighbours who might have even felt menaced. The 
charge was quite harsh and unfairly rooted in an intense dislike of the two men rather 
than justified by their actual policies. By contrast, the Hungarian regime headed by 
Horthy and Bethlen was deemed a stable and solid creation, despite its anti-democratic 
measures. As such, the Foreign Office was convinced, it accounted for peace and 
stability and deserved support. That was the thinking behind Britain’s staunch refusal to 
have anything to do with attempts to precipitate a change of government in Budapest 
and her willingness to extend a helping hand in the matter of the Hungarian 
reconstruction loan. In a word, in the continuous wrangle between the Little Entente and 
Hungary the Foreign Office believed that the fault lay mostly with the former. Still, 
diplomats from Whitehall were aware of security risks related to the observance of the 
Trianon Treaty obligations and were ready to take action in order to coerce Hungary 
into compliance. But there were other forces at work. The Treasury and the Bank of 
England pursued their own ambitions in a comprehensive plan to restore the economic 
health of Central Europe. The Hungarian reconstruction loan was held to be a crucial 
step in that direction. For that purpose financial institutions, especially the Treasury, 
brought pressure to bear on the Foreign Office such as to make it brush aside the 
security concerns in regard to Hungary and overpower the Little Entente’s resistance. In 
the ensuing assessment of priorities between the conflicting agendas the Foreign Office 
climbed down and recognised the primacy of Niemeyer’s and Norman’s plans. In doing 
so it overlooked its own concerns and discarded recommendations from the War Office.    
A close understanding between France and the Little Entente was dimly viewed 
in the Foreign Office because it appeared to have perpetuated the gap between the 
victors and the vanquished of the late war and was thus detrimental for European 
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pacification. This impression was further amplified by the distorted perception in 
Whitehall as to relations existing between Paris and the alliance. The forward policy 
adopted on the part of Poincaré’s government at the time of the Ruhr crisis and his 
effort to associate the Little Entente countries with France heavily prejudiced the 
outlook of the Foreign Office towards the former. This tendency was so overwhelming 
that a flow of British Ministers’ reports from Belgrade, Prague and Bucharest which ran 
contrary to the preconceived opinions held in London made not the slightest difference. 
The Central Department was imbued with prejudices to such an extent that it did not 
simply ignore the reports dispelling notions of a full-scale commitment of the Little 
Entente to Paris but indeed exaggerated the real scope of relations between the two.   
 Naturally, in such a frame of mind nothing was more unpalatable to Curzon and 
his subordinates than a further strengthening of ties between France and her three 
‘vassals’. The attitude adopted towards conclusion of the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty of 
1924 clearly demonstrated British feeling on the matter and revealed a discrepancy 
between the British perception and the true situation. While Beneš did his best - with 
considerable success - to reduce Czechoslovak dependence on France trying to follow 
the middle course between Paris and London in a manner which could be nothing but 
pleasing to Britain, he was met in the Foreign Office with suspicion that he was 
becoming completely subservient to Paris.    
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CHAPTER 3 
  
MANAGING PERPETUAL CRISIS, 1925-1927 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The mid-1920s seems to have been the most tranquil time during the interwar period. 
The Locarno agreement appeared to its contemporaries as a milestone which truly 
ushered in a new era of peace and international cooperation. Although it was limited to 
Western Europe, it was expected that it would provide a solution for the permanent 
pacification of Central and South-Eastern Europe as well by emulating the pattern of 
reconciliation. This chapter looks at Britain’s endeavours to promote a Locarno-style 
policy and its reaction to the increasing confrontation between Italy and the Little 
Entente, particularly Yugoslavia, as a function of Franco-Italian rivalry. British foreign 
policy struggled to smooth away this conflict and bring about a comprehensive 
appeasement in the region.  
The first section of the chapter outlines the abortive British attempts to initiate 
some sort of Locarno-like agreement which would cover the Danubian basin and the 
Balkans, with each region being dealt with in a separate settlement.  It is suggested that 
failure was the inevitable result of a policy based on misperceptions and failed 
expectations. Since the Foreign Office was circumspect in the manner it acted and took 
pains not to appear too forward in its mediation role, it could only follow and respond to 
the successive stages of crisis in South Eastern Europe: the first stage of crisis, analysed 
in the second section of the chapter, was caused by the forward Italian policy in Albania 
that effectively destroyed any prospect of a stabilisation on the Locarno pattern; the 
third section examines another failed attempt at a tripartite arrangement between France, 
Italy and Yugoslavia; Franco-Italian rivalry in Romania constitutes the fourth section; 
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finally, the conclusion of the Franco-Yugoslav agreement and the second Tirana Pact 
between Italy and Albania at the end of 1927, which consecrated a new and perilous 
situation whereby two hostile blocs were pitted against each other, are the subject of the 
fifth section. The following sections describe and analyse the responses of Whitehall to 
those successive stages and reveal the underlying premises which were common strands 
throughout.                  
 
 
 
3.1. The Locarno Remedy  
 
When the Locarno agreement was initialled on 16 October 1925 it raised great 
hopes and expectations across Europe that it ushered in a new era in international 
relations relieved of the anxieties and conflicts left over from the war. The exuberance 
of optimism was especially manifest in Britain and the role of Curzon’s successor, Sir 
Austen Chamberlain, in bringing it about was extolled. Ever since the war a doctrine 
had been gaining ground that the root of the evil that had caused the world catastrophe 
had been the secret diplomacy of the pre-war era whereby a few policy-makers had 
concluded clandestine military pacts which had divided Europe into hostile blocs. The 
ensuing conflagration had been but a natural progression of such a sinister situation; a 
new era of post-war open diplomacy under the aegis of the fledgling League of Nations 
was meant to ensure that the continent would not revert to the old bad ways.1 The 
formula of a voluntarily contracted agreement between former enemies seemed an 
obvious solution for the rest of the continent as well and talk was rife in the House of 
Commons about the extension of the Locarno principles to the Balkans.2   
                                                 
1 Gordon Craig, ‘The British Foreign Office from Grey to Austen Chamberlain’, in The Diplomats, 1919-
1939, ed. by Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert, 2 vols (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), I, pp. 
15-48 (pp. 22-24); Paul Kennedy, The Realities behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British 
external policy, 1865-1980 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 243-244.   
2 Frederic Northedge, The Troubled Giant: Britain among the Great Powers, 1916-1939 (London: Bell, 
1966), pp. 269-270.   
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 While preparing his memorandum on the Locarno settlement, the Historical 
Adviser of the Foreign Office, James Headlam-Morley, did not neglect the necessity to 
provide for the security of Central and Eastern Europe or overlook the grave dangers of 
a failure to meet this requirement:  
Has anyone attempted to realise what would happen if there were to be a new 
partition of Poland, or if the Czechoslovak State were to be so curtailed and 
dismembered that in fact it disappeared from the map of Europe? The whole of 
Europe would at once be in chaos. There would no longer be any principle, 
meaning or sense in the territorial arrangements of the continent. Imagine, for 
instance, that under some improbable condition, Austria rejoined Germany; that 
Germany, using the discontented minority in Bohemia, demanded a new frontier far 
over the mountains, including Carlsbad and Pilsen, and that at the same time, in 
alliance with Germany, the Hungarians recovered the southern slope of the 
Carpathians. This would be catastrophic, and, even if we neglected to interfere in 
time to prevent it, we should afterwards be driven to interfere, probably too late.3
 
For Headlam-Morley, a fervent advocate of the maintenance of the settlement of 1919, 
notwithstanding any necessary and even desirable minor rectifications, a clear and 
official British statement of policy in regard to Central and Eastern Europe was required 
not only to accomodate the uncertainties and vagueness of the League of Nation’s 
mechanism, but also to assure the smaller states of the region of their existence and 
peaceful development. The goal to pursue, he proposed, was a rapprochement between 
the Little Entente countries and Hungary in such a way as to lead to a conversion of the 
treaties binding the former into a mutual treaty of guarantee.4 Thus, the system of 
separate alliances, ‘fundamentally inconsistent with the Covenant of the League’, would 
be transformed into a more general agreement, eventually European in scope. Headlam-
Morley’s suggestion of a clear-cut guarantee for the smaller states was never going to 
be seriously contemplated, but the Foreign Office did try to promote a Locarno-model 
settlement for Central Europe and the Balkans.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 James Headlam-Morley, Studies in Diplomatic History (London: Methuen, 1930), p. 170. 
4 Ibid., p. 184.  
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3.1.1. A Central European Locarno 
 
Chamberlain was quick to seize the momentum and used the occasion of the 
Locarno gathering to advance a suggestion to Beneš that a similar arrangement might be 
reached between the Little Entente countries and Hungary and Austria.5 The Czech was 
responsive and promised that he would work to that end. Indeed, Beneš did discuss the 
subject with Ninčić, but the report of the new British Minister at Belgrade, Howard 
Kennard, was not too encouraging - the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs thought that 
the initiative should come from either Britain or France and they believed that Italy 
would make trouble as regards Austria while Hungary would put forward impossible 
demands.6   
When Kennard reported that Ninčić was sceptical about the prospects of the 
Balkan pact and more hopeful of a Central European variant, the Foreign Office 
concurred with his estimation.7 Chamberlain cleared his mind on the subject as well and 
his views were expressed in circular instructions to Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade 
and Bucharest. The Foreign Secretary took a high moral ground: 
For their part His Majesty’s Government would most cordially welcome and give 
their fullest support to any proposal having for its object the extension to Central 
Europe of the principles established at Locarno. Salvation, however, must come 
from within, and there can be no real peace but by consent. If the Great Powers 
were to impose peace, such peace would remain an outer garment, which could be 
thrown off at any moment. The Governments directly concerned must will peace. 
When they do, and then only, will peace be a reality.8  
 
On the more practical side, Chamberlain pointed out two preliminary conditions to be 
preached to all and sundry: a policy of conciliation towards the minorities in the 
successor states and the cooperation and goodwill of the Italians.9 The latter provision 
                                                 
5 TNA, Chamberlain to Tyrell, 19 October 1925, C 13131/13131/62, FO 371/10701. 
6 BDFA, vol. 6, Doc. 159, Kennard to Chamberlain, 22 October 1925.  
7 TNA, Minutes by Bateman, 23 October 1925, Howard Smith and Lampson, 24 October 1925, C 
13386/13131/62, FO 371/10701; Lampson was a pessimist in regard to possibility of an agreement which 
he believed would founder on the Hungarian intransigence. Romanian Foreign Minister Duca in contrast 
to his Little Entente colleagues regarded the Balkans as better field for the conclusion of mutual security 
pacts than Central Europe. See BDFA, vol. 2, Doc. 109, Dering to Chamberlain, 7 November 1925.   
8 DBFP, ser. IA, vol. I, No. 39, Chamberlain to Clerk, 30 October 1925. 
9 Ibid.; also No. 40, Chamberlain to Graham, 30 October 1925.  
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showed that he pragmatically appreciated that insuperable obstacles were more likely to 
come from a Great Power than from the smaller successor states.  
 The British Minister at Budapest, Colville Barclay, sounded the Hungarian 
Foreign Minister, Lajos Walko, about the idea and concluded that the country at large 
was far from sharing the spirit of Locarno.10 His pessimism was shared by Lampson 
and the Permanent Under-Secretary, William Tyrell, who maintained that the minority 
grievances were not a genuine concern of the Hungarian government but rather a means 
of keeping an irredentism alive until a favourable occasion had arisen to restore direct 
rule from Budapest over those minorities and the lost territory.11 Barclay’s impression 
was confirmed in a conversation between Lampson and the Hungarian Minister in 
London when the latter resolutely refused even the suggestion of concluding general 
arbitration treaties with the neighbouring states.12 Chamberlain was also disillusioned 
about the true Hungarian motives in the matter.   
In terms of practical politics, then, how could a Locarno-modelled agreement 
realistically be promoted? The invidious task of conjuring up a concrete plan was 
undertaken by Howard Smith.13 His basic assumption was that Hungary, unlike 
Germany with her occupied Rhineland and trading interests, lacked any special 
inducement to seek a rapprochement with her neighbours. On the other hand, the Little 
Entente states needed a spell of settled peace in order to consolidate their administration 
and their hold on the new provinces peopled by different nations. Hence, it was the 
Little Entente that had to initiate reconciliation by offering reasonable and sufficiently 
attractive concessions to its adversary:  
The agreement might be something on the following lines. Hungary would agree to 
accept the frontiers as laid down by the Treaty of Trianon. Any revision of the 
                                                 
10 BDFA, vol. 2, Doc. 106, Barclay to Chamberlain, 6 November 1925. 
11 TNA, Minutes by Lampson, 12 November 1925, and Tyrell, 13 November 1925, C 14270/13131, FO 
371/10701; Contrary to the official policy Hungarophile Lampson personally felt ‘that a restoration of at 
least Transylvania would be in the ultimate interest of European civilisation.’ Emphasis in original.   
12 TNA, Minute by Lampson, 11 November 1925, C 14474/13131/62, FO 371/10701.  
13 BDFA, vol. 2, Doc.108, Memorandum respecting the Situation in Central Europe [written by Howard 
Smith], 11 November 1925.  
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frontiers is impossible now. Certain areas might be declared demilitarised zones of 
a certain depth on each side of the frontier, and each of the States concerned – 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Roumania, Jugoslavia and, if necessary, Austria – would 
undertake to resist any other State which violated the demilitarised zones. In this 
way the Little Entente would still exist and operate in the case of Hungarian 
aggression, while Hungary would herself have the assistance of all the other Powers 
in the contrary case. This would meet Hungary’s present objection that she, who is 
disarmed, is surrounded by enemies armed to the teeth; and would tend towards 
general disarmament in this part of Europe.14
 
Nothing could, however, be accomplished without addressing the minority issue. 
In this respect Howard Smith proposed an entirely new approach. Hitherto all the 
minority grievances had been dealt with in accordance with the terms of the minority 
treaties through the medium of the League of Nations. The experience was, Howard 
Smith’s memorandum claimed, deeply unsatisfactory as the procedure had been giving 
undue importance to insignificant complaints and affording the Hungarians a valid and 
perpetual excuse to foment irredentism and allege afterwards that the League had not 
given a fair hearing to minority petitions; moreover, it had been producing nothing but 
interminable and unsolvable bickering which, in turn, could only further exacerbate the 
relations between the parties concerned. By mutual agreement such a procedure should 
be abandoned and replaced by ‘conciliation boards, which would be called on to settle 
any question affecting the treatment of the Hungarian minority which the Hungarian 
Government should see fit to bring up.’15 The concept of conciliation boards would be 
borrowed from the Locarno treaties. Though the appeals would no doubt be abundant in 
the beginning, they could reasonably be expected to diminish in time. If accepted, this 
would be a major concession on the part of the Little Entente as it would effectively 
allow the Hungarian government to interfere in their internal affairs.  
The memorandum envisaged a further concession by the Little Entente which 
consisted of revoking the ban upon a Habsburg restoration.16 The suggestion was 
justified on the grounds that the peace treaties did not even mention the House of 
                                                 
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid.   
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Habsburg and its dethronement as opposed to the German dynasty and that the law 
passed in the Hungarian parliament had come into being under direct pressure from both 
the Little Entente and the Great Powers. The gesture of the former in this sense would 
alleviate tension and bring closer a general appeasement. 
The suggestions advanced tended somewhat to underrate the main problem – 
Hungary’s utter refusal to acquiesce in the status quo concerning the frontiers – an 
attitude of mind which was clearly recognised in the Central Department. That in itself 
rendered pointless any effort to treat the minority issue as the crux of the problem. Yet, 
the memorandum represented a fairly elaborate and skilful attempt to tackle the 
obstacles which stood in the way of a Central European Locarno and, given the 
circumstances, it could have hardly made more far-reaching proposals. 
A more precise indication of the practical lines on which the thoughts of the 
Foreign Office were running was outlined in reply to Kennard’s suggestion 
unobtrusively to encourage the Yugoslavs in the direction of a Balkan Locarno. The 
Chief of the Central Department underlined that the scheme for Central Europe and the 
Balkans fell into two distinct headings, although they might under favourable conditions 
‘ultimately interlock to some extent.’17 As regards the former he was hopeful that 
something would come to pass following the forthcoming conversations with Bethlen at 
Geneva and he believed that ‘we must look to Benes to keep things going in that 
particular sphere rather than to Nincic.’18 Hungary was to be treated with the utmost 
patience so as not to add to her Prime Minister’s domestic difficulties and in general the 
process of Central European pacification should be left to run its course.  
A chance to instil the idea of a Central European agreement among the states 
concerned offered itself during the usual pourparlers during the League sessions in 
Geneva. Chamberlain, accompanied by Lampson, met with Count Bethlen and urged 
                                                 
17 TNA, Lampson to Kennard, private, 28 December 1925, C 16693/13131/62, FO 371/10701; A copy of 
this letter was privately sent to Budapest, Prague, Bucharest, Sofia, Athens, Paris and Rome.  
18 Ibid.  
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him to come to terms with the Little Entente states.19 Having frankly admitted that no 
Hungarian government could ever recognise the territorial settlement under the peace 
treaty as final and pointed out all the difficulties standing in the way of any Danubian 
Locarno, the Prime Minister still intimated that he would take the opportunity of the 
proceedings of the Hungarian Committee of the League in March 1926 to discuss the 
question personally with Beneš and propose some sort of arbitration agreement.   
At the time when progress in the negotiations was expected, however, the franc 
forgery scandal clouded the prospect of a successful issue.20 Lampson insisted that it 
was necessary to spare no effort to scotch the affair lest it should prejudice an attempt to 
achieve conciliation between Hungary and her neighbours.21 Howard Smith was more 
pessimistic in his prediction that hopes of any settlement were being delayed for many 
months and perhaps years.22 This prognostication proved very accurate. On the 
occasion of a personal meeting with Lampson at Geneva on 8 March 1926 Bethlen 
admitted that nothing could be done in the matter of an arbitration treaty with 
Czechoslovakia due to the bitterness aroused in Hungary by Beneš’s part in the 
agitation over the forgeries scandal.23 The Hungarian suggested that conciliation might 
be initiated with Yugoslavia instead and his new proposal was well received at the 
Foreign Office.24 Indeed, it had long been obvious that certain factors rendered an 
understanding between Hungary and Yugoslavia much easier to realise than a 
rapprochement between Hungary and the other two Little Entente members. The 
smallest tract of former Hungarian territory with comparatively few Hungarians had 
been ceded to Belgrade as compared with the large Magyar minorities in Romania and 
Czechoslovakia. Finally, there was an important psychological proclivity, noted by all 
                                                 
19 DBFP, ser. IA, vol. I, No. 137, Record of a Discussion between Sir Austen Chamberlain, Mr. Lampson 
and Count Bethlen, Geneva, 8 December 1925.  
20 See pp. 75-77.  
21 TNA, Lampson to Phipps, 14 January 1926, C 417/210/21, FO 371/11364.  
22 TNA, Minute by Howard Smith, 20 January 1926, C 652/210/21, FO 371/11364.  
23 BDFA, vol. 2, Doc. 139, Memorandum by Mr. Lampson, 8 March 1926. 
24 TNA, Minute by Aveling, 8 April 1926, C 4319/1618/62, FO 371/11243. 
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British observers, to come to terms with Yugoslavia: whereas the Magyars, proud of 
their military tradition, were contemptuous of the Czechs and Romanians in terms of 
their war record, they had a wholesome respect for Serb military virtues. The British 
were aware of how formidable a difficulty this intolerance and the reactions it caused on 
the other side presented:  
If the issues involved were not so serious the attitude of Hungary towards the Little 
Entente would be amusing. It is stupid of the Hungarians to talk as they do, and 
they despise the Czechs and Roumanians and do not seem to be able to resist telling 
them so with consequent fury and fear from Prague and Bucharest. As a matter of 
fact Hungary is powerless and if only Prague and Bucharest could take no notice 
the Hungarians would probably desist.25  
 
For that reason it seemed very opportune to start the process of reconciliation from the 
quarter where the chances appeared to have been most favourable.  
Furthermore, as a result of the forgery scandal Beneš was suspected of being 
primarily interested in getting rid of Count Bethlen.  When Beneš’s overtures to 
Hungary for the conclusion of an arbitration treaty were rejected the Foreign Office was 
full of understanding for the intricacies of Bethlen’s internal position; by contrast, the 
Czech was generally credited with insincerity and an eagerness to score a point at the 
expense of his adversary.26 The negotiations between Hungary and Yugoslavia 
proceeded well for a while and Walko told Chamberlain in September 1926 that an 
arbitration agreement might be signed by the following month as a first step towards 
something in the nature of a Locarno settlement.27      
This was not to be, however, as Mussolini made sure that Hungary would not 
come to terms with Belgrade at the same time as Italian relations with Yugoslavia 
reached a breaking point in connexion with the Albanian crisis. The Duce had attempted 
to turn the Locarno formula to his own benefit and organise a grandiose Danubian-
                                                 
25 TNA, Minute by Howard Smith, 22 May 1925, C 6761/3066/62, FO 371/10699; also minute by 
Howard Smith, 7 April 1925, C 4851/4851/21, FO 371/10778.   
26 TNA, Minute by Howard Smith, 3 March 1926 referring to Dodd to Chamberlain, 25 February 1926, C 
2591/1618/62, FO 371/11242; Barclay to Chamberlain, 1 March 1926, and minute by Sargent, 12 March 
1926, C 2841/1618/62, FO 371/11242.  
27 TNA, Chamberlain to Parr, 14 September 1926, C 10169/3641/21, FO 371/11372. 
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Balkan pact in which Italy would be the sole arbiter and from which France would be 
absolutely excluded.28 His plan had failed as he was unable to pressure the Yugoslavs 
into complete abandonment of France and he now embarked on courting revisionist 
states, the neighbours of Yugoslavia, in order to encircle that country and bring her to 
heel. Hungary had a crucial role to play in the encirclement of Yugoslavia and 
Mussolini went out of his way to gain her as an ally. He succeeded in signing a pact of 
friendship with Hungary during Bethlen’s official visit to Rome on 5 April 1927 which 
was accompanied by a secret agreement on the illicit arming of the Hungarian army; the 
details of this arms smuggling into Hungary as well as the training of Hungarian pilots 
in Italy and the purchase of three hundred aircraft in contravention of the Trianon Treaty 
were worked out during the visit to Rome of Bethlen’s personal emissaries in July.29        
The British had no idea of what actually transpired at Rome nor did they suspect 
any sinister development. Not even the Little Entente officials suspected the conclusion 
of any kind of military understanding and their diplomats calmly commented on 
Bethlen’s visit during their interviews at Whitehall. But it became apparent that 
arbitration treaties between Hungary and Yugoslavia or – still less likely - the other 
Little Entente states were not to be expected. After the Little Entente conference at 
Jáchimov in May 1927 the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Vojislav Marinković, informed 
Kennard that the negotiations for an arbitration treaty with Hungary would not be 
continued.30  
The reaction of the Foreign Office was a manifestation of all its essential 
illusions and misconceptions in regard to Hungarian foreign policy. Barclay asseverated 
from Budapest, his views being unreservedly accepted in London, that although the 
outstanding feature of Hungary’s foreign relations throughout 1927 had been a 
                                                 
28 James Burgwyn, Italian Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, 1918-1941 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 
1997), pp. 36-40.   
29 Vera Jelinek, ‘The Hungarian Factor in Italian Foreign Policy, 1918-1927’ (unpublished doctoral 
thesis, New York University, 1977), pp. 319-320.    
30 TNA, Kennard to Chamberlain, 18 May 1927, C 4529/532/62, FO 371/12111. 
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continued rapprochement with Italy, the overtures had been invariably coming from 
Rome. This situation could not have failed adversely to affect relations with the Little 
Entente, particularly with Yugoslavia, but the Minister was sure that Hungary had no 
desire to be a mere satellite of Italy and was not likely to side with her in the case of 
Italo-Yugoslav hostilities. Predictably, Count Bethlen’s remaining in office was deemed 
the surest guarantee of the Magyars not adopting any adventurous course, in addition to 
a common sense assumption that given Hungary’s geostrategic position ‘she may be 
absolved of the folly of entertaining dreams of aggressive action’.31        
The situation in Central Europe was rendered even more tense by the newspaper 
campaign that was soon to follow. On 21 June 1927 Lord Rothemere published the 
article ‘Hungary’s Place in the Sun’ in the Daily Mail taking up the Hungarian case for 
revising the Treaty of Trianon.32 From the intercepted telegrams passing between the 
Hungarian Legations at London and Paris and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 
Budapest, the Hungarian government appeared to have been taken somewhat by 
surprise and the Minister at London tried to keep out of the whole business.33 
Nevertheless, the uproar that ensued across Central Europe, including a public dispute 
between Beneš and Lord Rothemere, stamped out any prospect, if ever there was one, of 
friendly discussions between the Magyars and their neighbours.    
 
 
 
3.1.2. A Balkan Locarno 
 
The attempt to come to some sort of a Balkan Locarno followed the review of 
British policy in the Balkans in mid-1925 which had been provoked by Kennard’s 
enquires from Belgrade as to the main lines of such policy. The discussion clearly 
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32 Carmi, ch. 4. 
33 TNA, Memorandum by Howard Smith with a summary of intercepted messages, 17 October 1927, C 
8535/5327/21, FO 371/12186.  
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demonstrated the Central Department’s frame of mind. Lampson cold shouldered any 
inference that Britain should have an active policy in the region, the state of which he 
did not on the whole find too disturbing:  
Now that Russia & Austria have been eliminated, the Balkans are far less dangerous 
to us than they were before 1914. Heaven forbid that we should start interfering 
with unwanted advice or trying to mould the course of events down there. Let us 
carefully observe; let us look to our representatives to keep us fully informed; let us 
try to increase trade etc between this country & Serbia. But do not let us go further 
than that.34
 
Chamberlain expounded the view that the lack of immediate British interests in the 
region precluded a necessity to plump for ‘any particular solution of any of its many 
problems.’35 He recapitulated a dictum that the internal and external peace among the 
Balkan nations would in due course bring about their prosperity and economic 
development ‘from which we should desire the natural advantage of a great trading 
nation which is the only thing we desire for ourselves.’36
Kennard, who took a much graver view of the Balkan situation as seen from 
Belgrade, did not subscribe to the Foreign Office’s ‘present policy… to have no 
policy’.37 He was convinced that any thought of bringing Italy and France together was 
doomed to failure given their conflicting policies and was in favour of a more far-
reaching and bolder approach centred on his current post:  
In my own humble opinion we should aim at the encouragement of a Balkan 
federation, however remote. It is our best chance of resisting the ultimate pressure 
from Germany and Russia which may otherwise be prolonged indefinitely. 
Romania is, of course rotten; Greece is wobbly and Bulgaria will require time to 
get on her feet again. The Yugs are certainly the soundest and while they may be 
suffering from swollenheadedness and ultranationalism, they have all the 
elements of a strong nation and if they can only settle their internal differences, 
should play the major role in the Balkans in the future.38
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36 Ibid. Emphasis in original.  
37 TNA, Kennard to Nicolson, private, 22 June 1925, C 8682/251/62, FO 371/10695.  
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Kennard’s proposal for the encouragement of a Balkan federation did not meet with 
approval in Whitehall,39 while his suggestion in regard to the leading part that should be 
bestowed on Yugoslavia found some favourable reception subject to reservation that 
‘we could be certain that the SCS Kingdom would never effect a junction with Slav 
Russia & form a channel for the divertion [sic] of Russian ambitions in Constantinople 
to one of the more important Greek ports’.40 After careful consideration it was decided 
‘that the best line for HMG to follow in the Balkans was to strengthen the League’s 
influence (through Serbia), but to curb the more truculent moods of Belgrade.’41  
Besides strictly local conditions the Foreign Secretary’s doctrine required 
enlisting the support of Rome, all the more so as Italian policy in the Balkans was 
hitherto deemed ‘obscure and vacillating.’42 On 10 June 1925, assuming that he could 
muster up loyal Italian cooperation in the Balkans, Chamberlain, together with Briand, 
addressed a personal appeal to the Duce for his continued support and collaboration in 
the preservation of peace there.43 The idea originated with Nicolson and it disclosed all 
the fundamental fallacies of the British estimation of the situation. It was founded on 
two premises: 1) that ‘the prime offender is the S.C.S. State egged on by Italy’ and 2) 
that based on the first assumption the only way of pacifying the region was to ‘rope in 
Italy’ into joint action with France and Britain which should be attained by ‘playing up 
directly to Mussolini’s vanity.’44 The scheme was at the same time riddled with 
incompatible suspicions about Italian conduct that had been entertained at the Foreign 
Office for a long time. When the message of the British and French Foreign Ministers to 
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Rome failed to produce any impact this was not a cause for concern in Whitehall. Quite 
the contrary, Lampson was much relieved that ‘Mussolini appears to have put our recent 
letter to him in a pidgeon-hole!’ as he believed that the Italians would never loyally 
cooperate over the Salonica issue on account of their encouragement of Yugoslavian 
aspirations in the port’s direction.45 In fact, Chamberlain was told that the telegram had 
reached Mussolini shortly before the two of them met on the occasion of the initialling 
of the Locarno treaty in mid-October 1925. The Secretary of State repeated his 
suggestion to the Duce but received ‘a rather non-committal answer.’46 Mussolini’s 
reticence did not augur well for the future and was moreover found to have given 
‘colour to the recent secret reports we have had as to the doings of Italy in the 
Balkans.’47 Despite unfavourable signs regarding Italian policy, the British remained 
unshaken in their conviction that the only way of proceeding with a Balkan Locarno 
was in cooperation with Rome. It seems that the Foreign Office maintained that 
Mussolini had not adopted any definite, and still less a definitely destructive, course in 
the Balkans (or Central Europe) and therefore steadfastly persevered in cultivating his 
good will.      
This was amply demonstrated in dealing with ever louder and more frequent 
Yugoslav warnings pertaining to Italian intentions. When Ninčić communicated to 
Kennard the Yugoslav General Staff’s fear of an Italian military coup the Foreign 
Office discounted such utterances as unfounded. Lampson made full allowance for 
rampant Italian intrigue but doubted whether it would ‘materialise into definite 
dangers’, while the Third Secretary, John McEwen, thought that the fear might have the 
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wholesome effect of making Belgrade more tractable over the Salonica railway.48 On 
receipt of a report from the Rome Embassy denying military preparations in Italy 
Nicolson was much harsher on Ninčić, ‘a stupid & unscrupulous man & therefore 
dangerous’ and dismissed the whole story as the latter’s ‘scare-crow’.49    
The rift between Yugoslavia and Italy became apparent in Albanian matters after 
the swift succession of two revolutions in that country. The first one saw pro-Italian 
bishop Fan-Noli overthrowing the President Ahmed Bey Zogu in June 1924. With 
covert Yugoslav military support Ahmed Zogu then re-established himself at Tirana in 
December the same year. What at first appeared to have been a clear victory for 
Yugoslav foreign policy soon proved to be a false hope. Rome provided desperately 
needed funds for Ahmed Zogu’s administration and gradually attained an undisputed 
hold on Albanian economic life which rendered the independence of the country a mere 
chimera.50 It was not long before the Yugoslav military envoy at Tirana, Lieutenant-
Colonel Tanasije Dinić, reported to the Great General Staff that Ahmed Zogu had 
definitely transferred his and his country’s allegiance to Italy in return for generous 
financial support.51      
In fact, Yugoslavia’s attitude towards Italy was far from being exaggerated and 
unreasonable. The Italian General Staff had been preparing plans for attack on 
Yugoslavia since May 1925 and on 2 October 1926 the Duce ordered his Chief of 
General Staff to have 20 divisions ready to teach Yugoslavia a lesson. An anti-Yugoslav 
press campaign and overt statements by Fascist jingoists declaring their pretensions on 
the Dalmatian coast left no doubt in Belgrade about the true nature of Italian intentions. 
On 12 March 1925 King Alexander, Ninčić and the military authorities requested from 
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the Czechoslovak Minister an urgent delivery of 100,000 rifles, 100,000,000 rounds of 
ammunition and 100,000 grenades for the purpose of a defensive war.52 Beneš fully 
shared Belgrade’s suspicions and on 26 November promised the Yugoslav military 
attaché covert and active military help.53 A month later the two men had another 
conversation and the Yugoslav relayed to Beneš a personal plea from his sovereign 
enumerating the direst necessities of the Yugoslav Army, namely aircraft and pilots who 
should be dispatched as volunteers.54 The Czechoslovak Foreign Minister gave positive 
assurances in respect of all necessary military material. Having discussed the possibility 
of an Italo-Yugoslav conflict in his recent visit to Paris and London, he also stated that 
France was unreservedly behind Belgrade, while Chamberlain was convinced that Italy 
would not dare to attack Yugoslavia as she was currently contemplating aggression 
against Turkey.55     
Since Yugoslav professions concerning the Italian menace were disbelieved, 
Oliver Harvey, fresh from the Rome Embassy, suspected that Ninčić was trying to delay 
or avoid any negotiations for a Balkan pact.56 As the Foreign Minister grew more 
nervous about Italian aggressive intentions and vented his concerns to Kennard, the 
latter was more inclined to scoff at his ‘somewhat puerile apprehensions’ and 
administer a warning that the contempt often felt in Yugoslavia for Italian military 
strength might be disastrous for the country.57 Still, in time Kennard was increasingly 
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struck with the genuineness of Yugoslav perturbation as regards Rome’s designs but his 
renewed reports to that effect did not change the opinion held in the Foreign Office that 
it was ‘so much moon-shine - a mere rehash of the usual Balkan talk to which we are 
accustomed’, a reference to Ninčić’s repeated outpourings on the subject.58 The 
Ambassador at Rome vehemently confirmed the views of his superiors as to the 
perfectly pacific policy of the Italian Duce.59 The Central Department officials argued 
that the Balkans could not provide the room needed for Italian colonisation and thus 
could not be a suitable victim of Mussolini’s aggression.60    
Kennard was eager to get the ball rolling and egged on Ninčić towards taking 
the initiative in the matter of a Balkan Locarno. As a beginning he recommended a 
rapprochement with Bulgaria to which, he optimistically professed, the Macedonian 
problem would not be an insuperable obstacle.61 The Minister’s zeal and general course 
of action were approved by the Central Department. Yugoslavia and her Foreign 
Minister, Lampson confirmed, were marked out for the leading part in the Balkans.62 
Belgrade should be encouraged to conclude arbitration treaties of the type signed 
between Germany and Poland and Germany and Czechoslovakia at Locarno as the sort 
of treaties concluded between Germany and France and Germany and Belgium were 
applicable to neither Central Europe nor to the Balkans since there was no question of 
anyone guaranteeing agreement in the way Britain and Italy had done in Western 
Europe. The Yugoslavs should be tempted to proceed in the desired direction by the 
prospect of soaring international standing and prestige. In the meanwhile Kennard was 
instructed to preach the desirability of conciliatory methods in dealing with individual 
points of friction such as the Ghevgheli-Salonica railway as the best way of preparing 
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the ground for a comprehensive settlement. Lampson thought that the suggestion should 
be put to Belgrade to approach Bulgaria and Greece simultaneously in order to avoid the 
impression in both countries that a rapprochement with one of them was aimed against 
the other.63 Lampson’s recommendation was that whereas Central European 
pacification should be encouraged as unobtrusively as possible Yugoslavia should adopt 
a more forward policy in the Balkans subject to avoiding the impression ‘(a) that we are 
thrusting the thing down the throats of anyone, or (b) that Serbia is trying to do so.’64  
Before the British got involved in promoting a Balkan Locarno the idea had 
already been mooted by Greece. On 3 November 1925 the Secretary-General of the 
League of Nations, Sir Eric Drummond, was handed a note on behalf of the Greek 
government which set forth a suggestion that the League should take the initiative in 
promoting a security pact in the Balkans. The rationale behind this proposal was the 
Greek wish to overcome the outstanding questions with their neighbours and step out of 
their political isolation by dint of a general security arrangement. However, there was 
no prospect that the League would undertake such a task and in addition the initiative 
was resented in Yugoslavia.65  
At the beginning of 1926 the British closely watched what they hoped to be a 
development in the right direction. The Yugoslav government embarked on fresh 
negotiations with Greece and Bulgaria with a view to concluding a Balkan Locarno. The 
Yugoslav approach was to resolve all the outstanding questions with Athens as a 
prerequisite for the successful conclusion of an arbitration treaty.66 On 17 August 1926 
the agreement between Greece and Yugoslavia was finally reached, comprising of a 
political treaty of understanding and friendship and a set of conventions covering 
railway and transit questions, including the administration of the Ghevgheli-Salonica 
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Railway, the Yugoslav free zone in Salonica and a minority convention. However, when 
a revolution broke out in Greece just a few days after the signature of these conventions, 
the dictatorship of General Pangalos was deposed and the new Greek government never 
ratified the agreement.   
Nor was the position as regards Bulgaro-Yugoslav relations any better. The 
arbitration treaty offered by Belgrade at the end of April 1926 was refused by the 
Bulgarian government as it contained articles aimed at the suppression of  IMRO which 
were found impossible to undertake in Sofia and which raised fears that they would 
give a legal ground for interference in Bulgarian internal affairs. The Foreign Office 
could not comprehend the Yugoslav attitude towards Bulgaria – the insistence on the 
suppression of the IMRO, besides being difficult to fulfil, was bound, in its view, to 
prevent any chance of coming to terms with the government at Sofia.67 The long-
standing British view was that ‘given time a fairly representative Bulg[arian]. Govt will 
be able to deal with them without outside interference – just as, in the course of time, 
the SCS Govt will be able to deal with the [I]MRO’s activities in S[outh]. Serbia.’68 
Opinion was unanimous in the Central Department that it was once more Ninčić’s 
profound ignorance, whether real or contrived, that was ‘becoming increasingly 
dangerous as a factor in European relations.’69  
The firm belief that salvation from the Macedonian imbroglio was to ‘come 
from within Bulgaria’ accounted for British determination to see a loan for the 
settlement of the refugees from Greek Macedonia in Bulgaria through the medium of 
the League.70 A settled state of the peasantry would cut the ground from under IMRO’s 
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feet and thus contribute to political stabilisation in Bulgaria and ultimately to Balkan 
peace. The loan produced a markedly unfavourable impression in Yugoslavia and went 
to prove, according to a report from Belgrade, the feeling of suspicion and mistrust 
which rendered any Balkan Locarno impossible. George Ogilvie-Forbes of the Belgrade 
Legation attributed such a state of affairs to the general backwardness of the country, 
the state of civilisation of which he compared to ‘England in the days of Sir Robert 
Walpole’; he prophesied that it would take a generation for it to find its Pitt who would 
equip her for the great role she was destined to fulfil in South-Eastern Europe.71 The 
Foreign Office brushed aside Yugoslav, Romanian and Greek opposition and lent their 
support to the refugee loan which was pushed through mainly by the determined efforts 
of the Treasury and the Bank of England.72   
Things were left to drift from bad to worse. The end of September 1927 was 
marked by an intensified terrorist campaign on the part of IMRO which culminated in 
the assassination of General Kovačević, the commander of the brigade located at the 
Yugoslav town of Štip, on 6 October. IMRO was supplied with arms and money by the 
Italians.73 The Central Department acquired intelligence information, including 
intercepted letters, confirming what the Yugoslavs took for granted - that Macedonian 
comitadjis were actively supported by Italy and operating from Albanian territory, but 
such information was treated as not definite and no great importance was attached to 
it.74      
Marinković adopted an entirely different attitude towards the Bulgarian 
government than his predecessor Ninčić and was determined to maintain as friendly 
relations with Sofia as possible. His approach accorded with British assessments that the 
outrages of IMRO were actually desperate measures to revive its waning strength and 
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put an end to a rapprochement between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The Foreign Office 
was therefore receptive to Marinković’s plea to bring pressure to bear on the Bulgarian 
authorities and the Foreign Minister Bouroff was admonished that his government had 
to go out of its way to prevent further incidents, the continuation of which would 
destroy all chance of Bulgaria obtaining another much-needed reconstruction loan.75 
Although the crisis was smoothed away, the circumstances were far from conducive to 
any détente between Yugoslavia and her eastern neighbour.    
Therefore, by the end of 1927 it became obvious that nothing would materialise 
out of attempts to reach a Balkan Locarno and that the political situation in the region 
was actually worse than before. As far as the Foreign Office was concerned, the 
responsibility for this dismal failure was mostly laid at the door of the Yugoslav Foreign 
Office. In his annual reports Kennard painted a bleak picture of Ninčić’s unstable and 
lamentable policy which made overtures to Bulgaria with a view to intimidating Greece 
and then approached Greece in order to frighten Bulgaria. The only result was the 
isolation of his own country.76 Yugoslavia was, in the British view, the one country 
with a capacity to break the Balkan deadlock and Yugoslav vacillations were seen as 
dangerous turns of policy.77 Although there was certainly a good deal to be said for the 
deficiencies of Belgrade’s foreign policy, such an appreciation was much exaggerated 
and completely left out of consideration a factor of paramount importance in the 
Balkans, namely the insidious impact of Mussolini’s foreign policy. The fact that Italy’s 
true motives and surreptitious dealings were totally misperceived was a staggering 
blunder in the Foreign Office’s handling of the constructive idea of Balkan Locarno.  
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3.2. The Albanian Crisis  
 
At the beginning of 1926 the Foreign Office showed an interest in Albanian 
affairs. The pervading belief was that Italy, after having had her proposal for the 
partition of Albania declined in Belgrade, had set her mind on complete economic and 
political control of the country ‘without however any territorial designs’.78 In step with 
the British policy of ‘non-interference’ both the Central Department officials and 
Chamberlain claimed that the only course of action for Albania, were she seriously 
menaced by Italy, would be an appeal to the League.79 Although the British anticipated 
possible trouble in that quarter, they seriously miscalculated the imminence of the 
Albanian danger and up to May 1926 were under the illusion that ‘it is not impossible 
that Italy and Serbia might come to some agreement as to spheres of influence in the 
country, the Serbs to have Scutari and the Italians Valona.’80 An eventual Italian 
possession of the port of Valona was not thought vitally to affect British naval and 
military interests and was thus viewed indifferently.   
Italian aspirations in Albania were based on a grossly distorted reading of the 
resolution of the Conference of Ambassadors of 9 November 1921 which stipulated that 
the Council of the League of Nations would entrust the Italian government with a 
mandate to restore Albanian independence in the case of its being abrogated. In August 
1926 Mussolini presented Chamberlain with a note which amounted to claiming a 
special position for Italy in that country. Taking care not to get engaged in a dispute 
with the Duce, the Foreign Secretary cautiously negated any right of ‘exclusive 
influence’ for Italy in Albania.81 It was maintained in the Foreign Office that a 
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permanent Italian occupation of Albania under any such pretext was not a matter of 
practical politics. Harvey was positive that neither the Little Entente nor Greece nor 
Albania herself would accept a permanent mandate nor it was probable that the League 
in consequence would recommend such a course. All that was required, Harvey argued, 
was to give no opportunity to Mussolini for discussing the purport of the resolution and 
let Ahmed Zogu refuse the Italian demand for the matter to ‘remain dormant, and the 
more time passes the more out of date and impossible of fulfilment the Italian 
interpretation of the Resolution will appear.’82 Chamberlain approved the stance 
suggested by Harvey and significantly added: ‘If I differ, it is in distrusting Belgrade a 
great deal more that I do Rome.’83 Accordingly, the Secretary’s answer to Yugoslavia’s 
fearful enquiries as to the interpretation of the 1921 resolution was: ‘Behave yourselves 
& the case will not arrive.’84  
 As to the general line that the British representative in Albania should take, 
Chamberlain summarised it in the instructions to William Seeds in the following terms:  
Italy is clearly entitled to secure concessions from the Albanian Government and to 
seek outlets in Albania for her trade and surplus population in the normal way, but 
once she endeavours to interfere with the internal government of the country or to 
work for sovereign possession of any part of its territory, she will be creating the 
very danger which His Majesty’s Government are so anxious to avoid – a conflict 
with a third Power and the possibility of war.85  
 
Though proclaiming the desirability of promoting the independence and territorial 
stability of the country, Lampson admitted that he was not clear in his own mind as to 
how far Britain could go in this respect against Italian ambitions.86 On closer 
examination the Foreign Office reaffirmed their attitude that a more active British 
policy in Albania facilitating the League’s influence in the country and soothing the 
Italo-Yugoslav suspicions by means of multilateral pacts between Albania and her 
neighbours was not desirable as it would antagonise Rome.  The only alternative was to 
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proceed with the ‘present policy of meeting incidents ad hoc and then endeavouring to 
localise their effects’.87  
On the occasion of their personal meeting at Leghorn on 1 October 1926 
Mussolini reassured Chamberlain in regard to his respect for Albanian integrity and 
independence, saying that he was prepared to pledge himself to that effect in a written 
treaty.88 The significance of this reference became clear when news of the conclusion of 
the Italo-Albanian treaty of 27 November 1926 was published. It also became obvious 
that it was but a prelude to serious trouble in South-Eastern Europe. From Belgrade’s 
point of view the agreement (the first Pact of Tirana) was deliberately couched in vague 
terms as to what might constitute a disturbance against the political, juridical and 
territorial status quo in Albania. The treaty thus established a thinly veiled protectorate 
which enabled the Italians to land troops on any flimsy pretext. Indeed, Yugoslavian 
suspicions of the thrust of Italian policy were not amiss as the treaty had been preceded 
by a secret military accord of August 1925 between Italy and Albania by which the 
former was pledged to support the territorial ambitions of the latter at the expense of 
Yugoslavia.89    
On learning of the Tirana Pact the Central Department was taken by surprise but 
not alarmed in the slightest. On the contrary, the fact that Italian relations with the 
Albanians had been regulated on the basis of a published treaty was deemed ‘the great 
thing’; furthermore, the opinion was advanced that ‘Sig[nor]. Mussolini has set an 
admirable example which Albania’s other neighbours w[oul]d. do well to follow.’90 Far 
from suspecting any Machiavellian plot, the British believed that the treaty had tied 
Mussolini’s hands to some extent and had made it more difficult for him to bully 
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Ahmed Zogu into submission; consequently, Howard Smith pronounced that ‘it is 
ridiculous of the Serbs to say that this treaty… is a threat to Serbia.’91   
Kennard tried to impress on his superiors the gravity of situation as seen from 
Belgrade and recommended an action, proposed by the Yugoslavs, to obtain the 
conclusion of a tripartite pact as a way out of the predicament, but his suggestion, 
especially the hint it contained of a British guarantee, was rejected out of hand in the 
Foreign Office.92 Nevertheless, the alarm caused in Yugoslavia awakened the Foreign 
Office to the seriousness of the situation, notwithstanding all the calming assurances 
given to the Yugoslavs about the anodyne nature of the treaty.93 The specious 
statements he was instructed to relay to the Yugoslav government confused Kennard, 
and Orme Sargent, Lampson’s successor as the Chief of the Central Department, had to 
explain to him the real motives behind these proceedings: 
I see you are surprised that we should have described the Tirana treaty as 
‘contributing to the preservation of peace’, and that we should have asked you to 
impress on Nincic Italy’s good faith. But surely some such line as this is necessary 
if we are to try and prevent the Serbs from going off the deep end. If we went and 
said to them baldly - We quite agree with you that the Italians have played a dirty 
game and that the treaty is a serious ‘danger to the peace of the Balkans’, wouldn’t 
we defeat our own ends?94
 
Meanwhile, the situation was rendered more serious and uncertain when Ninčić 
resigned in consequence of the failure of his policy of cooperation with Rome, an act 
closely followed by the death of the Prime Minister Pašić.  
Having decided to act with the utmost diffidence, the Foreign Office left it to the 
discretion of the Ambassador in Rome as to whether to enquire of Mussolini in regard 
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to the dangerous effects of his treaty.95 It was indicative of the reticent attitude adopted 
by British diplomacy that nearly a month passed after the signature of the Tirana treaty 
before Graham availed himself of the opportunity to discuss the issue with the Duce 
himself. The latter’s assurances that he was still prepared to provide the Yugoslavs with 
adequate explanations in respect of Albania, if they ‘grovel sufficiently’, as Howard 
Smith put it, but not to allow their adherence to the pact, were duly noted in the Foreign 
Office without the slightest tendency to pursue the question any further.96 After all, it 
was not deemed necessary to proceed with the enquiry as Chamberlain persisted in his 
belief that all the commotion that had been caused was due to the secretive and sudden 
manner of the pact’s conclusion rather than to its substance. ‘I maintain to all my faith 
that Italian policy is what Signor Mussolini has repeatedly assured me that it is’, 
Chamberlain repeated - though he was fully aware that there were those who ‘think me 
blinded by my regard to him.’97 Unshaken in his conviction, Chamberlain discounted 
news of Italian military preparations ‘unless indeed the Serbian attitude has led Rome to 
expect Serbian intervention’.98  
Mussolini took the occasion of Ninčić’s resignation to affect anger at 
accusations of bad faith and effectively reneged on his initial proposal to welcome 
Yugoslav adhesion to the Italo-Albanian pact either in the form of a separate and 
analogous agreement with Albania or a tripartite pact. Although Chamberlain put great 
store by his original suggestion as a proof of the innocuous character of Italian policy, 
and, having unofficially advised the Yugoslav government to proceed along these lines, 
was accordingly placed in a false and awkward position, he accepted this pretence at its 
face value. Used to making allowance for Duce’s personal susceptibilities, the Secretary 
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of State, seconded by the Ambassador at Rome and his staff in the Foreign Office, 
declared that he could ‘well understand irritation caused by form given to Nincic’s 
resignation and by [Yugoslav] press comments.’99  
 The extent of the Foreign Office’s misjudgement of the real background of the 
Tirana Pact did not stem from its misperception of the true Italian intentions alone. 
There was also a deep-rooted suspicion that the Yugoslav Ministry of Interior was in 
the habit of fostering revolts in northern Albania independently of the Foreign 
Ministry.100 To be sure, these doubts were not unfounded. Having reached the 
conclusion that Ahmed Zogu was irreversibly committed to the Italians, the Yugoslav 
War Office, behind the back of the government, unleashed an undercover operation to 
overthrow and replace him with his brother-in-law and then Minister at Belgrade, Cena-
bey Kryeziu.101 Although he did not find out all the details of this underground 
operation, Kennard suspected that intrigues might have been in progress between the 
Albanian refugees, political opponents of the Albanian President, and the subordinate 
officials of the Ministries of the Interior or of War.102 That sort of subversive activity 
was part and parcel of the Italo-Yugoslav trial of strength in Albania. The British 
received information to the effect that the Italians were also heavily intriguing with the 
Albanian exiles in combination with the Macedonian revolutionaries to bring about the 
downfall of Ahmed Zogu’s regime.103 Since Rome was achieving great success in its 
peaceful economic penetration, the Foreign Office brushed aside such reports and 
focused on Yugoslavia which, it was believed, had good reason to upset the Albanian 
President. For that reason Belgrade was looked upon as the chief disturber of the peace 
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in Albania. The Yugoslav case was further damaged as that perception fitted in only too 
well with the inveterate and highly unfavourable perception of Yugoslav foreign policy 
in general:  
The Yugoslavs have uneasy consciences. They aspire to be the big Balkan State & 
in fact believed they were all-powerful. They rejected the Greek alliance & have 
been so stiff in their terms of renewal that Greece, weak tho’ she is, turned & 
rejected them. Nor has Yugoslavia made friends with Bulgaria. She never trusted 
the Italians or even attempted to turn over a new leaf after the Pact of Rome. She 
has banked on belief in her own strength & on support from France. She is now 
reaping the harvest of her policy of arrogance & double-dealing, & is isolated.’104
 
 Chamberlain believed that Ninčić himself had made many mistakes in coping 
with the situation following the publication of the Tirana Pact due to his complete 
miscalculation of Mussolini’s psychology.105 In the Foreign Secretary’s view his 
Yugoslav colleague’s personal mishandling was coupled with and amplified by chronic 
domestic troubles:  
I cannot even now quite measure up M. Nincic to my own satisfaction. How much 
of his policy or lack of policy was weakness, both of personal character & political 
position, & how much was trickery & crookedness, it is hard to say, but the curse of 
[word illegible] was on it, & its instability was fatal to success. I suspect that if the 
S.C.S. Gov. had not in any case been on the verge of a domestic crisis he would 
have handled the Tirana situation very differently.106
 
 
 
 
3.3. The Tripartite Agreement  
 
 As the Central European/Balkan Locarno hung fire, another project was under 
consideration which was supposed to offer stabilisation and pacification. In February 
1926 Kennard heard of conversations proceeding in Rome for the conclusion of a 
tripartite agreement between France, Italy and Yugoslavia purporting to offer a 
guarantee of the frontiers of Central Europe. This agreement was obviously envisaged 
as a means to neutralise the Franco-Italian rivalry which centred around Yugoslavia and 
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for that reason was limited to these three countries. To provide it with a substantial 
foundation it was specifically designed to prevent the Anschluss.   
The Foreign Office was unanimously unfavourable to such a proposal. It was 
viewed as an alliance agreement of the old type and, as such, apt to keep alive the desire 
for union with Germany in Austria.107 In fact, any manifest determination on behalf of 
France, Italy and the Little Entente to maintain the integrity of the provisions of the 
treaties of St. Germain and Trianon was liable in the fullness of time to provoke some 
kind of mutual agreement between Germany, Austria and Hungary. The charge levelled 
against the rumoured treaty was once more, as Lampson put it, that it was as far from 
the Locarno ideal ‘as chalk from cheese.’108  
The British actually did not need to worry. Nothing could be more unpalatable 
to Mussolini than a formal understanding whereby he would admit a French guarantee 
and influence in a region he considered his own preserve. He skilfully exploited British 
aversion to the suggestion and affected to dislike a tripartite pact on the grounds of its 
incompatibility with Locarno principles.109 His propagandist trick met with 
considerable success. Howard Smith did not doubt for a moment that it was the French 
who did not ‘want the ideas of Locarno to take root and flourish in the Balkans and 
Central Europe’ and was still adamant that his utterance was  
not intended to be an anti-French manifesto but simply to show that British and 
French policy in this question are diametrically opposed. We, I take it, wish to 
interfere as little as possible and then only in the hope of promoting peace: France 
desires to take a foremost part in shaping the destinies of Central Europe and the 
Balkans, presumably in order that they should assist her in the next clash with 
Germany.110  
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Chamberlain and his subordinates were also sure that French policy as they perceived it 
was not that of Briand - a figure much liked and respected by the Secretary of State - but 
rather the unfortunate product of the Quai d’Orsay.111   
Instead of a tripartite pact Mussolini suggested an arbitration agreement between 
Hungary and Yugoslavia which would be guaranteed by Italy. This he could extol as 
being in accordance with the Locarno spirit; and more importantly for him it provided a 
convenient excuse for the furtherance of Italian interests. Although the Central 
Department took the Duce’s assurances at their face value and believed that the Italian 
views were conmpatible with their own, they were still determined to proceed slowly 
and carefully in order to avoid alienating France and rendering Italy more 
intransigent.112 The only dissenting voice concerning Italian policy and the British 
support for Mussolini came from Kennard, who only a month earlier had not been sure 
about the genuineness of Yugoslav fears of Italy but who was now nonplussed to the 
point of suspecting that there was some close understanding between London and 
Rome.113 His uneasiness was lightly brushed aside in Whitehall and the Minister was 
assured that ‘in this particular case Mussolini is following the line which we favour, 
while the French seem to be taking the opposite line, namely the creation of defensive 
alliances for the preservation of the position as crystallised in the Treaties of St. 
Germain, Trianon and Neuilly.’114 That is not to say that the essential nature of the 
Franco-Italian dispute as a struggle for predominance in Central Europe was lost on the 
Foreign Office, or that Mussolini’s desire to substitute Italian hegemony in the region 
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for French was entirely overlooked.115 Rather, the Italian bid for a preponderant role in 
the Danube valley and the Balkans was perceived as natural due to geographical 
reasons, and was never taken too seriously in the Foreign Office.   
France and Yugoslavia had no illusions about the Italian attitude. On 18 March 
1926, during his visit to Paris, Ninčić came to an understanding with Briand and they 
initialled a bilateral treaty of friendship but decided not to proceed to a formal signature 
in order to spare Italian susceptibilities.116 Encouraged by King Alexander’s admission 
that his country would not proceed with negotiations with France in the teeth of Italian 
opposition, Lampson was hopeful that a Franco-Yugoslav agreement would come to 
nothing; having received the information from the secret source connected with the 
Foreign Office at Belgrade that the Yugoslavs were about to renew negotiations with 
the French for a military agreement, he impressed upon the Yugoslav Minister in 
London, Djordje Djurić, the folly of getting drawn into a squabble between Italy and 
France.117   
 
 
 
3.4. The Struggle over Romania  
 
Although Yugoslavia was in focus in the mid-1920s, Romania, the most passive 
member of the Little Entente, had her share of participation in the Franco-Italian 
confrontation. The Franco-Romanian treaty of friendship was signed on 10 June 1926. 
Unofficial information came to Whitehall from Bucharest concerning a secret annex in 
the shape of an agreement as to the amount of military equipment which France was 
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supposed to supply to Romania in case of war.118 Though neither corroborated later nor 
correct, this was exactly the sort of information that could not fail to be distasteful to the 
British.     
There was no doubt in the Foreign Office that the treaty was ‘a further link in 
the chain of treaties binding the Little Entente to France – with a dash of Locarno spirit 
added.’119 It was the wording of the treaty, with its emphasis on conformity to the 
League, which accounted for that touch of Locarno spirit. Romania was primarily 
motivated to enter into the agreement, the Central Department official Charles Bateman 
mused, in order to obtain further guarantees for her precarious possession of Bessarabia, 
although the pact was not explicitly directed against the Soviet Union and France was 
probably not to be counted upon to do more than supply technical services and advice 
should real trouble arise over the province. The British were satisfied that the French 
signature would not legally alter their own position as regards the Bessarabian Treaty, 
which remained unratified by Italy and Japan and therefore not in force.  
The whole affair left British diplomats rather indifferent. Robert Greg, who had 
taken up his post at Bucharest shortly before the conclusion of the pact, formed the 
opinion that the treaty was ‘of a benevolent and platonic character rather than of any 
outstanding political significance.’120 His impression tallied with the view taken in the 
Central Department that due to the geographic position of Romania Franco-Italian 
rivalry would never be as intense in that country as it was ‘nearer home’, a clear 
reference to Yugoslavia.121 Bateman was convinced that Romania could have easily 
concluded agreements with both Paris and Rome without either of them taking 
umbrage. Since the substance of the treaty was not deemed important, the Foreign 
Office engaged in its favourite discipline of judging – the opinion being divided - 
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whether and to what extent the text, found to be similar to the abortive tripartite pact 
between France, Italy and Yugoslavia, was conformed with Locarno rather than the old 
pattern of alliances.122  
Mussolini was determined not to be outbid by France in Romania and the tenure 
in office of General Alexandru Avarescu, an ardent admirer of Fascism, provided him 
with a great opportunity. On 16 September 1926 the Italo-Romanian treaty was 
concluded. The secret provisions accompanying the agreement called for the adoption 
of a pro-Italian policy on the part of Romania which meant an alignment with Hungary 
and Bulgaria; for this the Duce had to pay a price and he duly ratified the Bessarabian 
Protocol in March 1927.123 The Foreign Office, apparently guided by Bateman’s 
analysis, reacted to this second treaty with the same indifference it had displayed 
towards the first one with France. On hearing about the impending Italo-Romanian 
treaty Howard Smith forecast that Rome was actually trying to acquire oil 
concessions.124 From the moment the news of the negotiations reached the Central 
Department Lampson simply confessed that it was ‘a most mysterious affair and we 
don’t know what to make of it’.125 During and even after the negotiations nobody in 
Whitehall seems to have thought it worth while to enquire as to their import.   
 There was more behind this supreme British indifference towards Romania than 
simply her peripheral position. Greg frankly admitted certain social aversions he 
believed were typical of an average Briton acquainted with the country:     
This is rather a disappointing post. To begin with Roumania has such a bad name in 
England that it is rather hopeless preaching her cause, all the more so as one’s own 
sympathies are not with her temperamentally even though one may think, as I do, 
that she has got an unduly bad name abroad. The people as a whole lack the virility 
of their neighbours on the other side of the Danube and the false Latin culture and 
huge social pretentions of Bucharest Society are to me irritating in the extreme. 
There is an extraordinary sense of unreality about the whole place.126  
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Nor was the security position such as to provide an ambitious Minister with a real 
challenge: ‘Bucharest is neither a potential danger zone like Sofia and Belgrade nor an 
even mixture of real danger and real political importance like Warsaw’, Greg added to 
his depressive account.127  
Nevertheless, Greg closely watched how disturbances in the region affected 
Romanian foreign relations. The Minister had little doubt that Romania’s marked 
reserve towards and apparent disinterest in the Albanian events temporarily weakened 
the Little Entente.128 His superiors in Whitehall believed that party divisions in 
Romania were governed by French and Italian sympathies, Brătianu’s Liberals 
plumping for Paris and General Avarescu for Rome.129 As to the outcome of that trial of 
strength, France was thought to be capable of restoring her former position with 
Brătianu’s help.      
 
 
 
3.5. The Franco-Yugoslav Treaty   
 
On 18 March 1927, in a note to the British, French and German governments, 
Mussolini publicly accused Yugoslavia of preparing an armed incursion into Albania 
with a view to overthrowing Ahmed Zogu. The ensuing crisis was exactly the sort of 
trouble that might have been expected as a consequence of the Tirana Pact. It presented 
a twofold task for British diplomacy: the Foreign Office had to deal with the immediate 
cause of friction between Yugoslavia and Italy in Albania and to treat that friction in its 
larger and proper context of the Franco-Italian conflict.    
After careful consideration the Foreign Office decided that a policy of tacit 
acquiescence in Italian penetration in Albania was the one most likely to contribute to 
the maintenance of peace between Rome and Belgrade. Furthermore, that policy was 
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without any adequate alternative short of a ‘first-class row’ with Italy.130 Both Graham 
and the Minister at Durazzo, Seeds, agreed on this point.131 If the Italians were to land 
troops on the Albanian coast the Central Department’s intention was to try and convince 
the Yugoslavs not to take any military counter-action by impressing on them the fact 
that they would put themselves in the wrong before the League of Nations.132  
The British attitude towards the possibility of an Italian occupation of Albania 
clearly demonstrated that the fate of that country did not matter as long as an armed 
conflict between Yugoslavia and Italy could be avoided. The only way of preventing 
war was to restrain the weaker power from giving any provocation to its stronger 
neighbour. Hence the Central Department became increasingly preoccupied with the 
state of affairs at Belgrade. Mussolini’s professions about plots engineered by 
clandestine military societies in Yugoslavia fell on fertile ground in Whitehall.133 
Harvey even spoke of a cleavage of opinion between the civilian and military 
authorities in Belgrade in respect of relations with Italy and Albania.134   
Nor was such a perception of the situation in Yugoslavia allayed by a report that 
there had been much talk at the end of 1926, prior to death of Pašić, about the 
establishment of a military dictatorship headed by the chiefs of the White Hand.135 The 
Military Attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel F. Giles, dismissed the prospect of an armed 
adventure on the part of the Yugoslavs in view of the appalling deficiencies of war 
material which were difficult to overcome given the currently parlous financial 
conditions of the country. The impression in the Central Department still prevailed that 
                                                 
130 TNA, Minutes by Harvey, 7 September 1927, and Sargent, 9 September 1927, C 7410/25/90, FO 
371/12065; Chamberlain to Graham, 9 May 1927, C 3785/808/92, FO 371/12116.   
131 TNA, Minute by Sargent, 26 September 1927 and Graham to Tyrell, private, 20 September 1927, C 
7848/25/90, FO 371/12065.  
132 TNA, Howard Smith to Kennard, private, 24 January 1927, C 485/25/90, FO 371/12064; Sargent to 
Kennard, private, 7 November 1927, C 8824/25/90, FO 371/12065. 
133 TNA, Minute by Harvey, 7 January 1927, C 192/25/90 and Minute by Chamberlain, 18 January 1927, 
C 514/25/90, FO 371/12064. 
134 TNA, Minute by Harvey, 14 March 1927, C 2298/25/90, FO 371/12065.  
135 TNA, Report on Effect of Recent Political Disturbance in Yugoslavia on the S.C.S. Army by Military 
Attache at Belgrade F. Giles, 23 February 1927, enclosed in Kennard to Chamberlain, 24 February 1927, 
C 1978/25/90, FO 371/12064. 
 151
a real danger lay in the possibility of a weak government in Belgrade being ignored by a 
clique in the Army which might be plotting a coup against the Ahmed Zogu regime in 
defiance of the political leadership.136 A possible scenario envisioned an incursion into 
Albania by Zogu’s political opponents residing on Yugoslav territory, aided and abetted 
by some shady and unscrupulous elements within the government. This impression was 
reinforced by the considered opinion of Kennard, based on information provided by 
Colonel Giles, that there were indeed subordinate Yugoslav officials who obstinately 
hoped to upset Ahmed Zogu’s government.137 It was instructive of the nature and 
reliability of intelligence reports such as could be gathered in the circumstances that 
their validity was estimated on the premise that they corresponded ‘exactly with the 
national characteristics of both parties’; and, furthermore, that in anticipating the 
potential course of events one was always handicapped by the fact that it was 
impossible to expect ‘common sense from the average Balkan politician, to whom 
intrigue is as food and drink.’ Whitehall was not quite sure what to make of persistent 
Italian distinctions between the civilian and military authorities,138 but the utterances 
repeated time and again from Rome seem to have influenced the views of the Foreign 
Office.  
On the other side, the Military Attaché at Rome reported on covert Italian 
military infiltration into Albania and the concentration of the fleet but maintained that 
the Italians did not plan to resort to an aggressive policy. He even interpreted such 
measures as were adopted as proof of ‘Italy’s pacific intentions’, arguing that she would 
have let matters take their course had she been looking for an excuse for armed 
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intervention.139 Reports to that effect went a long way to confirm what Chamberlain 
unreservedly believed: ‘I will stake my reputation for judgement of Italian policy on the 
statement that Mussolini does not desire to intervene by force in Albania & will not do 
so if trouble is not started from other quarters. If M. Kennard and the French can keep 
the Serbs quiet they need not fear the Italian Govt.’140  
The Minister in Belgrade did his best to carry out the Secretary’s instructions. 
He confirmed that the Yugoslav government had adopted two courses which he had 
been unofficially suggesting for some time past - replacing their current Minister in 
Rome, who had  incurred the Duce’s personal dislike, with Milan Rakić, one of their 
ablest diplomats, and removing large numbers of Albanian émigrés from the frontier to 
the interior.141 But Kennard’s own profound suspicions of Italian intentions were 
unabated and he unofficially impressed his personal views on the Central Department. 
In a reply to his insistent pleas that more resolute action on the part of the British 
government was necessary in order to avert the brewing disaster, Sargent put forward 
his diagnosis that Italy   
is suffering from various sorts of congestion, including that of swelled head, which 
makes her ver[y] self-conscious and very anxious to show off as though she were a 
grown-up person, and this in its turn makes her inclined to be a bully. I do not know 
what the best cure for this sort of disease may be, but I am sure that the worst thing 
in the world is to take her seriously and encourage her to think that we really are 
frightened of the terrible things which she may do if she wants to. Surely the right 
line is to make it clear that we think that the whole of her behaviour is merely silly 
and that if she insists upon showing off she must not be surprised if it leads to a 
stand-up quarrel with the Jugs. This broadly speaking is the line which we have 
taken in Rome. As for the Jugs, we have as tactfully as possible hinted to them that 
the best way to deal with a bully is to stand up to him and that they only encourage 
Italy to behave still more outrageously by always coming to us whining for advice 
and support. If the question is treated in this way, I am inclined to think that Italy 
will soon be brought up against these hard facts which in her present troubled state 
are much more likely to bring her to reason than any amount of nagging and 
lecturing by the Secretary of State. If she once realised that she was really driving 
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into a position of having to fight the Jugs, I think we would find that she would 
hurriedly climb down.142  
 
Sargent further imagined that the Italians would not be willing to antagonise the League 
over their conflict with Yugoslavia. If his prognosis was wrong and the clash erupted, 
he wondered if it was ‘altogether cynical for us to adopt the attitude that our interests 
will be fully safeguarded if we can restrict the area of the conflict, as we ought certainly 
to be able to do?’143   
Sargent’s subtle intimations were articulated in a much more outspoken manner 
by the Secretary of State: ‘Jugo-Slavia seems to me pretty safe unless she tries to make 
herself safer by alliances which Signor Mussolini regards as threatening Italy.’144 This 
was but another confirmation of Chamberlain’s firm conviction that Yugoslavia was the 
sole offender in the Balkans and that France was further aggravating a bad situation by 
stepping forward as her protector:   
I may be quite wrong but as I see things it is Yugo Slavia which is at present the 
disturbing factor. I wish that France would speak more resolutely at Belgrade. Yugo 
Slavia is the most powerful of the Balkan States; therefore France courts her & 
thinks of yet another alliance, but Yugo Slavia is restless, bullying and 
unreasonable in her demands on Greece & in her attitude (in the past, at any rate) to 
Bulgaria. And because she is all this herself, she is nervous & suspicious about 
others, & her policy tends to provoke in other countries reactions which give some 
ground for her fears.145  
 
Chamberlain stressed that Mussolini could not step back when it came to his amour 
propre and that he was apprehensive as to whether ‘the French have got on quite wrong 
lines with the Italians & are or having [sic] been feeding themselves on dreams’.146  
The blame for the deadlock in relation to Italy was therefore equally distributed 
between Belgrade and Paris. The latter was suspected of affecting a fear of the Italians 
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while actually being actuated by jealousy alone.147 Having learned of the French 
standpoint Lampson was struck by what he saw as an extraordinarily narrow view that 
regarded Italy as bent on trouble - one which he declined to accept and which he 
thought was a consequence of misunderstanding and a lack of proper communication.148 
Even the notoriously Francophile Chamberlain simply confessed that he could not 
‘understand why France needs to meddle in this affair.’149  
The new Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vojislav Marinković, tried to 
persuade Kennard that the core of the problem was Mussolini’s relentless effort to 
detach Yugoslavia irrevocably from France and that nothing short of that would suffice 
to establish close understanding with Italy. In Marinković’s opinion there was a 
compelling reason why Belgrade could not contemplate such a reversal of policy:    
His Excellency stated that he was quite prepared to cease depending on French 
support provided that he could be sure of the friendship of some other Great Power 
such as England, but he feared that, should Yugoslavia come to an understanding 
with Italy which would cause an estrangement with France, Italy might within a 
short time, having effected her isolation, attack this country. The S.C.S. 
Government could not therefore afford to modify in any way their present attitude 
towards France.150  
 
This observation elicited a comment by Howard Smith which revealed a fundamentally 
different perception of the perplexed relations within the Franco-Italo-Yugoslav triangle 
and an entirely different British conception of the proper policy for Belgrade to pursue:  
I think that M. Marinkovitch argues the wrong way round. One of the reasons, though 
perhaps not the main one, of Italian suspicion of Serbia is her close connection with 
France, Italy feeling that by this connection France maintains a predominant 
influence in the Balkans to which Italy aspires. In fact it is just jealousy of France. If 
Serbia would give up her dependence on France, then I fancy Italy would at once 
become more friendly to her especially if she showed Italy that she was quite ready to 
stand alone and was not afraid of her. And we know that Italy does not want war.151  
 
Mussolini’s intransigence and his strenuous attempt to browbeat Yugoslavia 
finally failed and led to the formal signature of the long-delayed Franco-Yugoslav treaty 
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of friendship and arbitration on 11 November 1927. The treaty was supplemented by a 
secret military protocol of a distinctly indefinite nature.152 It stipulated that the 
respective General Staffs would proceed to consultations about the technical conditions 
of cooperation should such collaboration be necessary as a result of action undertaken in 
connexion with obligations to the League and as defined in the first article of the treaty. 
The platitudinous character of this convention was similar to the letters exchanged 
between Poincaré and Beneš on the occasion of the signature of their treaty of 1924. 
Nevertheless, the Italians again suspected a clear-cut military cooperation against them, 
an impression which they spared no effort to impress upon the British. Colonel Giles 
discussed the matter with his French colleague and submitted his considered opinion 
that the story of a clear-cut military convention was fuelled by the Italians and was 
inherently ‘groundless and chimerical’.153    
Chamberlain deplored the conclusion of a treaty he thought bound to aggravate 
the state of relations with Rome and diminish their chances of improvement, and also 
the conspicuous manner in which, in his opinion, it had been done.154 He clearly 
showed the signs of his displeasure. When Marinković wanted to visit London after 
having personally signed the treaty in Paris Chamberlain let him know that such a visit 
would depend on whether he intended to include Rome in his itinerary.155 That was 
enough to put an end to any talk of a visit. As for the French, the Foreign Office was 
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convinced that the misdeed of concluding the agreement with Yugoslavia was the work 
of the die-hard forces in the Quai d’Orsay, headed by ‘the villain of the peace’ 
Berthelot, against the better judgement of Chamberlain’s dear friend, the pacific and 
sensible Briand.156 In the words of the Permanent Under-Secretary Tyrell, the wretched 
ways of past diplomacy prevailed over Locarno ideas: ‘This is a sad legacy left by M. 
Poincaré to M. Briand. We must stand by with buckets of cold water to pour over all 
parties that will need it. Let us keep cool.’157   
Mussolini’s prompt response to the Franco-Yugoslav treaty was the conclusion 
of a treaty of mutual defence between Italy and Albania on 21 November 1927 which 
had actually been in preparation for months past. This instrument laid bare the 
insincerity of Italian policy and faced British diplomacy with additional difficulties in 
trying to restore Italo-Yugoslav relations to a reasonably satisfactory footing. The 
Foreign Office tried to assuage the effects of the treaty by firstly insisting on the 
postponement of its publication, and secondly by Chamberlain’s appeal to Mussolini to 
expand it into a tripartite agreement embracing Yugoslavia and running on lines of the 
Locarno type, a suggestion he was prepared to put forward in Belgrade as his own in 
case Mussolini was averse to taking the initiative himself.158 Thus, any direct opposition 
to Italian policy, which was after all a natural development of previous trends and was 
facilitated by British passivity, was not to be contemplated. The influence that the 
Secretary of State was supposed to be able to exercise in Rome was rather to be brought 
to bear on the grounds of the disturbing effect that the second Pact of Tirana had upon 
European peace and the embarrassing position in which the British government was 
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placed by being presented with a fait accompli. And this despite the prominent part they 
had been taking to improve the mutual relations of Italy and Yugoslavia.159   
The attempt was futile as Mussolini repudiated Chamberlain’s suggestions and 
even implied that the French attitude was a decisive factor in the situation. His 
assertion, Sargent held, underlined a main danger coming from this new departure in 
policy: it did not just run contrary to the spirit of the Covenant and Locarno but was 
‘likely to intensify the tendency towards the creation of rival blocs of states in Central 
Europe’.160 While Sargent believed that it was necessary to impress upon the Duce 
British confidence in the pacific nature of French policy, Tyrell was in favour of a 
policy of aloofness towards Italy which he deemed more effective than getting into a 
controversy.161 In his conversation with the new Italian Ambassador, Antonio 
Bordonaro, Chamberlain took a middle course, refuting accusations against French 
policy and openly stating his disagreement with Rome, but adopting a non-committal 
attitude as to the future line Britain might take.162  
The feeling that set in at the Foreign Office was one of somewhat melancholic 
resignation: ‘We have done our best to make the best of two bad jobs & things must run 
their course’, Tyrell concluded.163 Despite thoroughly changed circumstances as 
evidenced by the conclusion of the two treaties, there was no inclination among the 
Central Department officials to consider any change of policy. Kennard was the only 
person who maintained that British diplomacy should have made every effort from the 
first to induce France, Italy and Yugoslavia to come to a Locarno-model agreement 
which would offer the only chance of peace in that troubled part of Europe. The 
Minister had no doubts as to the true reason for the disquieting state of affairs: ‘As it is, 
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owing to our disinclination to tackle Mussolini, we have this silly pact “à deux” and 
relations between Belgrade and Rome worse than ever they were.’164  
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
The Locarno settlement of 1925 raised hopes in London of a similar 
understanding in Central Europe and the Balkans. Two preconditions stood in the way 
of success. First, a basis of agreement needed to be found among the smaller states of 
the region. Chamberlain believed that it would be counter-productive to impose a 
solution on unwilling parties and that salvation must come from within. The Foreign 
Office was optimistic as to the prospects of both a Central European and a Balkan 
Locarno as it was thought that Bethlen was prepared to work to that end along the 
Danube and that Yugoslavia could be made an axis of settlement in the Balkans. 
Although British assessments suffered from a general inclination to pose as a patron of 
Bethlen’s government and take an unduly dim view of Yugoslav foreign policy, the 
approach was fundamentally sound. But a successful outcome actually depended on the 
second precondition - concerted action on the part of the Great Powers. It was apparent 
that Franco-Italian rivalry presented a grave obstacle to any stabilisation and a 
permanent settlement in the Danubian/Balkan regions. If there was to be any chance of 
a Locarno-type agreement the two Powers had to abstain from pursuing conflicting 
policies and recruiting clients, and lend their support to a mutually agreed settlement. 
This was the crux of the problem. Mussolini was not interested in an agreed and 
genuine settlement on the Locarno lines and embarked on an aggressive policy of 
ousting French influence from what he considered his sphere of political preponderance 
and encircling Yugoslavia as a necessary precondition for achieving his aims. 
Chamberlain completely and utterly misjudged Mussolini’s policy. In his view, shared 
                                                 
164 TNA, Kennard to Sargent, private, 17 November 1927, C 9339/808/92, FO 371/12218.   
 159
by others in the Foreign Office, Italy was not bent on adventure and aggressive 
enterprises, despite her childish and tiresome bullying of Yugoslavia. In fact, Italy’s 
behaviour was interpreted as a fearful reaction to what that country perceived to be the 
hindering of her legitimate aspirations by France through the agency of Belgrade.  
Hence Kennard was exclaiming in vain that ‘It is after all ridiculous for Italy to 
block all proposals for a genuine settlement of Central Europe and the Balkans and the 
sooner she is made to realise that her ridiculous susceptibilities and intrigues can no 
longer be humoured the better.’165 On the contrary, Chamberlain was convinced that 
Italy could be induced to contribute to a Locarno-like agreement and he banked his 
whole policy on that presumption. The Secretary of State tried to promote a concerted 
action by Briand, Mussolini and himself that could overcome any potential difficulties 
raised by the Danubian/Balkan countries.  
Hopeless as it was, Chamberlain’s policy carried on and shaped the British 
response to all forthcoming events and crises. When Mussolini concluded the first 
Tirana Pact the Foreign Office accepted his explanations at their face value and focused 
on assuaging the Yugoslav reaction. When on the pretence of its incompatibility with 
Locarno principles the Duce declined to adhere to a tripartite agreement project which 
tackled the core problem of relations between Rome and Paris, Whitehall acquiesced in 
Italian policy once again. Finally, when Mussolini protested and tried to prevent a 
Franco-Yugoslav treaty he had full British sympathy and even active help in 
discouraging Belgrade and Paris from concluding a formal pact. Throughout, the British 
attitude rested on the premise that Italy, notwithstanding her petty and sometimes 
ostensibly dangerous susceptibilities, did not pose a threat to peace but was rather 
provoked by the existence of a close understanding, real or imaginary, between France 
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and the Little Entente, particularly Yugoslavia. Therefore, it was for those powers to 
reassure Italy that her fears were groundless rather than the other way round.   
The blunders of British policy could not lead to any positive results. Its main 
tenet was the idea that the most dangerous thing for the preservation of peace was a 
division of states into hostile blocs on the pre-war pattern. The Foreign Office believed 
itself to be doing its best in order to avoid such a development when in fact, due to its 
fundamental misperceptions and erroneous judgement, it facilitated that very outcome. 
Indeed, the security position in Central and South-East Europe at the end of 1927 was 
worse than it had ever been since the end of the war with two clearly defined and 
antagonistic groups of states: a revisionist bloc consisting of Italy and her ally Hungary 
together with the Italian satellite Albania, and an anti-revisionist bloc of France and the 
Little Entente countries. Therefore, the splicing together of the latter group was another 
marked setback for British diplomacy, which wanted a severance of the ties uniting 
Paris and the Little Entente but which defeated its own ends. It was a measure of the 
failure of British diplomacy that its muddled ways managed to inspire all the other 
parties with a profound mistrust. There was a wide-spread belief in Yugoslavia, albeit 
not for long, that Britain was backing Italy in her imperialist designs.166 The French 
were also convinced that the British regarded with favour a potential Italian ascendancy, 
even one achieved by victorious and limited war in Central Europe.167   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE TRANSITIONAL YEARS, 1928-1932 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
At the turn of the decade the situation in Central Europe was more fluid and uncertain 
than ever. There were many unsettling indications than the general trend was one of 
reverting to the old patterns of grouping into hostile blocs and British diplomacy strove as 
ever to counter that dangerous development. This period was characterised by Italy’s 
increasingly subversive activities in the whole of the Danube area and the Balkans and by 
the economic depression which became a convenient peg on which the Great Powers 
hung proposals which, although ostensibly aimed at the economic alleviation of the 
region, were designed to further their political interests.  
 British policy was rather slow to appreciate the full impact of these trends. This 
chapter suggests that the Foreign Office was usually well informed and aware of the 
negative developments but inclined to stick to its old perceptions of the main security 
problems and suitable ways of remedying them. At the same time there was an inkling of 
a pressing need to find an alternative and more effective policy which would take the 
shape of some sort of undefined and vaguely envisaged revision as evidenced by the 
changed attitude towards Habsburg restoration. The first section of the chapter looks at 
how Whitehall seriously underestimated the impact that the incidents and the renewed 
manifestations of recalcitrance with the existing international order on the part of 
Hungary and Bulgaria had on the Little Entente countries and their closing of ranks. The 
second section shows the tendency of the same old views on Italo-Yugoslav relations to 
linger on and the British attempts to improve them. An unrealistic and distorted 
perception is also demonstrated in the outlook on the relationship between France and the 
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Little Entente which is analysed in the third section. Finally, the fourth section presents 
an overview of British perspectives of the problem of Austrian stability and 
independence, and provides another example of a belated realisation of the issues at stake, 
particularly in regard to proposals for the alleviation of the economic distress in Central 
Europe in which Vienna featured prominently.      
 
 
 
4.1. Old Adam’s Ways 
 
On 1 January 1928 the Austrian customs officials at the Italian frontier station of 
St. Gotthard discovered five truck loads of machine-gun parts falsely declared and 
destined for Hungary. The Little Entente countries brought the incident to the attention of 
the League of Nations, accusing Hungary of secretly arming in defiance of the Trianon 
Treaty. The inconclusive decision as to the responsibility of the Hungarian government 
reached by the committee of enquiry appointed by the Council of the League left the 
Little Entente with a feeling of considerable disappointment. The British attitude towards 
the incident had a lot to do with this outcome. The Foreign Office decided – and 
succeeded in convincing the French on this point – that the best means of disposing of the 
Hungarian arms traffic was one that would keep the matter ‘out of court, or rather out of 
[the] League.’1 Nothing definite could follow from the thorough examination of such an 
affair, Whitehall’s diplomats believed, and it was for the best to smooth the matter away. 
When a year later another incident involving arms smuggling into Hungary occurred, 
Edward Crowe stated that Hungarian breaches of the military clauses were commonplace 
while Howard Smith simply expressed the opinion that the Foreign Office should not 
‘bother about this.’2 When the irritation with Italian surreptitious dealings became 
particularly pronounced there was even talk of ‘getting Graham to make it quite plain to 
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Mussolini that we are fully aware of the vast traffic in arms between Italy and Hungary’.3 
However, no action was ever taken in this regard. 
Exactly the same thing was taking place in regard to Bulgaria. The Central 
Department received secret information about Bulgaria’s armament constituting an open 
breach of the military clauses of the Neuilly Treaty which was undertaken with the 
connivance of the Italian military authorities, if not the government itself.4 The 
impossibility of taking effective measures to enforce the treaty obligations coupled with 
the ineffective machinery of the League to penalise the guilty party led the officials to 
agree that ‘the unheroic course of doing nothing is the right one’.5  
However, in the Bulgarian case the most dangerous situation threatening the 
preservation of peace always arose out of the intermittent IMRO outrages. A new 
stimulus for the continued terrorist campaign also came from the Italian side. Having 
learned from the new Italian Foreign Minister, Dino Grandi, that the Fascist government 
intended to keep on good terms with IMRO as they found the latter a useful tool in their 
dealings with Belgrade,6 the Foreign Office became aware of ‘Italy’s disreputable game 
of intriguing with the disruptive elements in the Balkans in order to weaken Yugoslavia’ 
and insisted on the strenuous observation of the peace treaties so as not to be appearing to 
co-operate with Rome in her policy.7 Although Sargent did not want to force matters to 
an issue, he hoped that cooperation with France in making official representations to the 
government in Sofia with a demand for resolute action against IMRO would ‘have a 
salutary effect on Mussolini in making him realise that we are not prepared to acquiesce 
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in and still less support him in the dangerous game of encircling Yugoslavia, which he 
seems to be inclined to play at in the Balkans at the present time.’8  
To reinforce the point Chamberlain persisted in conveying the warning to Sofia 
not to lend herself to supporting Italy to the detriment of relations with a neighbouring 
country, a piece of advice the soundness of which he thought the Bulgarians began to 
realise.9 Sargent even came to believe that it was malevolent Italian influence that was at 
the bottom of the troubled relations between Sofia and Belgrade. His assessment was 
fully shared by the new Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Robert Vansittart: ‘Our Balkan 
policy is the exact opposite of Italy’s. We must always be trying to draw together what 
she is pulling apart. The antithesis is unfortunate, but it is not our fault, and we must go 
our way resolutely.’10 When in March 1930 fresh terrorist outrages were committed on 
Yugoslav territory Vansittart thought it necessary to ‘do anything to force the Italians 
away from their murderous pets, the [I]MRO’ and tried without success to rope Mussolini 
into making a joint representation to the Bulgarian government together with the British 
and French.11   
Despite periodical outbursts of violence, the Foreign Office was of the opinion, 
based on information from its Legation at Sofia and independent secret sources, that 
IMRO, which had lost any constructive purpose of existence and degenerated into a 
criminal gang, would die a natural death with the passage of time. Meanwhile the only 
available policy was to urge moderation all round: to press the government of Andrey 
Lyapchev into taking more determined measures in order to rein in IMRO and to restrain 
Belgrade from contemplating any drastic action on its part.12 Being exposed to constant 
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terrorist outrages the Yugoslavs were hardly put to the test in continuing their policy of 
restraint towards the Lyapchev government, especially so as they, unlike the British, 
found both the Bulgarian Prime Minister and King Boris duplicitous and unwilling to 
oppose IMRO, as well as ill-disposed to sincere cooperation with Belgrade.13
The general situation did not seem conducive to any settlement in Central Europe. 
In the midst of the St. Gotthard affair Beneš asked for Britain’s full moral support in 
order to disillusion the Hungarians as to the prospects of frontier revision and thus pave 
the way for a Locarno-modelled agreement.14 Having heard Beneš’s views, the Foreign 
Office once more studied the possibility of the application of the Locarno pattern to the 
states of Central and South Eastern Europe. Although it was acknowledged that the 
growing rivalry between France and Italy in the region presented a chief obstacle, and 
that there were other hindrances pertaining to relations between the states concerned 
themselves, Howard Smith maintained that a mutual guarantee pact could still be 
obtained.15 He reiterated his conviction that it was for the Little Entente to offer 
concessions to Budapest in order to induce her to come to terms. Bulgaria presented an 
exceedingly difficult problem due to her being in the hands of IMRO. The analysis 
showed that the Foreign Office stuck to its old formulae without any regard for the 
substantial deterioration which had taken place during the preceding few years. Beneš 
developed his views in a further conversation with the League’s Secretary-General, Sir 
Eric Drummond, but the opinion remained in the Central Department that his proposals 
did not go far enough to be crowned with success.16 When in a speech to his electors in 
                                                 
13 AJ, London Legation, fascicle I, I-3, Karović [Foreign Ministry] to Djurić, 3 April 1930, confidential 
no. 228; In December 1930 a plan for preventive military action that would destroy IMRO’s strongholds 
in the Bulgarian part of Macedonia was approved by the Defence Minister but never executed. See 
Bjelajac, Vojska Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, pp. 239-240.    
14 TNA, Drummond to Selby, 6 February 1928, C 1045/G and Maclaey to Chamberlain, 18 February 
1928, C 1382/1382/12, FO 371/12867.  
15 DBFP, ser. IA, vol. IV, No. 142, Memorandum respecting the Adaptability of the Locarno System to 
Central and Eastern Europe by Howard Smith, 15 February 1928.    
16 TNA, Record of Interview, 20 February 1928, enclosed in Drummond to Selby, 21 February 1928, and 
minutes by Howard Smith, 24 February 1928, and Sargent, 25 February 1928, C 1467/1403/62, FO 
371/12871.   
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March 1928 Count Bethlen spelled out that a Central European Locarno did not appeal to 
Hungary as she had no intention of renouncing her claim for frontier revision, the scheme 
was definitely put to rest. Although Bethlen’s outright rejection of Beneš’s advances and 
the public manner in which it was done was deplored in the Central Department, the 
overall impression was one of indifferent resignation.17   
The tensions in Central Europe surged anew when on 21 June 1928 Mussolini 
openly professed himself in favour of the Hungarian demands during an interview 
granted to the Daily Mail, the proprietor of which, Lord Rothermere, had already been 
championing the revisionist campaign. This new departure in Italian policy towards the 
Danubian region, and particularly the strenuous attempt at distinguishing between the 
need for Hungarian revision and the immutability of the new Italo-Austrian border at the 
Brenner Pass, did not impress Chamberlain too much: ‘Signor Mussolini sees the 
weakness of his position but is not wise enough to hold his peace.’18 As for the 
Rothermere campaign, the Central Department officials came to realise the undesirable 
effects it produced both in Hungary and the Little Entente countries, but it was 
maintained that the latter were calming down as they understood that it had nothing to do 
with the official policy, and that it would be a mistake to give it renewed publicity by a 
public disclaimer.19   
Whereas the British could keep a reserved and cautious attitude towards the 
increasingly threatening international situation, the Little Entente’s reaction was to close 
its ranks. On 21 May 1929 at the meeting of the Little Entente held in Belgrade the 
protocol was signed concerning the prolongation of the treaties of alliance concluded 
amongst Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania as well as the tripartite arbitration 
agreement. In September 1929 the first common war plans against Hungary which 
                                                 
17 TNA, Minutes by Bateman and Howard Smith, 15 March 1928, and by Sargent, 23 March 1928, C 
1973/34/21, FO 371/12933.  
18 TNA, Minute by Chamberlain, 31 March 1928, C 2520/182/21, FO 371/12936.  
19 TNA, Minutes by Bateman and Howard Smith, 13 April 1928, C 2818/182/21; Minutes by Sargent, 13 
June 1928, and Tyrell, 14 June 1928, C 4982/182/21; both in FO 371/12936. 
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envisaged two possibilities – Hungarian attacks on Czechoslovakia and Romania20 – 
were adopted at the conference in Prague. Both versions provided for a coordinated and 
decisive offensive on the part of the three allied armies which would end in the 
occupation of the whole of Hungarian territory. On 9 September 1930 the plans were 
completed with a variant which responded to a potential Hungarian offensive against 
Yugoslavia.21 At the same time another two plans were worked out dealing with a 
simultaneous attack by Hungary and Bulgaria on Yugoslavia and Bulgarian aggression 
alone against the latter in which case Romanian armed intervention would ensue.22   
A close and fruitful cooperation was established in the exchange of intelligence 
information as well. On 22 May 1929 a Czechoslovakian proposal to arrange periodical 
conferences for the purpose of sharing intelligence reports on the growth and organisation 
of the Hungarian army was accepted and a formula devised for covering the expenses.23 
It became customary to hold meetings of the heads of the respective intelligence 
departments a few days before the Chiefs of the General Staffs’ conferences. The current 
state of Hungarian and Bulgarian military preparations was studied at the meeting of 8-9 
May 1931. It was estimated that the Hungarian armed forces consisted of 21 infantry and 
2 cavalry divisions while Bulgarian effectives were appraised at 18 infantry and 2 cavalry 
divisions.24    
                                                 
20 VA, registry 17, box 105, fascicle 2, doc. 2 and 3 containing the plans ‘Projet No 1’, 5 September 1929, 
and ‘Projet No 2’, 14 September 1929, [both in French] for the action in case of the aggression on 
Czechoslovakia and Romania respectively; To facilitate cooperation between the allies it was also 
decided to establish a telegraphic link between the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav General Staffs over 
Romanian territory. See Doc. 4, General Syrovy to General Milovanović, 6 September 1929, in the above 
fascicle.  
21 VA, registry 17, box 105, fascicle 3, doc. 2.   
22 Ibid., doc. 3.   
23 VA, registry 17, box 105, fascicle 2, doc. 5. 
24 VA, registry 17, box 105, fascicle 4, doc. 10, 11; The Hungarian Army was considered fairly well 
equipped as the former military factories restarted their production and enabled a considerable supply of 
material during 1930. There were also substantial illegal arms imports from Germany and Italy. The 
Bulgarians were believed to have had enough rifles and heavy machine guns and some 700 cannons but to 
be lacking in light automatic weapons. One of the decisions reached at the conference was that each 
General Staff should send a specialist in Prague in order to organise a common surveillance service over 
Hungary.   
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The next important step in strengthening the alliance was the conclusion on 11 
May 1931 of a new tripartite military convention at Bucharest which replaced all previous 
conventions and their annexes and modifications.25 This document also introduced a 
substantial change in the planned reaction of the Little Entente to potential Hungarian 
aggression. While heretofore no preparatory measures had been contemplated prior to a 
Hungarian attack on a member state, the new convention went as far as calling for a 
mobilisation undertaken in anticipation of the enemy’s military action. This change was 
brought about by a novel frame of mind in which the Hungarian danger was perceived in 
an altogether different context. Whereas during the 1920s conflict with the Magyars was 
assumed to be a local affair, a grim European outlook in the early 1930s suggested the not 
so improbable prospect of a European war. Should that be the case Hungary would be 
naturally expected to come down on the side of a German-led revisionist bloc but she 
would not present the main threat to the Little Entente. She would rather be a nuisance 
launching an attack in the rear of the Little Entente forces, the vast majority of which 
would be engaged elsewhere. In the view of the Little Entente’s military planners, such a 
contingency dictated a rapid full-scale blow which would knock Hungary out of a war 
and enable the three allied countries to concentrate all their available troops against other 
more powerful enemies. Simultaneously with the tripartite military convention, a new 
military convention between Yugoslavia and Romania dealing with the Bulgarian danger 
was concluded and annexed to the former instrument (ratified on 14 October 1932).26 The 
conventions were supplemented with operational plans designed to meet different 
contingencies. The first one was prepared to respond to a Hungarian attack on Romania 
while the other two allies were not engaged elsewhere; the second one, between 
Yugoslavia and Romania provided for coordinated action against Bulgaria were she to 
                                                 
25 Milan Vanku, Mala Antanta, 1920-1938 (Titovo Užice: Dimitrije Tucović, 1969), pp. 358-361.  
26 VA, registry 17, box 105, fascicle 4, doc. 12.  
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menace either country.27 In addition, a detailed plan was drawn up in case of a combined 
attack on the part of Hungary and Bulgaria on Romania.28 Once again, the assumption 
was that the conflagration would become a general one, and the aim was to defeat first the 
Magyars and then the Bulgarians so as to have a free hand for action on other fronts. The 
urgency of preparation for armed conflict seemed to be all the greater in the light of the 
erroneous conviction that the other side had already reached a formal understanding for 
joint action. The Yugoslav military attaché in Hungary assured his superiors at Belgrade 
that a military alliance of some sort had been concluded between that country and Italy 
following Grandi’s visit to Budapest and the return visit to Rome of General Gyula 
Gömbös, Hungarian Defence Minister, in 1929. This was confirmed, as was commonly 
held amongst the diplomatic corps at his post, by close relations between the two General 
Staffs.29  
These new preoccupations of the Little Entente’s high commands reached their 
logical denouement at the Prague meeting of 14 December 1931 in the drafting of the first 
war plan for a full-blown general conflict on the pattern of the Great War.30 In the 
circumstances, it was only too patent that the Little Entente would take a decidedly 
negative attitude towards the impending Disarmament Conference and thus make a 
common stand with France and Poland. The work of the General Staffs’ representatives 
was continued in Belgrade where another two versions of general conflict plans were 
adopted on 17 November 1932. The worst case scenario for Belgrade envisaged a 
simultaneous attack on Yugoslavia by Italy, Hungary, Albania and Bulgaria, Soviet and 
Bulgarian aggression on Romania and an Austro-German offensive against 
                                                 
27 Ibid., doc. 14 and 15 respectively; Both scenarios were deemed highly unlikely except as an attempt to 
provoke a wider conflict.    
28 Ibid., doc. 16.    
29 AJ, Bucharest Legation, 395-22-220, confidential no. 22389, subject: Checking news of a military 
alliance between Italy and Hungary, Political Department of the Foreign Ministry to Minister, 12 
November 1930. 
30 VA, registry 17, box 105, fascicle 4, doc. 20; Hypothetical situation presaged in ‘Projet No 1 CG 
[Conflit General]’: Czechoslovakia was being attacked by Germany, Austria and Hungary, whereas 
Yugoslavia was being invaded by Italy, Albania and Bulgaria, and Romania by Soviet Union and 
Bulgaria.  
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Czechoslovakia. Another situation was more favourable than ‘Projet No 1’ as it assumed 
Bulgarian neutrality while Hungary was supposed to attack Yugoslavia instead of 
Czechoslovakia.31   
The British always assumed the existence of military understandings between the 
Little Entente countries but were not able to dicover the actual texts of the conventions.32 
The cementing of ties between the three states was not welcome to London as it was 
viewed in the same unfavourable light as heretofore: ‘The continued existence of the 
Little Entente is in itself a perpetual provocation to Hungary and it is hardly surprising if 
she takes any opportunity of abusing it.’33 When in the wake of one of the Little Entente 
conferences the Czechoslovak Minister of War made a speech during a visit to Belgrade 
praising the unity of the alliance and the importance of its military and economic 
collaboration, Sargent succinctly remarked, in an allusion to Vansittart’s famous 
metaphor for the viciousness of the old militaristic mentality: ‘Old Adam at his worst.’34 
The Belgrade Legation soon confirmed such suspicions, reporting that the Czechoslovak 
War Minister had no qualms suggesting that military cooperation meant jointly elaborated 
plans by the respective General Staffs. The news heightened the wariness of the Central 
Department and junior official, Douglas Busk, gave vent to the general feeling: ‘I suppose 
the Little Entente have some conceivable cause for alarm according to their lights but this 
sort of attitude will not get them anywhere.’; Vansittart’s disquiet led him to propose the 
compilation of a ‘brief annual bulletin of the old boy’s progress’ in order to ‘keep his 
medical record, and symptoms such as these might be noted for his temperature chart.’35     
No doubt the tenor of disapproval would have been much amplified had diplomats 
from Whitehall known about the ultimate determination of the allies to resort to arms if 
                                                 
31 VA, registry 17, box 106, fascicle 1, doc. 6, Projet No3 CG and doc. 7, Projet No2 CG respectively; 
See Doc. 2 in the same fascicle for a protocol on delimitation of the three occupation zones that Hungary 
was to be carved up to in case of war.  
32 TNA, Minute by Bateman, 6 June 1929, C 3975/718/62, FO 371/13587.   
33 TNA, Minute by Crowe, 3 September 1929, C 6761/718/62, FO 371/13587.  
34 TNA, Minute by Sargent, 8 July 1930, C 5549/3004/62, FO 371/14349.  
35 TNA, Minutes by Busk, 17 July 1930, and Vansittart, 19 July 1930, C 5660/3004/62, FO 371/14349.   
 171
need be. As it was, the British seriously underestimated the ability of the Little Entente 
powers to come to any definite agreements. Apart from asserting that the organisation had 
further fortified its standing as a powerful factor in Central European politics, the 
Belgrade Legation did not suspect that anything substantial had transpired during the 
conference either in relation to Hungary or Franco-Italian rivalry. Sargent expressed the 
same opinion, adding some mild ridicule of the host: ‘The conference probably discussed 
everything under the sun (it could hardly avoid doing so with M Benes in the chair!) & 
reached no conclusion on any concrete point.’36    
The corollary of this unsympathetic attitude towards the Little Entente was as 
always the distinctly lenient treatment of the Hungarian government. The difficulties of 
the Bethlen government in dealing with the Little Entente’s representations, incurred on 
account of irredentist manifestations in Hungary, were looked upon with the utmost 
sympathy. Count Bethlen was still believed not to be promoting irredentism but rather 
struggling to keep in check ‘a disease in the Hungarian people themselves’.37 On the 
other hand, although Bethlen’s qualities remained highly valued in the Foreign Office the 
appraisal of the Hungarian attitude towards Central European appeasement showed 
marked signs of a more critical assessment. When the Hungarian leader put forward a 
demand for the cancellation of the Little Entente alliance treaties as a precondition for the 
conclusion of arbitration treaties between Hungary and her neighbours, Howard Smith 
underwent a complete volte face from his earlier position and now proclaimed that it was 
                                                 
36 TNA, Minute by Sargent, 30 July 1930, C 5966/3004/62, FO 371/14350.  
37 TNA, Minutes by Bateman, 15 July 1929, and Howard Smith, 18 July 1929, C 5086/348/21, FO 
371/13664; In contrast Victor Wellesley, the Deputy Under-Secretary, claimed that popular opinion in a 
more democratic Hungary would show ‘less obsession over frontiers.’ This reappraisal of the merits of a 
potential change of the regime in Budapest appears to have been initiated by Arthur Henderson, the new 
Labour Foreign Secretary, who was reported, shortly after his coming to office, to have ‘taken a particular 
interest in the possibility of bringing about a more democratic form of Government in Hungary, and was 
anxious to review the whole situation’. See Sargent Papers, Sargent to Chilston, 10 August 1929, FO 
800/276. The discussion remained purely academic.    
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‘for Hungary to come forward like Germany at Locarno, and make a definite offer: but 
this is not in the Hungarian mentality.’38  
Incessant Hungarian campaigning concerning the status of the Hungarian 
minorities in the successor states met with no success among British policy-makers. 
Sargent was adamant that British meddling in that matter could only lead to the arousal of 
the suspicions of the Little Entente and the exciting of the passions of the Hungarians 
with potentially disastrous results which ‘at best would prove very embarrassing to HMG, 
since there can be no question of their constituting themselves the self-appointed 
champions of Hungarian minorities either at Geneva or elsewhere.’39 Nor was the 
Hungarian case admitted on its merits. Wellesley found that the Hungarian minority in 
Czechoslovakia was better treated than the Slovaks in Hungary and even ‘the Magyar 
majority in Hungary! They have, at least, political right, and access to land.’40 In fact, 
Budapest was not believed to have been sincerely appreciative of the eventual adoption of 
a more sympathetic and humanitarian policy towards the Magyar minorities in the 
successor states as that would rob her of her real grievance – the loss of territory and 
potential wealth.41   
 What most occupied the attention of the Foreign Office was the revived show of 
determination on the part of the Little Entente to squash at any price any attempt at 
crowning young Otto Habsburg, who was approaching majority in November 1930, as 
Hungarian king. At the conference in the Czechoslovak town of Strbské Pleso on 25-27 
June 1930 the Little Entente reaffirmed its will ‘to go all the way’ in preventing a 
Habsburg restoration which continued to be viewed as a serious threat to the existence of 
the successor states.42 Beneš’s request for a timely British warning in Budapest against a 
Habsburg restoration called for a revaluation of the whole issue. It demonstrated that the 
                                                 
38 TNA, Minute by Howard Smith, 18 July 1929, C 5119/348/21, FO 371/13664.  
39 TNA, Minute by Sargent, 27 December 1929, C 9713/771/21, FO 371/13665. 
40 TNA, Minute by Wellesley, 2 January 1930, ibid.  
41 TNA, Houston-Boswell to Scrivener, private, 25 July 1932, C 5155/58/62, FO 371/15923.  
42 AJ, London Legation, fascicle I, I-7, Marinković to Djurić, 10 July 1930, confidential no. 632.   
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Foreign Office’s attitude had undergone a profound change since 1921 as the imposition 
of the Habsburg ban on Hungary was now seen as a flagrant interference in the rights of 
the Hungarian people to self-determination: 
The action of 1920-21 is so contrary to the political principles of His Majesty’s 
Government, that when one considers it now dispassionately in the light of present 
conditions, it is inevitable that His Majesty’s Government should attempt at the 
earliest opportunity to escape from the commitment to which they pledged 
themselves then under what was practically a threat of war by the Little Entente. 
Whatever may have been the dangers to the Little Entente of the Habsburg restoration 
in 1921, it is ludicrous for them with their swollen armaments to argue that the 
establishment of Otto on the throne of disarmed Hungary would at this time of day 
threaten the safety of any of the Succession States. I hope we intend therefore, that if 
the Little Entente are unwise enough to try in 1930 to make our blood run cold with 
threats of war, as they did in 1921 in order to hold us to our commitments, we will 
not to allow ourselves to be bluffed or rattled but to try, if possible, to escape from 
our false position and get the responsibility for dealing with this problem shifted from 
our shoulders to the proper quarter, namely the Council of the League of Nations.43
 
 Since France and Italy were more interested in the question it was decided to 
leave the initiative to them. This was deemed all the more opportune as the attitude of 
these powers appeared to be rather uncertain. It was suspected that Mussolini may have 
reversed his policy and actually condoned the restoration both in Austria and Hungary, 
and that France could also acquiesce seeing that it was inevitable and from her point of 
view might serve a useful purpose of thwarting the Anschluss.44 In the circumstances, 
both Sargent and Vansittart thought it best not to commit to any course of action and 
preserve a free hand for the eventual juridical decision of the Council of the League. 
However, the British Ministers at Vienna and Budapest sent reassuring reports from their 
respective posts which showed that there were no real prospects of a putsch.45 Indeed, 
Otto’s eighteenth birthday passed off in complete tranquillity. Although an immediate 
crisis was avoided, the Foreign Office was sure that the Habsburg question had not been 
disposed of and would erupt in an acute form at some time in the near future. A thorough 
                                                 
43 TNA, Minute by Sargent, 4 July 1930, C 5369/3929/21, FO 371/14396; Busk suggested that the 
occasion could be used to demand of Hungary a conclusion of arbitration agreements on the Locarno 
model in return for the consent of the Great Powers for a Habsburg restoration.  
44 TNA, Minutes by Sargent, 1 and 3 November 1930, and Vansittart, 5 November 1930, C 
8086/3929/21, FO 371/14397. 
45 TNA, Chilston to FO, 4 November 1930, C 8203/3929/21; Phipps to FO, 3 November 1930, C 
8172/3929/21; Minute by Vansittart, 11 November 1930, C 8325/3929/21; all in FO 371/14397.  
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legal analysis of the British obligations in respect to the Little Entente powers under the 
Ambassador’s Conference resolution of 1921 was undertaken but did not provide 
satisfactory results as to the validity of an eventual contention that there was no legal 
ground for them to insist on the intangibility of that provision.  
 The attitude towards the restoration question was still to be decided on political 
grounds and there was no unanimity of views within the Foreign Office. While Vansittart 
deemed it inevitable in the course of the next few years as part of the treaty revision 
which it was opportune to contemplate, the Labour Foreign Secretary, Arthur Henderson, 
was inclined to comply with Beneš’s suggestion of a warning to Budapest if the prospect 
ever arose; meanwhile he preferred to leave the matter in abeyance.46 Still, it was thought 
necessary to prepare the ground for a likely change of attitude in case of a fait accompli. 
In his conversations with Central Department officials Yugoslav Minister Djurić was 
given to understand that the restoration movement, if it gained in strength, would be 
difficult to stop.47 In Prague the British Minister had no qualms about telling his 
Yugoslav colleague, as his personal opinion, that the Little Entente should not be against 
Otto’s becoming king because a proper royal government would be less prone to external 
adventures than the Horthy regime.48   
In the circumstances, 1932 closed on a very uncertain note as to what the future 
held in store. At the extraordinary meeting of the Little Entente Foreign Ministers at 
Belgrade on 18-19 December it was decided to perfect the organisation of the alliance by 
constituting a permanent organ of the Council of the Little Entente comprising of the 
three Foreign Ministers and a permanent Secretariat which would prepare the agenda for 
the Council and conduct the necessary technical work. Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary to 
the Cabinet, was quick to recognise that this consolidation was accounted for partly by 
                                                 
46 TNA, Minutes by Vansittart, 22 January 1931, and Selby, 7 February 1931, C 187/187/21, FO 
371/15242. 
47 AJ, London Legation, fascicle I, I-7, Djurić to Marinković, 5 August 1930, confidential no. 632.  
48 AJ, London Legation, fascicle I, I-4, Lazarević to Political Department of the Foreign Ministry, 14 July 
1930, confidential no. 444/30 enclosed in Kasidolac to Djurić, 14 August 1930, confidential no. 718.   
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the growing clamour for ‘Equality of Rights’ by the ex-enemy states and partly by Italy’s 
Machiavellian policy.49 He was concerned about the unsettling signs as to future 
developments in Central Europe: 
There are numerous indications that something is afoot in that part of Europe, & most 
of these point to an attempt on the part of the Italians to draw closer to Austria and 
Hungary, though whether a military alliance has really been concluded it is not 
possible to say. In any case such an alliance could only be dangerous after the 
consummation of Gleichberechtigung. The essential feature seems to be that Europe 
is dividing itself into the “have-nots” and the “haves” backed by France.50  
 
 Given all the information gathering in the Foreign Office about the destructive 
Italian dealings across the Danube basin and Balkans,51 and the awareness of the perilous 
turns that events might take, Whitehall’s stance appears to have been quite enigmatic. In 
fact, it was easily explicable by the old perceptions of Italian policy which made 
allowance for its manifestations that would otherwise cause much more alarm. Even 
when it was extremely difficult to explain away occasional violent Italian outbursts, the 
Duce’s conduct of policy towards Yugoslavia was exonerated from accusations of sinister 
designs on account, as Sargent, Tyrell and Chamberlain all concurred, of the alleged 
‘influences working against Mussolini in his own household; and influences too which he 
is not strong enough to suppress.’52 Vansittart maintained the standard view that it was 
only because of her own inferiority complex and feelings of insecurity that Italy indulged 
in her destructive policy; he took for granted Rome’s thesis that the Franco-Yugoslav 
alliance was but a tool for containing Italy.53 But more importantly, the possibility that 
                                                 
49 TNA, Minute by Hankey, 4 January 1933, C 10963/3829/62, FO 371/15928; Hankey was right as to the 
motives. The initiative came from Beneš who feared the danger of Mussolini’s putting forward a proposal 
for an Italo-German division of spheres of influence in Central Europe on the understanding that Austria 
and Hungary become acknowledged as an Italian preserve, Czechoslovakia being left to the German 
sphere and Yugoslavia isolated which would paralyse the Little Entente. See Piotr Wandycz, ‘The 
Foreign Policy of Edvard Beneš, 1918-1938’ in Victor Mamatey and Radomír Luža (eds.), A History of 
the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1945 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 
216-238 (p. 227).  
50 TNA, Minute by Hankey, 30 December 1932, C 10898/51/92, FO 371/15994. 
51 TNA, Minute by Bateman, 12 September 1928, C 6829/2/92, FO 371/12979.  
52 TNA, Minutes by Sargent, Tyrell and Chamberlain, 2 February 1928, C 821/43/92, FO 371/12980; 
Minute by Chamberlain, 2 February 1929, C 735/123/92, FO 371/13708.   
53 TNA, Memorandum by Vansittart, ‘An Aspect of International Relations in 1930’, C 3358/3358/62, FO 
371/14350; the British view of Italian psychology was not entirely misplaced as Mussolini was at times 
truly afraid of France and Yugoslavia launching a preventive war against the Italians though that was of 
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Mussolini could definitely commit himself to a militaristic policy and thereby irreversibly 
part ways with Britain was dismissed on the grounds of Italy’s geostrategic position in the 
Mediterranean, enclosed in a sea which was an undisputed British preserve. It was typical 
that even an ardent advocate of ‘a policy of consistent and unswerving co-operation with 
France’ such as Walford Selby, Principal Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary, felt 
that it would be wrong to make too much of Italian machinations:   
French fears of Italy are in reality rather absurd since she should realise the 
fundamental fact … that Italy and Italian policy are in the ultimate resort controlled 
by us. Nevertheless, Italian manifestations of policy in Central Europe which have on 
occasion a strongly anti-French flavour are very inconvenient from our point of view 
and from the point of view of the policy of pacification which we desire to pursue, 
and the less we see of them the better, since useful as Italy may be as a pawn in our 
game in Europe, she is not a factor on which we can rely to make our policy 
effective.54
   
 Despite the disturbing features of the international outlook the Foreign Office kept 
drifting without any idea as to how to respond to predicted challenges. Vansittart alone 
concluded that Britain should have a concrete policy and baldly asserted his conviction 
‘that eventually nothing short of some form of treaty revision will enable Europe 
permanently to settle down – by consent.’55 He cautiously qualified his advocacy for 
revision by presenting it as a consummation which could be attained ‘slowly as we get 
into the way of peace’ and within the framework of the League of Nations; he preferred 
to term it treaty modification as if the terminology itself could have made it less 
unpalatable to the antirevisionist countries.  
 
 
 
4.2. Yugoslavia and Italy 
 
A confrontation between Rome and Belgrade remained the most disturbing 
feature of inter-state relations in Central and South Eastern Europe. The problem was 
                                                                                                                                               
course merely a reflection of his own aggressive plans against those two countries. See John Gooch, 
Mussolini and his Generals: the Armed Forces and Fascist Foreign Policy, 1922-1940 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 126, 130, 145, 199, 209-210.    
54 Oxford, Selby Papers, Ms. Eng. c. 6585, ‘Points in connection with the Italian position’, memorandum 
by Selby, 25 February 1932. Emphasis in original.   
55 TNA, An Aspect of International Relations in 1931, C 3217/321/62, FO 371/15205.   
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made even more complicated on the account of the crisis which gripped Yugoslavia in 
June 1928, when following a shooting in the Parliament resulting in the death of the Croat 
leader Stjepan Radić, a complete rift between the Serbs and Croats shook the foundations 
of the state. On 6 January 1929 King Alexander dissolved both Parliament and the 
Constitution and proclaimed a personal dictatorship, and Yugoslavia entered an uncertain 
experiment in statecraft. Not surprisingly, Mussolini, encouraged by the internal 
dissensions in Yugoslavia, was bent on working towards the disintegration of the 
country56 and evaded any meaningful negotiations with the Yugoslavs under all sorts of 
pretences. In conversations in Geneva with Marinković, Grandi was not prepared to give 
any assurance as regards Italian restraint from military intervention in Albania and made 
it abundantly clear that Belgrade would have to make its choice between friendship with 
Paris or Rome.57  
Marinković had no illusions about the incipient negotiations and believed that 
intervention from London alone could break the deadlock. Indeed, Marinković strove to 
regain the confidence of London in Yugoslavia’s peaceful policy which he considered to 
be one of the essential prerequisites for a successful diplomatic struggle with Rome; and 
he thought he could justifiably claim a measure of success.58 He wanted to enlist British 
help in restraining the Italians at the point where their forwardness was most perilous:  
Brutally speaking, I would like to have England… tell the Italians in a confidential 
but determined manner that there can be no intervention in Albania unless her 
independence and the border’s integrity are in question, irrespectively of whether we 
[Yugoslavia] are in agreement or not, for such an intervention would be contrary to 
the Covenant of the League of Nations and international law.59   
 
 As there was no question of such plain-speaking to Foreign Office officials, the 
Foreign Minister intimated to his envoy Djurić that he should employ a more subtle 
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approach in his conversations, but he was nevertheless hopeful that it would be possible 
to induce ‘the English to say a decisive word in Rome’. These attempts were steadfastly 
pursued. Konstantin Fotić, Yugoslav delegate at Geneva, sounded Philip Noel-Baker of 
the British delegation at the Disarmament Conference on whether it would be possible for 
the British government to bring the friction between Rome and Belgrade up before the 
Council of the League in order to arrest a dangerous development in the situation.60 
Marinković was sceptical that negotiations with the Italians could serve any useful 
purpose but was bent on keeping them going for the sake of appearances and above all for 
the sake of relations with Britain: ‘London is always the goal of all my efforts whether in 
Paris, Geneva, Hague, Belgrade or Rome.’61   
However, in the wake of the Franco-Yugoslav treaty of 1927 the Foreign Office 
assumed that there was no prospect of any improvement in the relations between Rome 
and Belgrade unless France and Italy composed their acute differences. Kennard was ill at 
ease with Italo-Yugoslav relations being made a function of the negotiations which were 
underway between Rome and Paris62 and foresaw that Italian pressure might supply 
further impetus to Yugoslavia’s decided tendency to flirt with Germany and bring about, 
in due course, the resumption of German eastward expansion - and that on a far more 
favourable basis. His forebodings were not taken to heart in London.63 The Belgrade 
Legation was instructed to refrain from discussing the renewal of the Pact of Rome as 
Chamberlain could not predict the future line to be taken by Mussolini and did not want 
to commit himself in any way.64  
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A reluctance to dabble in Italo-Yugoslav relations stemmed from the conviction, 
as Graham put it, ‘that if once a proper Franco-Italian understanding can be reached, Italy 
will leave off her present policy which keeps the Balkans in continual unrest.’65 Sargent 
went as far as stating that Italian subversive activities against Yugoslavia were not really 
aimed at that country but were rather weapons employed in the perceived defence against 
French hegemony in Central Europe, and would consequently be dropped at once if 
Rome could be assured of Yugoslavia’s true independence.66 This sort of thinking was 
irritating in the extreme to the new British Minister at Belgrade, Sir Nevile Henderson, 
who bitterly recalled many years later how Italy ‘was during those years the pet of 
Downing Street, and when I used to represent Yugoslavia’a point of view in the quarrels, 
I was constantly having Signor Gayda [a prominent Fascist journalist] thrown at my head 
to prove how wrong I was. Gayda, the Goebbels of Italy!’67  
Nevertheless, the entanglement of Yugoslavia in the web of outstanding issues 
between France and Italy appeared to have been the major obstacle to an understanding 
between the two Great Powers. The Chief of the Central Department estimated that the 
key for a comprehensive political settlement between Rome and Paris was ‘not in the 
oases of the Sahara or the schools of Tunisia but in Belgrade and the Balkans.’68 When 
Philippe Berthelot, General-Secretary of the Quai d’Orsay, hinted to Ambassador Tyrell 
that he wished to reach a tripartite Franco-Italo-Yugoslav agreement as a way of breaking 
the deadlock the Foreign Office warmly approved of the idea. Sargent came to regret the 
fact that the British had lightly turned down French proposals for a tripartite agreement in 
1926 as contrary to the Locarno spirit: 
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Looking back now one can’t help feeling that perhaps the standards we applied were 
altogether too high and that we would have been better advised to have urged forward 
the conclusion of such a tripartite agreement in the interests of Franco-Italian 
relations even though it might not fulfil in every respect the criterion we had set up. If 
such a tripartite agreement had been concluded in 1926 it is possible, indeed 
probable, that Franco-Italian relations would never have grown as strained as they 
have since become. For had it been concluded, the fatal Franco-Yugoslav Treaty of 
1927 would never have materialised in its present form, and in the absence of that 
treaty we may take it that Italy’s suspicions and fears of French policy in Central 
Europe would never have reached the pitch which now makes all attempts at 
conciliation so difficult.69
 
Nothing materialised from Berthelot’s suggestion as it became clear that Mussolini was 
not prepared to accept such a solution. A further stillborn idea which originated with the 
Central Department was that the Franco-Yugoslav treaty be replaced by an arbitration 
treaty and supplemented by a similar instrument between Italy and Yugoslavia.70   
The elusive quest for a suitable formula continued as Henderson sent increasingly 
alarmist reports about the general nervousness in Yugoslavia in regard to Italian 
aggressive designs.71 Sargent contemplated the possibility of resolving the differences 
between the Adriatic neighbours in a wider framework of some sort of Mediterranean 
Locarno which would include France, Italy, Yugoslavia and Albania, but Vansittart did 
not consider this suggestion to be practical politics.72 Yet, unlike a few years earlier 
Yugoslav apprehensions were taken seriously and it was recognised that the danger to 
peace did not come from that quarter. Henderson in particular was adamant that although 
the military circles had a lamentable habit of intriguing behind the back of the Foreign 
Ministry such activity was not to be overestimated as Belgrade entirely stood for 
pacification and stabilisation.73 The Central Department came to realise that it was Italy 
who had embarked on a definite policy with a view to preventing Yugoslavia from 
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growing into a formidable rival in the Adriatic and a powerful factor in both the Danube 
basin and Balkans.74 The Foreign Office and both Graham and Henderson continued in 
vain their concerted efforts to induce both parties to follow up the Geneva conversations.  
At the same time the British outlook remained sympathetic to Italy’s point of view 
in that it considered the detachment of Belgrade from France the only way of negotiating 
the impasse. France could not be expected to give way of her own volition. Berthelot was 
unequivocal that a French declaration of disinterest in the Balkans made with Italy in 
mind was out of the question.75 The only leverage the British had and were willing to use 
in order to wean Yugoslavia from Paris was of a financial nature. Henderson put great 
store in the successful issue of an international stabilisation loan for Yugoslavia in which 
British banking houses headed by the Rothschild group would lead the way as the 
practical means of cutting the umbilical cord with France.76 ‘My aim is to prevent 
Yugoslavia from getting her neck into a French financial noose from which she will never 
more be able to escape’, he professed.77 The venture seemed of paramount importance as 
French banks were also competing for the conclusion of a loan and nothing was more 
certain, in the British view, to further aggravate tensions between Rome and Belgrade 
than the strengthening of France’s economic hold on the latter. Henderson’s 
determination was all the stronger as he believed that France was not dissatisfied at the 
existence of strained Italo-Yugoslav relations and tended to encourage Yugoslav 
expenditure on armaments from which she herself benefited.78 Vansittart did his best to 
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facilitate the loan negotiations from London by staying in close touch with the 
Rothschilds,79 but it was to no avail as the reluctance and procrastination of British 
financers finally decided the Yugoslav government to make a deal with the more 
forthcoming French.    
As far as bilateral relations between Rome and Belgrade were concerned, 
Henderson knew that Italy would not be prepared to come to terms with Yugoslavia as 
long as she was doubtful as to whether the latter would settle down as a united country. 
Moreover, she was not willing passively to observe the outcome of the internal 
dissentions in Yugoslavia but rather endeavoured to prevent her consolidation by any 
subversive means short of war with a view to getting rid of a powerful neighbour.80 This 
policy was grossly mistaken, Henderson asseverated, for it was based on a blatant 
miscalculation: he was a staunch believer in Yugoslavia’s future, although her internal 
consolidation could be a matter of two generations rather than a few years. Even in her 
present condition the country was of immense importance: ‘There is no doubt whatever 
that Yugoslavia is the vital force of the Petite Entente and the keystone of not only the 
Balkans but of Central Europe.’81 Therefore, Henderson urged his superiors to lend 
support to Yugoslavia at the impending Lausanne Conference of 1932 for he feared that a 
financial bankruptcy of the country could be followed by social upheaval, a disastrous 
setback and calamity from the point of view of both British and Central and South 
Eastern European interests. Aid to Yugoslavia, he argued, meant helping King 
Alexander’s personal regime:  
The King is the button between the shirt of Serbia and the trousers of Croatia and 
Slovenia and the keeping together of shirt and trousers is to my mind essential if there 
is to be any stability in the Balkan Peninsula. The utility of a strong Yugoslavia 
seems to me incontrovertible, not only as a bulwark against an eventual German 
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“Drang nach Osten” or the menace of a Russian expansion towards Constantinople, 
but also in order to prevent a recurrence of the disastrous pre-war struggles between 
rival Great Powers for predominance in this part of the world.82  
 
 Notwithstanding the fact that the Minister’s supreme confidence as to the future of 
the country was not taken for granted in London, his basic assumptions were accepted. 
Vansittart acknowledged that the internecine strife between the Serbs and Croats was not 
only a danger to Yugoslavia’s very existence but also had the unfortunate result of 
inspiring ‘the feeling of insecurity’ and that her internal break-up could ‘have the most 
serious repercussions in Central Europe’.83 This realisation was not without its practical 
effect. Although the renewal of the Franco-Yugoslav treaty at the end of 1932 was 
regretted in the Foreign Office, Henderson’s views in regard to Italian responsibility for 
this unpalatable consummation were entirely approved.84  
 
 
 
4.3. Uncertain Quantity: a View of the Little Entente  
 
 A conspicuous feature of the British outlook on the Little Entente’s standing at the 
turn of decade was the absence of any clearly stated views of it as an entity. That was not 
just the consequence of ignorance in regard to the full scope of the increased military 
cooperation and planning on the part of the allies but rather a result of the impression that 
the Little Entente’s vitality was dwindling. Such a feeling could only be inspired by 
convergent impressions of its component parts. As Yugoslavia was a particularly 
complex and significant country whose internal stability and external relations effectively 
determined security issues in the Danube basin and the Balkans, the cases in point were 
Romania and Czechoslovakia.   
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 In November 1928 it looked as if the course of events in Romania may have taken 
a turn for the better. Having achieved an overwhelming victory at the elections the 
National Peasant Party came to office putting an end to ten years of a Liberal regime 
which left behind a pitiable legacy of corruption and maladministration. The British 
Minister at Bucharest, Robert Greg, believed that the new administration, led by the 
respectable Transylvanian leader Iuliu Maniu, could put into effect long delayed and 
much needed internal reforms and in the field of foreign policy make a clear break with 
the blindly pro-French orientation of its predecessors.85 The way to facilitate the 
emancipation of the Maniu government from France was to lend it desperately needed 
financial help, as was later to be tried with Yugoslavia. The attempt failed dismally but 
not for a want of enthusiasm from the Foreign Office. The case proved to be a classic 
example of the Bank of England’s utter unwillingness to cooperate with the Foreign 
Office in international financial transactions to the point of keeping it completely in the 
dark as to both the current negotiations with the Romanians and the confidential 
arrangements reached with the Bank of France in respect of a prospective loan.86  
This failure meant a reversal to the old posture of icy and unsympathetic 
aloofness. Further reports of the strengthening of France’s economic and military hold on 
the country reinforced the attitude already held.87 When the news of French deliveries of 
war material to Bucharest under exceptionally favourable conditions amounting to a 
subsidy had been confirmed it created a markedly negative impression in London.88 The 
ill will towards Romania was building up and her casting about for financial help at a 
time of economic depression met with Howard Smith’s stern snub: ‘Personally I am 
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doubtful whether Roumania is worth bothering about.’89 On Maniu’s stepping down from 
office and the formation of a new cabinet by Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, Hankey deemed 
that the Romanians could not hope for any enduring reconciliation with the three of their 
neighbours who coveted their lands nor could he see any alternative policy likely to 
relieve them of their existing anxieties: ‘they will presumably not want to jettison the 
Little Entente, which is what alliance with Italy or Germany would portend. In short, 
given the present arrangement of Europe, Roumania’s policy appears to be made for 
her.’90  
The Czechoslovakian case was especially intriguing. The country was a notable 
exception in the gloomy picture of Central Europe and had appeared to be ‘the model 
succession State; she has practically solved her racial, administrative and economic 
problems, appears capable of assimilating territories obtained from Hungary, and in 
foreign affairs gives excellent imitations of French methods and policies.’91 This glowing 
reference, with the exception of the annoying French ‘imitations’, would have been 
expected to portend a sympathy for and confidence in Czechoslovakia’s future and role in 
the region. However, exactly the opposite was the case.    
The negative attitude towards Czechoslovakia, not to mention Beneš personally, 
discernable in the Foreign Office during this period had a lot to do with the extremely 
hostile and scathing reports of Sir Joseph Addison, British Minister accredited to Prague 
since December 1930. ‘Czechoslovakia is an injustice – i.e. it is a fictitious country 
founded on several injustices and maintained by the continuance of injustice and the 
apparent impossibility of putting an end to it without a convulsion which it is to the 
general interest to avoid.’ – read one of Addison’s typical and most outspoken 
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professions.92 He pointed out ‘that all the elements which are usually the precursory signs 
of some form of dissolution are present in this country to-day’.93 The precarious position 
of the country which would be exposed in the event of any foreign entanglement, 
according to Addison, came from the fact that it was a composite creation with no real 
unity in which the Czechs, who constituted a minority of the population, oppressed the 
majority made up mostly of Slovaks, Germans and Hungarians who, in turn, had no 
loyalty to the country. This disturbing state of affairs could not fail to seriously 
compromise Prague’s defence capabilities; but it was not the only military handicap: ‘It is 
a fact that most competent observers are of the opinion that in the event of war, the 
absence of military traditions coupled with a lack of a proper fighting spirit will probably 
prove fatal to the Czechs, and it must be confessed that one is constantly provided with 
indications which are in accordance with this point of view.’94   
Addison felt sure that the continued existence of Czechoslovakia, arranged as she 
was to suit exclusively Czech interests, precluded Prague from sincere cooperation in any 
broader economic settlement. While observing how the ventilation of the feasibility of an 
Austro-Hungarian union in the press left the successor states completely unruffled, the 
Minister ascribed Czechoslovakia’s equanimity to ‘a state of self-complacency’ which 
stemmed from the comparatively more prosperous conditions than those obtaining in the 
neighbouring states and the consequent conviction that she did not need ‘to do more than 
note with a superior smile that which occurs or is discussed in these states.’95 His acerbic 
remarks about Prague’s internal and external policies left a strong imprint in the Foreign 
Office’s thinking. When complementing Greek Prime Minister Venizelos for his 
successful pursuit of appeasement with his neighbours, Vansittart was reminded ‘in 
contemplating this fine effort, of another man for whom a similar task has been waiting 
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for the last ten years, and who failed, not from trying, but from mistaking blunder and 
fine words for broad vision and hard work. I mean M. Benes and the problem of the 
Danube States.’96 The Permanent Under-Secretary’s firm attitude in placing the whole 
onus of blame at the feet of Beneš, not to mention Addison’s hostility, was one-sided 
given that the Hungarian government had long since decided to reject any economic 
rapprochement with the Little Entente countries for it believed that it would politically 
strengthen them and diminish the prospect of frontier revision.97
 The only aspect in which the Little Entente was still viewed and discussed as a 
collective body was in the context of its connexion with Paris. The cooperation between 
France and the Little Entente countries, Belgium and Poland reached its peak in the 
councils of the League, and Paris could always count on the votes of the latter states in 
any question affecting French national interests, a state of affairs that Walford Selby 
described as being ‘obnoxious to H.M. Government’.98 The fact that the Little Entente 
countries with the addition of Poland were lumped together in Vansittart’s famous ‘Old 
Adam’ memorandum under the heading ‘French satellite states’ was another testimony, if 
one was needed, of the dim view taken in London of French commitments to these states 
reinforced by the largely mistaken belief that Paris was ‘bound by various forms of secret 
military agreement’ to them.99 However, aside from the old argument of the 
incompatibility of the ‘Old Adam’ mentality with the progressive ideals of the post-war 
world, Vansittart put forward new reasons for the inevitable failure of the French system 
which he found in its inherent weaknesses:  
…France has always hoped against hope that these young people would grow up to 
be bulwarks of law and order in Central and Eastern Europe, thus furnishing efficient 
and sufficient guarantees for French “security.” Their peppery weakness and local 
brawls have been a disappointment. Conflicts of nationalities within the State, 
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corruption, administrative inexperience and irresponsible chauvinism have, in the 
case of Yugoslavia and Roumania, rendered them unreliable allies in the pursuit of 
this haunting and evasive “security”.  
 
 A year later Vansittart wrote that France had ‘begun to realise that her group, with 
the exception of Yugoslavia’ was ‘not worth much for “practical” purposes, as in the 
cases of Roumania and Czechoslovakia’.100 The former was as usual seen as a broken 
reed on account of her military inefficiency and known to be viewed by her own allies as 
more of a liability than an asset. The latter country was no doubt degraded in the light of 
Addison’s incisive screeds which apparently found their echo in Whitehall. The omens of 
dissolution of the French system were registered in Czechoslovakia as well, Vansittart 
observed not without satisfaction; she had ‘an uneasy feeling that she is no longer 
France’s pet, or even reliably her protégé, and that she might one day find herself 
abandoned by her ally’ and the disquiet produced thereby took ‘the form of nagging at 
neighbours and petty outbursts of “hate.”’101    
 
 
 
4.4. Austria, Anschluss and Economic Alleviation  
 
The central position which Austria held in the region made her stability a 
particularly sensitive and important point. The challenges to her tranquillity were 
twofold: internally, the country was upset by the friction between the paramilitary 
organisations of the Austrian Socialists and Fascists; and externally, the interference by 
her neighbours made Austria a grand stage of diplomatic struggle between their 
conflicting agendas. To make things more complicated, the internal bickering was 
aggravated by foreign support for the opposed factions. The British Minister at Vienna, 
Sir Eric Phipps, suggested to his superiors that the Austrian government’s position would 
be strengthened if he and his French colleague were to be authorised to urge the 
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disarmament of both Socialist and Fascist paramilitary organisations in the country.102 
The Minister thought it essential to keep the matter out of the public eye and gathered that 
the French were also none too anxious to publish a joint démarche abroad ‘as I think that 
both they [the French] and the Austrians feel that it is highly desirable to avoid giving the 
impression that France and England took this step as a result of pressure from any 
members of the Little Entente, particularly Benes, who stinks in the nostrils of the 
Austrians.’103 His suggestion was accepted and acted upon, and Phipps was soon pleased 
to report that Austrian Chancellor Johann Schober discreetly made use of the joint Anglo-
French démarche in order to suppress the internal resistance to disarmament in Vienna.104 
This constant and persistent pressure on the Vienna government of the day became a 
permanent feature of British policy. The British kept preaching ‘the importance of 
disarming the illicit associations (the Heimwehr on the one hand and the Socialist 
Schutzbund on the other) whose marchings and counter-marchings have been a standing 
menace to peace in Austria, and have laid that country open to the risk of foreign 
intervention’.105 After trying in vain for years to compel the Austrians to observance of 
their treaty obligations the Foreign Office resigned itself to the fact that no government in 
Vienna was likely to be strong enough to carry out the effective disarmament of the 
country.  
Phipps’ chariness not to associate his démarche with the members of the Little 
Entente was instructive of the sort of problems he confronted. He found that Beneš’s 
diplomacy in Vienna was animated by ‘his pact with the German-Czech Socialists to 
endeavour to bring about Anglo-French intervention in Austria in favour of the Austrian 
Socialists’.106 In order to dissuade the Czech from meddling in the internal affairs of 
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Austria Phipps was prepared to impress upon Beneš the fact that Schober was the most 
moderate Austrian to hold the office and that he could be succeeded by some pro-
Heimwehr intriguer.107 The Minister also intervened on behalf of Austria to secure 
concessions on the non-German reparations commission as against the Little Entente 
representatives during the Hague conference in January 1930. The Foreign Office was 
positively annoyed with Beneš’s ‘dirty game as regards Austria’ and recommended 
Phipps enlist the support of Philip Snowden, Chancellor of the Exchequer, so as to prevail 
on the Czech’s obstructive tactics and make him realise that his policy ran contrary to that 
of HMG.108  
On the other hand, Italy presented an even bigger nuisance with her underhand 
subsidies thrown at the Heimwehr. Characteristically, Italian subversion was not taken 
too tragically in the Foreign Office. To begin with, it was an article of faith among British 
diplomats that Rome had the same objective as to the preservation of Austrian 
independence as Britain and France had and which was founded on the seemingly 
incontrovertible contention that ‘Mussolini would hardly want the whole of 
“Deutschtum” on the Brenner instead of poor little Austria.’109 In this respect the opinion 
of Viscount Chilston, British Minister at Budapest, was very revealing. Due to her 
military weakness which made her absolutely incapable of holding out against the Little 
Entente he did not consider Hungary to be of any use to the Italians in the event of a 
conflict with Yugoslavia and he sought the explanation of a likely military cooperation in 
another direction: ‘It seems possible that if there is any secret understanding it may be 
connected with possible developments (such as the “Anschluss”) in Austria’.110            
At the same time the Foreign Office was not blind to the possibility that Mussolini 
could hope to utilise his rapprochement with Austria attained by the Austro-Italian treaty 
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of 6 February 1930 as part of his effort to encircle Yugoslavia, or even as a bridge to 
Germany with a view to forming a Germano-Austro-Italian bloc opposed to France and 
the Little Entente. Either development was deemed unlikely, but Sargent mused that the 
best course for Britain was to ‘do our best to discourage Austria from playing Italy’s 
game’.111 At the bottom of all Mussolini’s combinations in Austria, which was the 
linchpin of the whole region, was his manoeuvring in the perennial trial of strength with 
Paris, and Whitehall had some definite ideas as to how that struggle might be brought to 
an end: ‘But the Anschluss is not yet, whereas Italy’s activities in Central Europe are 
present and increasing. It is very unwise to call them unreal. They will continue so long 
as France does not withdraw in Italy’s favour or comes to an agreement with her, and the 
agreement will have to be in Italy’s favour.’112   
As elsewhere the most powerful weapon at Britain’s disposal was a promise of 
goodwill on the part of the London money market. Concerned about the prospect of a 
fascist-style coup in Austria, Phipps deemed that ‘financial pressure seems to me the most 
effective means of ensuring constitutional action here.’113 Likewise, the same remedy 
was found to be best suited for dealing with Italian obstruction in relation to any 
contemplated financial help for the Vienna government: ‘If Mussolini really has the 
effrontery to make his consent to the loan conditional on the non disarmament of the 
Heimwehr… the necessity for our pressure in a contrary sense would seem to be even 
more vital than ever. Most of the money must presumably come from England and 
America, so we ought to be able to win our point in the end.’114  
Finally, the economic depression, which was worse in Austria and Central Europe 
than elsewhere on the continent, set in motion the examination of elaborate and failed 
schemes to alleviate the lot of the hard hit successor states through the means of their 
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mutual cooperation and certain concessions by Great Powers.115 The idea was entertained 
in London that the effects of the economic depression could be conducive to assuaging 
the strained political relations in Central Europe inasmuch, in the words of Maurice 
Hankey, ‘as the wolves of the Little Entente are to lie down with the lambs of the ex-
enemy states.’116 In March 1931 the Austro-German Customs Union project was sprung 
upon the rest of Europe with a view to preparing the ground for the Anschluss, although 
the Germans emphatically denied any ulterior motive beyond seeking a cure for the 
economic distress.117 As for the Foreign Office it was convinced that the Anschluss was 
‘not one of the points round which diplomatic combinations and bargains are most likely 
to centre in the immediate future.’118 This miscalculation was a natural corollary of 
another flagrant misjudgement - that the Anschluss was not at the top of the list of 
German desiderata and would be preceded by Berlin’s tackling two other, more pressing, 
grievances: a drastic modification of the Polish frontier and rearmament at least to a point 
of parity with Poland. Not even the floating of the Customs Union proposal made the 
Permanent Under-Secretary suspect the Germans of premeditated political design behind 
allegedly economic motives: ‘Nor do I personally believe that this coup was conceived, 
or is intended, as any preface or approach to a political “Anschluss.”’119  
 In May 1931 the French responded to the German challenge by advancing the 
plan of their Prime Minister, André Tardieu, which proposed a preferential tariff system 
that five Danubian countries – Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and 
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Romania – were to confer on each other. Relentless manoeuvring of the interested Great 
Powers ensued and brought home the reality that it was political considerations that were 
coming to the forefront of such schemes.120 The signs were not wanting that the Danube 
area might become an arena in a battle for preponderance between France and Germany 
‘with Italy as a makeweight.’121 To prevent this undesirable development it was 
necessary to ‘establish such a measure of co-operation and interdependence between the 
Danubian States as would raise them above the status of pawns in the political game of 
France and Germany.’ For that very reason Vansittart reluctantly took a favourable view 
of the Tardieu plan as a step in the right direction. Yet, there was a not improbable 
prospect, Vansittart pointed out, that economic means would not suffice politically to 
emancipate the region from the tutelage of the two Great Powers: 
In that case, His Majesty’s Government may be called upon to decide whether they 
prefer French or German control of this important part of the world. This opens a 
large field of speculation where only generalisations are possible. But in considering 
the problem it must be borne in mind that, whereas French control is, on the whole, a 
defensive control maintained in order to re-establish the balance of power between 
Germany and France, i.e., to ensure French “security”, German control in these 
countries would be frankly aggressive and acquisitive, and, as such, would tend to 
accentuate the absence of equilibrium between the Powers of Europe and thus 
perpetuate a feeling of general insecurity.122  
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 British policy in the period under discussion provided a somewhat strange picture 
of coping with the increased troubles in the aggravated general atmosphere, persistently 
following the well-established patterns of thinking and too slowly adapting to the fact that 
circumstances had been changing for the worse. The Foreign Office tended to downplay 
both the indications of restiveness and the breaching of the peace treaties on the part of 
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the ex-enemy states and the firm stand and counter-preparations of a Little Entente bent 
on defending the status quo at all costs. The Italian intrigue which fostered unrest across 
the Danube basin and the Balkans to such an unprecedented measure was equally 
underrated and easily tolerated as it was still assumed to be a sign of weakness and 
insecurity rather than a reflection of an aggressive and determined policy. This conviction 
was not shaken in the slightest by the changed outlook on Yugoslavia which was not 
deemed a disturbing factor giving provocation to Rome. Hence it was hoped that Italian 
aggressiveness towards Yugoslavia could still be overcome, in the view of British policy-
makers, by pandering to Italian sensitiveness and detaching Belgrade from its French 
alliance.  
 The Little Entente system and its strong links with France were thought to be on 
the wane. This opinion stemmed from the impression of the internal weakness and 
instability of the member states which did not vouchsafe the maintenance of the existing 
order or promise to be a reliable anchor of the French security system. The Little 
Entente’s preparedness to employ military measures in the defence of its interests was 
deplored as a manifestation of the Old Adam mentality which would lead it nowhere. In 
Austria British diplomacy demonstrated again its tendencies to play down Italian intrigue, 
make too much of Beneš’s policy, and, again starting its appraisal from erroneous 
premises, seriously to underestimate the imminence of the Anschluss and Germany’s 
drive in the direction of South-East Europe.  
 The Foreign Office thus kept drifting between the increasing challenges of the 
situation in Central Europe, the inevitable but undesirable reaction of the antirevisionist 
countries, and its own inability to make up its mind as to any concrete line of action. 
Vansittart was the one and only official who offered an alternative policy. He believed 
that some sort of revision by consent through the agency of the League was a necessity, 
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but not even he could adumbrate what exactly the scope of any such revision would be, 
apart from a likely Habsburg restoration.        
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE QUEST FOR AN ELUSIVE DANUBIAN SECURITY, 1933-1936 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Hitler’s accession to power in Germany in January 1933 transformed European politics. 
One of manifestations of German foreign policy was an increased pressure on Austria 
by subversive means and its effects were immediately and acutely felt further down the 
Danube valley. The accumulating signs of the determined and coordinated German 
efforts to expand her economic and political influence in the direction of South-Eastern 
Europe called for the first comprehensive analysis in the Foreign Office in July 1935.1 
In British eyes the old divisions and rivalries among the smaller countries in the region 
took on a distinctly different complexion and were now viewed in the light of an 
increasing German danger to peace and stability. 
This chapter looks at different aspects of British policy that aimed at facilitating 
a security arrangement in the Danubian basin with a view to restraining German 
expansion. The new challenges invoked the tightening of the Little Entente front, on the 
one side, and Italian endeavours to promote a revisionist cause, on the other. The first 
section of the chapter seeks to shed light on what the British stance was between these 
two opposite propositions. The second section explores the Foreign Office policy in 
regard to the main problem of the period, namely the efforts to devise a mechanism 
though which Austrian independence could be protected and preserved in the face of the 
Nazi onslaught. It is concerned with the British outlook on the viability of Austria 
herself and obstacles in the way of presenting a united front for her defence through a 
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scheme of comprehensive Danubian agreement. As usual, a Habsurg restoration was 
also one of the possibilities where Vienna was concerned. The reactions to both German 
and Italian policy were evident in the Balkans as well and took the form of a newly-
founded Balkan pact. The British attitude towards the creation of this entente and the 
appreciation of its potential future impact on British interests are discussed in the third 
section. The fourth section analyses the perception of the German minority problem in 
Czechoslovakia and the new departure in Beneš’s foreign policy pertaining to the 
collaboration with the Soviet Union. The two issues were intertwined and their inter-
relationship determined the negative view of a large section – but not the whole – of the 
Foreign Office. Czechoslovakia’s rapprochement with Moscow opened the question of 
the collective attitude of the Little Entente towards the USSR. Britain was offered an 
opportunity to play a great role in determining what that attitude would be and this issue 
constitutes the fifth section of the chapter. The sixth section examines how the Foreign 
Office treated the old problem of Italo-Yugoslav relations which grew in importance in 
view of the crucial place it had in connexion with the laborious efforts to vouchsafe 
Austrian integrity in the framework of a wider Danubian arrangement. Finally, the 
seventh section surveys the immense impact that the German re-occupation of the 
Rhineland had on Danubian Europe and how it was viewed from London.              
 
 
 
5.1. New Organisation and New Challenges   
 
On 16 February 1933 the Little Entente adopted the Pact of Organisation which 
put into effect the decisions made at the Belgrade Conference of December 1932 and 
presented a further tightening of the alliance mechanism. It was a step towards a 
concept of a unified foreign policy as the member states were required to obtain the 
consent of their allies if they were to conclude any substantial agreement with an 
outside party. The view taken in the Foreign Office reflected a changed outlook on 
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Danubian affairs which was inspired by gradually deteriorating general situation rather 
than any change in attitude towards the three allies. Victor Perowne of the Central 
Department professed that the new organisation must be regarded as contributing in 
principle to stability in Central Europe and the Balkans.2 On the other hand, Sargent 
pointed out that, although the reasons which prompted the Little Entente to close its 
ranks were evidently self-defensive, ‘a thoroughly dangerous tendency’ was concealed 
behind the ‘innocent façade’: the cleavage between the conquerors and vanquished 
would be perpetuated and might be ‘shortly answered by some definite entente between 
Italy, Austria, and Hungary, and possibly Bulgaria.’3 The opinion was unanimous that 
the new pact was primarily directed against the disruptive Italian policy.4 To that extent 
British diplomats refused to express any adverse opinion to Hungarian and Italian 
officials as to the Little Entente’s new arrangements and the existence of the alleged 
secret military conventions, the conclusion of which was relentlessly harped on in the 
Italian press.5 When Graham tried to defend Rome’s policy, arguing that championing 
revision did not imply bellicose intentions, his observations, in marked contrast to their 
previous reception in Whitehall, were simply dismissed as ‘very unconvincing.’6  
As for the inherent value of the new Little Entente arrangement and its 
effectiveness, the Foreign Office was not impressed. Having heard from Titulescu about 
the intention to effect the unification of the three Little Entente armies in the near future 
Sargent expressed doubt as to the efficiency of this military force except for the purpose 
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 199
‘of bullying Hungary.’7 The particulars of the current deliberations were unknown. 
Apart from receiving the official and stereotypical communiqués, the British were 
largely unaware of the contents of the discussions and decisions reached during the 
initial meetings of the newly established Permanent Council of the Little Entente.8    
The first test for the reorganised Little Entente was dealing with a new Italian 
initiative. Mussolini’s proposal for the Four Powers Pact revealed the impotence of the 
League of Nations to come to grips with the existing tensions and mapped out a new 
course of substituting the concert of the Great Powers for the emasculated Geneva 
organisation. The idea was an exploration of the suitable peaceful means of effecting the 
revision of the peace settlement as clearly evidenced by the contents of the 
conversations between the British and Italians and the former and the French.9 
However, the scope of it was never clearly delineated apart from the fact that the 
prominence was given to the Polish corridor with the Hungarian frontiers likely to be 
the second priority if Mussolini had his way. In short, the Four-Power Pact represented 
an encouragement for the dissatisfied countries and spelled out uncertain and dangerous 
prospects for the satiated Little Entente powers and Poland. The Foreign Office staff 
even started a debate as to the practical effect that could be given to the instruments 
existing within the framework of the League for the purpose of redressing territorial 
grievances.10  
Hungary had to be carefully watched in this connexion. Lord Chilston was 
concerned that the new cabinet of Gyula Gömbös, impressed by Nazi success in 
Germany and no longer feeling isolated and friendless, might be inclined to take an 
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active part in foreign entanglements in anticipation of which it had been feverously 
rearming.11 He pointed out that the revisionist movement had undergone a profound 
change since the time of Bethlen when it had been merely ‘tolerated as a narcotic and a 
means to divert attention from the accumulating stresses of his administration’.12 Since 
Gömbös had come to office treaty revision had become ‘the fundamental principle of 
his policy’ which provided the revisionists not only with a moral impetus but also with 
considerable pecuniary subsidies allowing for a wide range of propagandist activities. In 
such poisoned atmosphere, the Minister stated, there was no prospect of rapprochement 
between Hungary and the Little Entente, indeed not even of any economic cooperation 
as long as political hostility was running so high. As a matter of practical politics 
Mussolini was discouraged from raising the Hungarian question within the Four-Power 
collaboration on the grounds that a ‘less said the better’ policy was most opportune for 
the time being.13 That did not stop the Foreign Office from studying the essentials of the 
problem, however. A lengthy and thorough examination of the Hungarian frontiers 
showed that it would be exceedingly difficult to carry out territorial revision which 
would be feasible from an ethnographical or any other point of view.14 On the other 
hand, the current state of affairs was deemed neither permanent nor tenable and it was 
thus predicted that if the Trianon settlement was not peacefully revised it would be 
‘destroyed in war.’15   
Public opinion in the three Little Entente states was alarmed by the intensified 
Hungarian propaganda which had a fair amount of success in Britain where a caucus of 
168 members of parliament was formed endorsing a request for revision; the official 
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British circles, however, maintained their attitude ‘of cool aloofness’ towards it.16 The 
propaganda itself was not taken too seriously in the Foreign Office where it was 
understood to be no more than a reaction to a rapid dissolution of the peace settlement 
with Germany. The Hungarian question, it was considered, would evolve depending on 
the wider European situation:   
As far as Hungary is concerned, it is unlikely that the question of revision will be 
settled on its merits or solely in relation to the strength of Hungary on the one hand 
and the Little Entente on the other. If revision does eventually come about, this will 
be a consequence, and the ultimate settlement will be a consequence, very largely 
of (a) the success or otherwise of Germany’s effort on her own behalf, and (b) the 
way in which Italian influence is used.17  
 
Meanwhile the Little Entente representatives inveighed against any broaching of 
revision and made their views known to the British delegation at Geneva.18 The Foreign 
Office carefully kept steering the middle course trying to calm down the Little Entente’s 
nervousness and hoping at the same time that the Four-Power directorate would provide 
a vehicle for rectification of the gravest deficiencies in the present order. In practical 
terms it was first and foremost concerned with the improvement of Franco-Italian and 
by inference Italo-Yugoslav relations which were preconditions for the success of the 
Four-Power Pact. That was the point which the British tried to impress on Rome.19 
However, Germany’s abandoning of both the League and Disarmament Conference, 
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along with the reservations of other powers, was the death knell which insured that 
Mussolini’s cherished idea never got off the ground.      
 
 
 
5.2. Austrian Independence and Danubian Pact  
 
On Hitler’s accession to power impetus was given to the idea of Anschluss. The 
maintenance of Austrian independence came again into the limelight of European 
politics, but this time it was not just against the background of economic distress but in 
connexion with the onslaught of the subversive Nazi activities which included 
terrorism. The Foreign Office was still at a loss as to how to envision an endurable 
solution. There were some who did not believe that Austria, ‘an unnatural and unsound 
political and economic unit’, was a viable entity and who thought that a final resolution 
of her fate was a matter of simple choice: ‘There are in the long run only two 
alternatives – the union of Austria-Hungary, whether or not by the restoration of the 
dual monarchy, or the “Anschluss”.’20 Whatever the prospects were in the long run, the 
only way of helping the cause at present was to strengthen the hand of the Austrian 
Chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuss, who showed great energy in resisting the German 
subversion.      
The Foreign Office was eager to assist the Dollfuss government by facilitating 
Austrian export trade and making Vienna economically stronger and thus more capable 
of withstanding pressure from Nazi Germany.21 To assist in this matter entailed giving 
Austrian exports certain tariff preferences and the Foreign Office needed the 
cooperation of the other departments concerned in this respect. That was not to happen. 
The Board of Trade made it clear that ‘owing to our most-favoured nation obligations, 
there could be no question of our according preference to any Austrian goods except 
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with the consent of all other foreign countries which send us goods of the same kind, 
and are entitled to most favoured-nation-treatment here.’22 Nor was the Treasury any 
more willing to extend further loans to Austria which was already in default of her 
previous financial obligations. But the relief for Austrian economic hardships was 
mostly expected to result from Franco-Italian negotiations with a view to evolving some 
broader economic settlement covering other Danubian countries as well.23 Not 
impressed with the schemes which had been discussed between Rome and Paris, the 
Foreign Office, in consultation with the Board of Trade, took a cautious and reserved 
stand and subjected its readiness to abrogate the most-favoured-nation rights on a 
number of preconditions which were not likely to be fulfilled. The collaboration 
between France, Italy and Britain, particularly between France and Italy, was mandatory 
in the political sphere as well. Vansittart spared no effort to impress upon Grandi, now 
Italian Ambassador in London, that a common stand and concerted action on the part of 
the three great powers were an absolute necessity in the face of the unabating German 
campaign against Austria.24    
The corollary of their close cooperation would be the inclusion and constructive 
participation of the smaller Danubian states in wider regional schemes for which the 
growing German threat was believed to have created the necessary conditions. It was 
anticipated and hoped in the Central Department that fear of Nazism might drive 
Austria and Hungary closer together and then even bring about a rapprochement of 
those two countries with the Little Entente bloc which was thought to have become 
more aware of its enhanced interest in the preservation of Austrian independence.25 
Chilston was satisfied that the Hungarians were ill at ease with German penetration of 
                                                 
22 TNA, Shackle (Board of Trade) to Perowne, private, 23 August 1933, ibid.  
23 TNA, Memorandum on the Economic Reconstruction of the Danubian States by Scrivener, 30 
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24 TNA, Vansittart’s account of conversation with Grandi, 23 August 1933, C 7618/2092/3, and Foreign 
Office memorandum, 1 September 1933, C 7940/2092/3, FO 371/16644.  
25 TNA, Minute by Perowne, 22 May 1933, C 4520/26/21, FO 371/16779; Sargent to Phipps, private, 31 
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Austria and fully alive to the reality that, despite having an opportunity to regain some 
of their lost territory as reward for a compliant attitude, they would be reduced to the 
role of German vassal as a consequence of Austria’s downfall.26   
 In the meanwhile Dollfuss kept pleading for a continued manifestation of 
interest in the fate of Austria and particularly for concrete and immediate economic 
measures in support of his regime. These pleas were fully backed by the considered 
opinion of the new British Minister at Vienna, Walford Selby, but his entreaties did not 
strike a chord with the majority of Foreign Office staff. In fact, they met with an 
unsympathetic response which was justified either on the grounds of Dollfuss’ inability 
to resist the Hitlerites, as propounded by Rodney Gallop and Owen O’Malley, or 
arrogantly declined as being misplaced and meant for the ears of those ‘directly 
concerned’, namely France and Italy, as argued by Sargent.27 This frame of mind was 
deeply distasteful to Vansittart who, although the highest-ranking official, was fighting 
a lonely battle:  
Let us keep this argument about only being indirectly interested for others, and not 
blind ourselves with it. What does it really mean? It is nothing but the cloak of 
impotence. Whether we are interested directly or indirectly we are interested 
enormously. We have all applauded Dollfuss from the start, because we are so 
greatly interested. But we have done mighty little to help him. “You do it. You are 
directly interested”, we say – to cloak our impotence. For we did try to devise ways 
of helping Austria this summer, and the other departments wouldn’t let us… That 
doesn’t mean that they are right on a long view, or that the role of HMG (not the 
F.O.) isn’t rather a humiliating one. Because we have failed to find ways of helping 
Dollfuss, there is no need to turn sour about him – and I notice a growing tendency 
in that direction coupled possibly with a little irritation with Sir W Selby…28  
 
Corresponding with Selby, who implored him for more active policy towards Austria, 
Vansittart had to repeat with resignation that it was ‘geography and other Departments 
that have beaten me’ and he went on to explain the real reasons which had tied the 
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hands of British diplomacy: ‘Of course the truth of the matter is that although we may 
be convinced that the maintenance of Austrian independence in present circumstances is 
a vital British interest, British public opinion, the House of Commons and, I might add, 
the Cabinet itself are by no means so convinced of this fact.’29  
As a matter of fact the Foreign Office itself was deeply divided on this issue and 
thus incapable of deciding on any policy. Carr produced a memorandum in which he 
contended that a German solution of the Austrian problem was inevitable and moreover 
preferable to alternative solutions – a de facto Italian protectorate or a temporary and 
untenable understanding between Berlin and Rome - insofar as it was most conducive to 
the political stability and economic prosperity of Central Europe, a viewpoint which 
was approved by O’Malley and Alan Leeper.30 On the other hand, Ralph Wigram, 
Sargent and Vansittart vehemently dissented, claiming that an expansion of German 
power in Central Europe would serve only to whet the German appetite and become but 
a prelude to yet further demands.31  
This impasse as regards the policy towards Austria reinforced the tendency to 
cling to what seemed to have been the only practical alternative which Vansittart 
described as a ‘carefully created and fostered impression of Anglo-Franco-Italian 
unanimity’.32 Unfortunately, it was also beset with many a difficulty. The crux of the 
problem lay in the old animosity between Italy and the Little Entente which rendered 
difficult the establishment of confidence between Rome and Paris. That made it 
imperative to align the Little Entente with a common policy of Paris and Rome, and 
make it play its part in the execution of such policy. In his penetrating analysis of Italian 
motives John Murray of the Rome Embassy pondered  
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…that one of principal reasons why [the] Italian Government are reluctant to align 
themselves with the French and British Government is because they suspect that the 
French policy is directed towards preserving Austria from Germany only to 
subordinate her to [the] Little Entente. Such [a] development would be only one 
degree less objectionable to them than presence of Germany on [the] Brenner Pass. 
Hence the constant allusions to the necessity of upholding Austria-Hungary (they 
are nearly always placed together) and of concluding some deal on their behalf with 
Little Entente on a basis of equality and without their having to sacrifice their 
economic and political independence. Given this attitude, possibility must be 
reckoned with that Italians are endeavouring to dissuade the Germans from forcing 
an Anschluss by holding out some prospect of an enlarged buffer state which would 
look to Italy and Germany rather than to France and the Little Entente.33  
 
 The only way of inducing the Italians to come down on the side of London and 
Paris, Murray insisted, was for France to grant concessions in either the colonial, 
economic or disarmament sphere, and that was most unlikely. Nevertheless, British 
estimates of ultimate Italian intentions and policy were not pessimistic. On receiving 
reports that Mussolini may have been playing with the idea of forging a Fascist bloc in 
Central Europe consisting of Italy, Germany, Austria and Hungary, Sargent was certain 
that, despite the sentimental affinity between the two doctrines, their conflicting 
interests in the region were irreconcilable: ‘This becomes glaring in Austria itself, 
where to be a Nazi means to be in favour of Austria’s absorption, body and soul, in 
Germany, whereas to be a Fascist means to be in favour of an independent Austria.’34 
Having examined the question the Cabinet did not embark on any decided course of 
action and emphasised the view that Italy held the key to the situation35 which made it 
necessary to elucidate the exact attitude of Rome. However, the Italian memorandum 
returned in reply to a written communication from the British government completely 
avoided the issue and irritated Vansittart as being ‘a ridiculous production’.36 O’Malley 
was not surprised with the fact that the Italians were not going to let themselves be 
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influenced by British representations since they realised ‘that our power of affecting the 
course of events there [in Austria] is practically nil.’37 In the circumstances the most 
that could be accomplished was the joint declaration issued by the British, French and 
Italian governments on 17 February 1934 – at the time of Dollfuss’ violent suppression 
of the Austrian Socialists - to the effect that they took a common view as to the 
necessity of maintaining Austrian independence and integrity.  
From the British point of view the Little Entente was causing no fewer problems 
than Rome. Having heard that the latter objected to Austria appealing to the League 
against Germany because of the opportunity that would provide for political action on 
the part of the Little Entente, Vansittart expressed his appreciation of the Italian 
‘prejudice against the Beneses and Titulescos’, although at the same time he bitterly 
complained to Sir Eric Drummond, the new British Ambassador in Rome, of Italian 
insincerity in regard to her dealings with Austria which made cooperation between the 
two countries exceedingly difficult.38  
It was the perception of the Little Entente’s policy as being unreasonable, 
unconstructive and even obstructive that accounted for British displeasure. To begin 
with the Southern Department fully appreciated that the ‘attitude of the Little Entente in 
the Austrian question is dictated principally by dislike and fear of Italy.’39 In 
consequence Italian intrigues made the Little Entente increasingly suspicious and wary 
of any, if only a purely economic, regrouping. At the end of 1933 intelligence data 
reached the Foreign Office to the effect that Italy was encouraging an Austro-Hungarian 
Customs Union with a view to counterpoising German and Little Entente influences 
alike in the two countries and as a preparation for a triple customs union in which Rome 
would participate as well.40 This was exactly the sort of thing that could stir serious 
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trouble with the Little Entente. In the summer of 1933 Vansittart was assured by both 
Beneš and two Romanians, Foreign Minister Titulesco and the opposition leader Duca, 
that the Little Entente would, if it came to the choice of evils, prefer the Anschluss to a 
union between Austria and Hungary, even an economic one, which they suspected 
Mussolini of contemplating.41 The very next day the Permanent Under-Secretary used 
the occasion of a conversation with Grandi to impress upon him the point of view of the 
Little Entente but found the Ambassador favourably disposed towards the idea of a 
union which, according to the Italian, would present a hindrance to Hitler’s policy.42 
However, Vansittart was soon informed that an exchange of views had taken place 
between Rome and Paris on the subject and that the union scheme had been put to 
rest.43 It was not the Little Entente’s opposition to such a suggestion in itself but rather 
the lengths to which it was prepared to go in its resistance that incurred the wrath of 
Whitehall. Annoyed with what he saw as the excitable reactions of the three allies, and 
in particular with Titulescu’s threat of Romanian mobilisation in the event of Austro-
Hungarian union, Vansittart vented his feelings to the French Ambassador Charles 
Corbin: ‘Such talk… was ridiculous, and apart from the fact that Roumanian 
mobilisation would impress nobody, Monsieur Titulescu would have to be reminded, if 
he indulged in such hysteria again, of the obligations of his country as a member of the 
League of Nations.’44  
The Foreign Office also blamed the Little Entente for not contributing its share 
of economic concessions for the relief of Austria. The issue turned on the hindrance of 
protectionist economic policy of Central European countries with their high tariff walls 
which smothered Austrian industry. Vansittart grew weary of the usual excuses for not 
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extending the necessary facilities: ‘Such reasons are always the easiest and most 
convincing; and the ninnies of the Little Entente are their chief exponents’.45 Still, there 
was nothing else to do but ‘favour trying to galvanise the Little Entente into being less 
hopelessly negative’ and induce them to drop their ‘blocking tactics’.46  
Not surprisingly, Italo-Yugoslav tensions presented the greatest obstacle to 
cooperation between Rome and the Little Entente. The Yugoslavs intensely disliked any 
notion of the ‘Fascistisation of Austria’ and their Minister at Vienna, Momčilo 
Nastasijević, unsuccessfully tried to enlist Selby’s help in impressing this point on the 
Austrian Chancellor. The episode signalled to the Southern Department that Belgrade 
would rather see Vienna under German than Italian control.47 This revealed a serious 
breach in a prospective united front for the protection of Austria as the French, 
Drummond was told by his colleague Chambrun, would, if forced to choose, plump for 
the latter option and the British would, Vansittart scribbled on Drummond’s letter, do 
the same.48     
The dangers of this conflict of interests were revealed in connexion with the 
Nazi putsch in Austria of 25 July 1934 which, though abortive, claimed the life of 
Dollfuss.  The country preserved its independence to a large extent due to the Italian 
military concentration on the Brenner which had a restraining effect on Hitler. On the 
other hand, the episode proved that the Austrian imbroglio could easily spark off a 
showdown between Yugoslavia and Italy. Henderson stated in no uncertain terms that 
Italian intervention in Austria was the most dreaded contingency for Yugoslavia for the 
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prevention of which the latter was prepared to coquet with Germany. This in turn could 
potentially disrupt her alliance with France and the Little Entente and would ignore the 
greater but not immediate menace of Drang nach Osten. The Yugoslavs would probably 
strive to counteract it by summoning a special session of the League and mobilising 
their army, perhaps followed by actual entry into the territory of their northern 
neighbour.49 The tenor of Henderson’s report caused no surprise in the Southern 
Department.50 The risks inherent in Italian military action were soon confirmed. The 
Military Attaché at the British Legation in Budapest, Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Mason-
MacFarlane, learned from a member of the Hungarian General Staff that his 
government, anxious to avoid becoming involved in a potentially perilous situation, had 
persuaded Mussolini with the utmost difficulty that any armed incursion into the 
Austrian province of Carinthia would be automatically met by Yugoslav military action, 
a confirmation of which the Hungarian Chargé d’Affaires in Belgrade had obtained 
from the Yugoslav Foreign Minister himself.51    
Other diplomatic difficulties were to follow. When the question of devising a 
pact for the preservation of Austrian independence was under consideration in Geneva 
both Anthony Eden, Lord Privy Seal, and Carr reported that fundamental differences 
had arisen in respect of the role of Yugoslavia and to a lesser extent other Little Entente 
powers.52 The Italians were bent on excluding Belgrade from participating in the 
conclusion of a pact on the footing of equality and drafting it in such a manner as to 
practically provide them with carte blanche for the armed intervention which could, in 
turn, only be regarded by Yugoslavs as a direct provocation. Eden expressed British 
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disapproval of such an approach but his attitude could not carry too much weight since 
it was made clear from the outset that HMG were not willing to sign any new document, 
however anodyne in form it may have been, which smacked too much of shouldering 
new commitments.    
While in Geneva Carr observed how the French Foreign Minister, Louis 
Barthou, was placed in a difficult position in his efforts to procure an agreement with 
Italy, particularly in respect of Austria, without simultaneously alienating Yugoslavia 
and driving her into the German camp.53 Whereas Carr believed that France, if faced 
with the choice between Rome and Belgrade, would prefer the former, Sargent took a 
view that the Italian position was not so strong as to force an agreement on her own 
terms. An Italo-Yugoslav appeasement would constitute, Sargent mused, an essential 
feature of any rapprochement between France and Italy, and the fear of a German 
takeover in Vienna should be sufficient to align all three countries together, if Paris 
acted prudently.54 For the time being Sargent could only note that ‘it is precisely Italy’s 
chronic quarrel with Yugoslavia which has added a last and supreme complication to 
the Austrian problem, as has been shown by the recent negotiations at Geneva.’55 To 
ward off Germany a new three-power declaration on Austria was published on 27 
September 1934 which amounted to no more than a pious reconfirmation of the 
previous one of 17 February.   
The impending visit to Paris of King Alexander was expected to considerably 
clear the ground regarding Franco-Italo-Yugoslav relations. Instead the tragedy in 
Marseilles on 9 October 1934, when a member of the Ustaša Croat terrorist organisation 
harboured and subsidised in Italy and Hungary murdered both the king and Barthou, 
made the situation more uncertain than ever. Anticipating recriminations which were to 
follow during the League enquiries into the Marseilles assassination pertaining to 
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possible foreign involvement, Sargent cynically noted that it was better that Hungary 
should be incriminated rather than Italy.56 Indeed, the proceedings at Geneva were 
conducted in a way that carefully avoided reference to Italian culpability so as not to 
wreck the prospects of an agreement between Rome, Paris and Belgrade with a view to 
safeguarding Austria.57 Eden, who later described the Marseilles murder as ‘the first 
shots of the second world war’, had a prominent part in handling the dispute in his 
capacity of a rapporteur before the Council of the League.58 No effort was spared to 
keep the appeasing momentum going in spite of the indignation after the crime. When 
the Italians hinted to the Quai d’Orsay that problems between Yugoslavia and Italy 
should be separated from Franco-Italian negotiations, Sargent disliked the idea as 
tending to aggravate the situation: ‘We should give the French all the support we can in 
resisting any Italian proposal to disjoint the problem of Italo-French relations from that 
of Italo-Yugoslav relations’.59    
In London Foreign Secretary Simon suggested a consideration whether 
something might be accomplished by a British initiative ‘with the object of trying to 
negotiate a settlement of the Austrian problem on the basis of a joint guarantee of 
Austrian independence by all her neighbours.’60 His formula would provide a point of 
departure in the negotiations regarding Central Europe which the new French Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, Pierre Laval, continued with Mussolini. In the view of the Foreign 
Office, these negotiations, although centred on Austria, were really concerned with 
much broader issues: 
It must be remembered that in these Franco-Italian negotiations, besides the 
immediate object of securing the defence of Austria, the negotiators have in view 
two ulterior aims of great importance, namely, (1) to bring about an Italian-
Yugoslav détente, first by supplying a common platform for Italian-Yugoslav co-
operation vis-à-vis of Austria, and secondly by providing in a multilateral 
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agreement for mutual undertakings between Italy and Yugoslavia not to interfere in 
each others affairs, (2) to prepare for the coming negotiations with Germany by 
establishing a common front between the three Great Powers, Great Britain, France 
and Italy, first by eliminating the causes of friction between France and Italy, and 
secondly by establishing a common Franco-Italian policy vis-à-vis of Austria.61   
 
 This ambitious undertaking seemed to be well on the road to realisation when 
the Rome Agreements between France and Italy were signed on 7 January 1935 during 
Laval’s official visit. The British were very hopeful that Franco-Italian understanding 
marked a decisive step in the materialisation of a policy for which they had been 
persistently labouring. They had also taken at face value the conclusion of the Rome 
Protocols of 16 March 1934 between Italy, Austria and Hungary – an obvious reaction 
to the Little Entente’s Organisation Pact and the conclusion of the Balkan Pact62 - as a 
contribution to the wider economic arrangements in the Danube basin. Many years later 
with the full benefit of hindsight Vansittart still believed that Mussolini’s initiative had 
been breathing life into the declaration of 17 February: ‘In March [of 1934] he 
[Mussolini] went on, and no blame to him, with his Rome Protocols providing for 
consultations, especially economic, between Italy, Austria and Hungary.’63 Equally 
typical was Vansittart’s appreciation of the manner in which the Little Entente met the 
Italian move. He remembered how Beneš ‘went on muttering that he would prefer the 
Anschluss to Austro-Hungarian economic union. Titulescu, the Rumanian who looked 
like a hairless Mongol, went about with his brilliant monologues on “spiritualising 
frontiers”, which meant nothing except that one should do nothing. I liked them both, 
but they could be very trying.’ Therefore, it was not Mussolini’s deed that worried the 
British but rather his maladroit tactics which ‘had aroused the fears of the Little 
Entente’ and were likely to complicate Franco-Italian relations and the insufficiency of 
the arrangement for what was perceived to be its chief purpose: ‘The Italo-Austro-
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Hungarian entente cannot in the view of most people throw any serious obstacle in the 
way of German expansion.’64 The unpleasant and disturbing news was simply ignored. 
When the British Military Attaché at Belgrade was given a report on the large-scale 
shipments of Italian arms to Austria and Hungary by the Intelligence Department of the 
Yugoslav Great General Staff the information was found to be embarrassing to the 
Southern Department whose policy was ‘to shut our eyes to what is going on.’65  
The practical arrangements that would give effect to Franco-Italian 
understanding as regards Austria were supposed to be worked out at a conference held 
in Rome which was to produce a comprehensive Danubian security pact. From the 
outset it became obvious that any prospective settlement would be most difficult to 
achieve. Quite apart from Germany and her potential to obstruct an agreement, the 
smaller powers were predictably at cross purposes. Hungary presented a list of 
conditions difficult of fulfilment, chief of which was a restitution of her sovereign rights 
in respect of armaments, as a prerequisite for her adherence to a non-intervention pact in 
regard to Austria.66 The question of the rearmament of the smaller ex-enemy states was 
considerably actualised and complicated by Hitler’s unilateral and contemptuous 
denunciation of the military clauses of the Versailles treaty and his execution of a full-
blown and rapid rearmament program. The Little Entente countries were alarmed that 
Hungary might follow suit.  
The British deemed that a prolonged ban on the rearmament of the smaller 
powers was untenable given the German precedent and that it was thus better to dispose 
of the issue by agreement rather than another unilateral breach of international 
obligations. Having heard that Titulescu had indulged in wild talk about the Little 
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Entente marching on Budapest in case Hungary, following in the German footsteps, 
abrogated the disarmament clauses of the Trianon treaty, the Southern Department 
instructed Hoare clearly to state British displeasure with that sort of utterance.67 The 
opposition to re-armament was considered in London not just unreasonable but also to 
be a product of an exaggerated sense of self-importance on the part of the three allied 
countries: ‘The Little Entente have so long been the spoilt children of Europe that they 
don’t intend to see themselves ousted from this position as the result of the Franco-
Italian rapprochement.’68 Beneš in particular was blamed for the detrimental influence 
he exerted in Paris with a view to stiffening what was by now already very strong 
French resistance to the disarmament convention. Vansittart was infuriated on that 
account while Eden was quick to join portraying the Czech as ‘a skilful intriguer & a 
patient go between. He does not deliver the goods. He is always promising but never 
performs.’69 The problem of the proposed re-armament was embarrassing especially in 
anticipation of the discussions at the impending Stresa conference of 11-14 April 1935 
between the French, British and Italian Prime Ministers and it was thought best that 
British delegation should not ‘take any line on its own’.70  
This chariness proved to be justified as the conference, aside from presenting a 
not altogether convincing show of unity and strength for the purpose of defending 
Austria, gave rise to the prompt protest on the part of the Little Entente regarding the 
sixth point of the Stresa communiqué – though the French had attenuated the Italian 
draft - which recommended that the rearmament issue should be settled by the 
                                                 
67 TNA, Minutes by Gallop and Carr, 21 March 1935, O’Malley, 22 March 1935, and O’Malley to Hoare, 
22 March 1935, R 1895/925/67; Hoare to O’Malley, private, 23 March 1935, and O’Malley to Hoare, 
private, 3 April 1935, R 2147/925/67; in FO 371/19502; also BDFA, vol. 11, Doc. 87, Hoare to Simon, 
21 March 1935.  
68 TNA, Minute by Carr, 7 May 1935, R 2933/1/67, FO 371/19498; also minutes by Lambert and Carr, 30 
May 1935, and Sargent and Vansittart, 31 May 1935, R 3418/925/67, FO 371/19502.  
69 TNA, Minutes by Vansittart, 1 May 1934, and Eden, 2 May 1934, C 2684/291/17, FO 371/17659; The 
impression of Beneš proding French intransigence in the disarmament matter was reinforced by Eden’s 
report from Geneva. See Note by Mr. Eden, enclosed in United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office, 16 
May 1934, C 3096/1647/17, FO 371/17664. 
70 TNA, Memorandum on Abrogation of the Military Clauses of the Treaties of St. Germain, Trianon and 
Neuilly, 8 April 1935, R 2553/925/67, FO 371/19502.   
 216
concerned countries within the framework of general and regional security guarantees. 
The Little Entente’s viewpoint was the exact opposite of the British one: it was 
contended that Germany could not be pilloried for something that was about to be 
voluntarily conceded to the lesser ex-enemy states.71  
Moreover, the Little Entente was regarded as ill-disposed towards the idea of a 
Rome Conference that was envisaged to settle the rearmament question in conjunction 
with some elusive Danubian pact.72 Having learned from Fulvio Suvich, the Italian 
Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that the Little Entente was about to put forward a 
list of conditions for the conference to take place, the Southern Department thought any 
such procedure unreasonable and purposely obstructive.73 As if the rearmament trouble 
was not enough, there were two other major and apparently insurmountable obstacles in 
the way of a Danubian pact. A stipulation providing for non-interference in the internal 
affairs of the signatories, a veiled reference to German interference, was inconveniently 
well-nigh impossible to reconcile with the notorious Italian patronage of the Vienna 
regime, on the one hand, and with the implacable and avowed determination of the 
Little Entente not to allow a Habsburg restoration on the other.74 The second difficulty 
was how to define the nature of any eventual security arrangements between the parties 
when Hungary categorically declined to enter mutual assistance pacts, Czechoslovakia 
and Romania insisted on them while Yugoslavia would not accept them unless 
Germany also participated, a contingency which was most unlikely. In the 
circumstances the Foreign Office was fairly certain that there was ‘little or no prospect 
of the Conference ever being held, at any rate in its original form.’ The gloomy outlook 
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in Central Europe did not inspire Gallop with much confidence in the substance of the 
Stresa policy:     
At the risk of expressing an unorthodox view I would like to place on record my 
opinion that in entrenching itself on the Austrian line the Stresa front is attempting 
to hold an untenable salient and courting disaster. I do not presume to suggest how 
or when this position should be evacuated but I do feel most strongly that it would 
be wiser to set our Verdun further back and consolidate and defend a position 
which offers better strategic possibilities.75  
 
 The deadlock in ranging the Danubian countries with their own newly-pursued 
policy drove France and Italy to seek other forms of accommodation. Titulescu believed 
that Mussolini quickly lost interest in a Danubian pact because the French and Italian 
General Staffs proceeded to make military agreements for cooperation in case Austrian 
independence was assailed.76 The Romanian averred – and was later backed by the 
Political Director of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, Božidar Purić - that the Little 
Entente would stand aside if France and Italy could agree to guarantee Austrian 
independence by themselves but if their participation was to be required he put forward 
a rather fantastic scheme: the minimum requirement envisaged Italy’s concluding a 
security pact with all the members of both the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente as a 
price for their participation while the maximum one even called for the participation of 
Germany and USSR.77 The British took this attitude to mean that the Little Entente was 
not willing to take part in a prospective agreement. The Foreign Office learned – and the 
War Office confirmed it – that the Franco-Italian military arrangement referred to was 
the so called ‘sandwich plan’ – the marching into Austria of both Italian and Yugoslav 
forces separated by one or two French divisions so as to form the butter in the sandwich 
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and thus prevent friction between the two armies.78 It was clear from the outset that 
Yugoslavia was a weak link in this plan. The late King Alexander’s first cousin and the 
head of the Yugoslav Regency, Prince Paul, told Henderson that he was strongly 
opposed to ‘being urged to undertake to join with France and Italy in attacking 
Germany in the event of the latter attempting forcibly to occupy Austria.’79   
 In Austria herself the desirability of conjuring up a rallying-point of national 
consciousness in the teeth of the Nazi menace once again revived the rumours of a 
Habsburg restoration. The Yugoslavs were inclined to interpret the intensified legitimist 
activity and the ostentatious public pro-Habsburg manifestations, condoned by the 
Austrian government, as a preparation for the restoration.80 Nastasijević reported from 
Vienna that the Habsburg question had considerably evolved since July 1932 when 
Mussolini, according to Yugoslav intelligence data, had discussed with the ex-empress 
Zita the restoration of a monarchy encompassing Austria, Hungary and Croatia under 
the reign of her son Otto.81 The plan was supposed to have been executed through the 
means of an uprising in Croatia in the spring of 1933 leading to the break-up of 
Yugoslavia. Although nothing materialised, the preparations were carried out in Austria. 
Mussolini was believed to be gradually proceeding with his scheme: first establishing 
control over the Austrian regime and restoring Otto in that country and then preparing 
the ground in Hungary.  
 After receiving several reports from the British Military Attaché in Vienna, 
Colonel MacFarlane, which painted a bleak picture of the loyalty of the Austrian army                   
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to the Dollfuss regime and the meagre prospect of the latter to maintain itself in power, 
Duncan Sandys of the Central Department stepped forward in favour of a union 
between Austria and Hungary to which the restoration of the Habsburgs in Budapest 
was to be a preliminary.82 The pursuit of a middle course which British diplomacy 
adhered to in spite of the increasing difficulties could only result, he was sure, in a 
‘resounding rebuff’. Having summed up his impressions from a four-week stay in 
Austria Carr was struck with the wide-spread pro-Habsburg sentiment which seemed to 
him – as it seemed to the Yugoslavs - to have been worked up under the government 
patronage.83 His views impressed his colleagues so much that Sargent wondered if a 
Habsburg restoration may not be the only thing to resuscitate Austrian will for self-
preservation, whereas the Foreign Secretary observed that the return of a Habsburg 
would not fit in with a Hitlerite Germany.84  
The Foreign Office took new stock of situation in the changed circumstances. It 
was estimated that a restoration might have some appeal for the Austrians and 
Hungarians, particularly the latter, but that it could not constitute a permanent solution 
unless it served as a vehicle for a substantial territorial redistribution for which very 
reason it would meet with intense resistance on the part of the Little Entente.85 In the 
existing political struggle centred on Vienna Italy was thought to be unwilling to 
sponsor it so as not irrevocably to alienate the alliance and push it into the arms of 
Germany. If, however, the Little Entente proved to be irreconcilable to Italy and ready 
to comply with the German solution, Mussolini could reverse his policy and lend 
support to the return of the Habsburgs as a last desperate attempt to check a threatened 
German annexation of Austria. Given the uncertainty of what the future held in store, 
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Carr recommended that HMG should evade any pronouncement of policy in advance. If 
a restoration eventually took place with Italian connivance it was believed that France 
would have to acquiesce in such a solution with a view to her anti-Anschluss policy, 
and Britain would also ‘be obliged to approve.’86     
The position in Hungary, however, did not seem propitious for the restoration. 
General Gömbös publicly professed himself against it, although Hankey suspected that 
he was rather anxious to postpone the question until the ‘equality of rights’ issue had 
been resolved and Hungary was not left completely at the mercy of the Little Entente.87 
Chilston assured his superiors that the government was really averse to the legitimist 
cause and that the mass of the Hungarian people were too preoccupied with economic 
distress to devote any serious attention to the kingship problem.88   
The Foreign Office was concerned that the question might crop up again in 
connexion with discussions about the application of the Rome Agreements of 7 January 
1935. More particularly, and similar to the situation a few years earlier, it wanted to 
extricate itself from the unpalatable possibility that Britain might be held to its 
obligations stemming from the old anti-Habsburg resolution of the Conference of 
Ambassadors. There were officials who preferred to pre-empt such a contingency by 
instructing British representatives in the relevant capitals to make clear that Britain did 
not intend to oppose a Habsburg return in Vienna.89 Despite the absolute unanimity in 
respect of the inherent rectitude of such a course, Vansittart and Eden deemed that the 
moment was singularly inopportune for any conspicuous pronouncement of policy on 
the subject given the ruffled state of European politics.90 The Little Entente became 
very excited about the revived Habsburg propaganda and appeared to have got wind of 
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an official tendency in Paris and London to view it with favour. This called for energetic 
action. The Yugoslav, Czechoslovak and Romanian Ministers made representations to 
Sargent, alleging that they had reason to believe that the Austrian Ministers were about 
to raise the issue of a Habsburg restoration during their official visit to London, and 
reaffirming their definite hostility to it.91 Vansittart scotched the protest as playing into 
German hands since it provided Berlin with an opportunity to argue that Nazi meddling 
in Austrian domestic politics was no different from the Little Entente’s veto in regard to 
the Habsburgs.92  
In July Jan Masaryk handed to the Foreign Office a memorandum accompanied 
by his personal notes whereby he expounded the reasons why the Little Entente 
countries could not condone the restoration.93 The Foreign Office seized this occasion 
to fully explain its views which amounted to an indictment of the successor states’ 
policy since the end of the war. To begin with, the assertion that a Habsburg monarch 
would constitute a threat to the Little Entente states by providing a point of attraction 
for national minorities and all the discontented elements within them was taken to be an 
admission of failure to make progress in stabilisation and consolidation of the successor 
states. Playing with the Habsburg idea in Austria was presented as a last resort in the 
search of means which would give the Austrians a semblance of permanent existence 
and national focus so as to reinforce their separate existence from Germany. It was 
given to understand that the British – and French – governments were bound to 
sympathise with efforts to strengthen Austrian independence ‘even though the particular 
method might not be the one which they might have selected if they had had a free 
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choice.’ Finally, reaffirming the conviction that the best solution for Austria was 
economic cooperation with Hungary and the successor states and some sort of customs 
union which would re-establish a proper role for Vienna in the economic life of the 
Danube basin, it was implied that it was a failure to produce anything along these lines 
– Beneš was particularly mentioned in this context – that had brought about the revival 
of the restoration movement.94   
 The only dissenting voice came from Henderson. He found the restoration to be 
fraught with grave dangers: it would irrevocably drive Yugoslavia into the German 
camp, possibly with Czechoslovakia, and spell the end of the Little Entente which 
would be substituted by a German bloc in Central Europe likely to be joined by 
Gömbös’ Hungary which was also ill-disposed towards the Habsburgs; Henderson 
argued that a restoration might prove to be the only thing to unite Austrian Nazis and 
Socialists and effectively render any government in Vienna impossible.95 Moreover, 
Henderson challenged Vansittart’s basic assumption of the Little Entente’s sole 
responsibility for the lack of economic cooperation in the Danube region which was 
necessary to make Austria viable. It was rather the unresolved political problems and 
the uncertainty they provoked that stood in the way of economic reconstruction:  
To my mind in order to ensure that economic reconstruction you have got to 
achieve first or at least simultaneously a measure of political stability in Central 
Europe, & it is hard to see how that is possible so long as the Hungarians persist in 
their ‘No, No, Never’ [to the Trianon Treaty] & the question of the Habsburgs and 
the Anschluss continues to be a nightmare to the Succession States, not to mention, 
so far as the Anschluss is concerned, to Italy, France and HMG.96       
 
Consequently, Henderson suggested that HMG should take a definite stand against a 
Habsburg restoration. His views presented a clear-cut and more daring alternative to the 
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Foreign Office stance but had no chance of being accepted nor did he, having now left 
Belgrade, have any more opportunity of shaping British policy.97  
As for the attempts at preserving Austrian independence on the basis of 
cooperation between France, Italy and Britain, which would involve the Little Entente 
and Hungary as well, they suffered a definite failure due to the repercussions of an event 
outside the European theatre. In October 1935 Italy invaded Abyssinia and opened a 
crisis which would pit her against London and Paris and the whole concept of collective 
security based on the League of Nations. The Austrian problem receded into the 
background for the moment but it was apparent that it could not be tackled anew along 
the futile lines of the previous schemes.    
 
 
5.3. The Balkan Entente 
 
In May 1933 the Foreign Office got wind of the ongoing endeavours of Turkish 
diplomacy to bring about the conclusion of a series of bilateral agreements of mutual 
guarantee among the Balkan states which would amount to a Balkan Union of a sort and 
reinsure the small countries of the region in respect of their continued existence, free 
from external interference on the part of Great Powers. As Henderson anticipated from 
the outset, it was clear that a possibility of realising a Balkan pact hinged on Sofia’s 
attitude, for Bulgaria was the only obstacle to such an understanding due to her 
unabated revisionist pretensions.98 Practically, the crux of the problem as viewed from 
London was whether Yugoslavia and Bulgaria could compose their differences.   
Examining the problem from the Bulgarian end Waterlow’s recommendation 
was to apply Anglo-French pressure on King Alexander and induce him to grant 
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instruction in a local dialect in primary education in Serb Macedonia as a concession 
and incentive to the Bulgarian government to come forward.99 Henderson was adamant 
that Belgrade would not consider for a moment any notion of regarding the 
Macedonians as a minority and pointed out the futility of any approach made along 
those lines. He fervently deplored the idea of British representations at Belgrade with 
the object of pressuring the Yugoslavs to grant educational concessions let alone the 
raising of the entire minority question.100 In fact, Henderson maintained the sort of 
advice that had consistently been given by the Belgrade Legation in this respect and the 
Foreign Office as usual accepted it as reasonable.101    
There were other difficulties as well. Carr heard at Geneva that Beneš was 
displeased with Titulescu’s Balkan tour and believed that the Czech was not keen on 
seeing the Little Entente watered down by the infusion of Balkanic elements which, 
from a Czechoslovak point of view, were likely to prove more of a liability than an 
asset.102 In the Balkans two opposite tendencies were manifesting themselves 
simultaneously and it appeared as if the resolution of their conflict may determine the 
future destinies of the peninsula. Towards the end of 1933 the movement for closer 
relations between Sofia and Belgrade was receiving a strong and somewhat sudden 
impetus.103 According to secret intelligence reports, the French were urging the Little 
Entente countries to pursue an active policy towards Bulgaria and arrive at an 
agreement with that country on the basis of mutual concessions with a view to 
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reinsuring against Germany in case of a breakdown of the Disarmament Conference.104 
A part and parcel of this policy was a meeting between King Alexander and King Boris 
on 18 September 1933 at Belgrade on which occasion the ground was prepared for a 
rapprochement between the two royal families and the two countries. In December 
1933, King Boris accompanied by his Prime Minister, paid an official visit to Belgrade. 
Apprised of reports of a generally receptive atmosphere in both countries in favour of a 
rapprochement Southern Department officials were still not optimistic as to its final 
outcome bearing in mind the insuperable Macedonian hurdle.105 On the other hand, 
Yugoslav fraternisation with Bulgaria was viewed with the deepest suspicion by Greece 
which was always apprehensive at the prospect of her Slav neighbours joining forces for 
the purpose of expansion on her Aegean coast. Athens thus forced the pace for a 
conclusion of a Balkan pact which would isolate Bulgaria. She was assisted in this 
endeavour by Titulescu whose insistence on a speedy conclusion of the pact was 
interpreted by Sargent as being determined partly by motives of personal prestige, but 
primarily by considerations of his Central European policy, namely the need to 
reinforce the Romanian position against Hungary which was facilitated by the 
neutralisation of Sofia through the provisions of the Balkan Entente Pact.106  
The Foreign Office was in favour of a complete Balkan pact between five 
Balkan countries – including Bulgaria and for obvious reasons excluding the Italian 
client state of Albania - and it persisted in inducing the concerned parties to take that 
course. In order to attain this goal it was believed that Greece should first settle her 
outstanding financial disputes with Bulgaria and negotiate a commercial treaty which 
should prepare the ground for Sofia’s political rapprochement with her neighbours.107 
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Furthermore, if Bulgaria was unwilling, as could certainly be expected, to commit 
herself to guaranteeing the present frontiers, it would be advisable to frame the scope of 
a pact in such a way as to secure Bulgarian accession rather than proceed with a four-
power convention which would be for all intents and purposes a pact directed against 
the Bulgarians.108   
No one was more opposed than Henderson to the attempts of the Greek Foreign 
Minister, Demetrios Maximos, to rush the Yugoslavs into signing a pact without 
Bulgaria and he was pleased to find the latter fully alive to the folly of doing so.109 As 
for Greece, Waterlow, now Minister in Athens, thought that she was not being 
mischievous on her own but rather ‘acting jackal for Turkey… with discreet support 
from Italy.’110 With the suspiciousness of Yugoslavia’s Balkan partners and France’s 
tendency to propitiate them, the prospects of a five-power agreement were not bright, 
but Gallop believed that having Sofia isolated was a bad policy: ‘Possibly the French 
may be right in thinking that half a loaf was better than no bread. I am more inclined to 
think that, Bulgaria being the “clou” to the whole Balkan situation, this particular half-
loaf is worse than no bread, since it will delay indefinitely any prospect of securing the 
whole loaf.’111 The only hope of holding up this undesirable development seemed to 
rest in Belgrade, and the Southern Department was prepared to strengthen Yugoslavia’s 
hand by reiterating British views in regard to a pact to both the Czechs and 
Romanians.112 In addition, Henderson was authorised to impress upon the Yugoslav 
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government, at his discretion and in conjunction with his French colleague if possible, 
the importance attached by Britain to the maintenance of close contact with Sofia.113   
 Such a hint was most welcome to the Yugoslav government. Djurić was 
instructed to assure the British that Belgrade was sparing no effort to procure Bulgarian 
adherence to the Balkan pact to the point of asking Sofia to put forward a formula to 
which she could consent; on no account would Yugoslavia agree to a pact which would 
not leave the door open for Bulgaria.114 It is interesting to note how a clearly and 
unequivocally expressed British attitude, contrary to the usual practice, made a 
profound, if altogether exaggerated and distorted, impression at Belgrade:    
It is characteristic that Britain who has left the impression of believing that 
differences between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria are necessary for the Balkan balance 
of forces, a balance that maintains peace, is now overtly working for an agreement 
between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. She [Britain] probably thinks that we will be 
more independent in that way, and less susceptible to French influence or perhaps a 
Franco-Soviet combination.115   
 
Even the French Ambassador Cambon now professed that the French government was 
in complete agreement with the British in respect of a full Balkan pact and worried 
about Titulescu’s forcing the pace.116   
But just when it appeared that events were developing to British liking 
Yugoslavia abandoned her opposition to a four-power convention and the Balkan Pact 
without Bulgaria was signed at Athens on 9 February 1934. The Balkan Entente took its 
final shape at the Angora meeting at the end of October the same year on which 
occasion a statute of the organisation was drawn up providing for Permanent and 
Economic Councils on the pattern of the Little Entente Organisation Pact. A military 
convention between Yugoslavia and Turkey which provisioned for mutual help against 
Italy as well as Bulgaria was signed on 5 June.117 Having found out that the pact had 
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been initialled in Belgrade, Carr noted with resignation that Titulescu and Maximos had 
‘got their very ill-advised way’, whereas Vansittart later called it ‘a bad and retrograde 
piece of work.’118 When the Greek press announced that British representatives in the 
capitals of the four signatory countries had been instructed to congratulate the 
governments concerned, Waterlow issued a démenti, once again deprecating a pact 
without Bulgaria, which was most embarrassing to a Greek government already 
exposed to heavy criticism on the part of the opposition.119 The Foreign Office 
suspected that some military conventions may have existed among the signatories, but 
thought that the knowledge of their exact scope was of no great practical importance 
and could be embarrassing; it was thus, in Gallop’s words, ‘a case when ignorance is 
bliss.’120       
Having collated all the information, often contradictory and confusing, as to how 
the Balkan Pact had come into being, Henderson modified his earlier stance. Holding 
that Bulgaria could not have been induced to adhere and had even acted with bad faith, 
the Minister came to conclusion that the pact achieved the most that could have been 
reasonably expected and that it should receive British ‘cordial support’.121 On further 
reflection the Foreign Office decided to reject Henderson’s suggestion for a public 
declaration in support of a Balkan understanding and to keep pressing for all round 
appeasement by impressing on Sofia the need to proceed with bilateral negotiations 
with her neighbours for the settlement of outstanding questions and the conclusion of 
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non-aggression pacts which she had previously held out as an alternative for a 
multilateral convention.122  
The Bulgarian problem was certainly no nearer to a solution. The study of the 
Bulgarian frontiers and territorial grievances showed that the British attitude continued 
to rest on the status quo as any change in this respect was bound to ‘create more 
problems than it would solve’:  
Bulgaria is psychologically ill, and it is only in treating her as a pathological case 
that any hope lies of her recovery. The most that can be said at present is this. 
Anything which would add to her sense of grievance should be studiously avoided, 
and for the rest she should be treated with patience and firmness; not taken too 
seriously when Mr. Hyde is in control of her, and warmly encouraged when Dr. 
Jekyll resumes charge.123    
  
As far as British policy in the region with a view to future developments in connexion 
with the German danger was concerned, the memorandum written by Carr demonstrated 
an unduly optimistic forecast:  
It is indeed quite on the cards that in twenty years time we may be working hand-
in-glove with Germany in the Balkans to counteract Franco-Italian-Russian 
intrigues. Such a hypothesis is, of course, pure guesswork. But it is no more 
unlikely than any other, and far more plausible than the prospect of a Germany, 
single-handed, dominating the Balkan peninsula to our detriment.124    
 
 Henderson, presumably prompted by the circulation of Carr’s memorandum, 
produced an analysis of his own which focused on the possibility of a Serbo-Bulgarian 
union and its potential consequences. The Minister reaffirmed his long-held conviction 
that the merger of the Bulgarians with the rest of the South Slavs was an inevitable 
consummation, albeit one likely to take some time and ultimately uncertain as to the 
form it would take.125 Once sobered down from disappointment and excessive 
ambitions, Henderson argued, the Bulgarians would realise that the only prospect of 
obtaining their other and more justified and vital desiderata – an access to the Aegean 
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and reclamation of the Dobruja – lay in a powerful union with the Yugoslavs which 
would be created with Macedonia serving as a link between the two kindred peoples 
rather than an apple of discord. Contrary to the often expounded opinion that the 
settlement of Serbo-Bulgarian differences would at long last bring peace and stability to 
South-Eastern Europe, Sir Nevile prophesied:  
Peace ends where Serb, or rather Yugoslav-Bulgar, union begins… Roumania 
would feel uneasy over the portion of the Dobruja entirely populated at that time by 
Turks and Bulgars, which she filched from the latter in 1913. The Greeks would 
feel equally anxious in regard to the Aegean coast, and Turkey as to Adrianople and 
ultimately Constatinople.126  
 
It was this prospect that accounted for the distinct uneasiness of the three signatories of 
the Balkan Pact which, as Henderson contended, they perceived ‘no less as a check on a 
Serbo-Bulgarian rapprochement than as a means to preserve the Balkans from the 
consequences of possible immediate European complications.’ Henderson’s 
vaticination, like that of Harold Nicolson ten years earlier, called for a consideration of 
the impact of a complete South Slav union on British interests. Whereas he believed that 
it might be a bulwark against Russian encroachment on the Balkans, Gallop feared that 
a strong state with a population of 20 million would disturb the Balkan equilibrium and 
create a formidable pan-Slav bloc in Eastern Europe constituting a threat to British 
interests in the Middle East.127   
 
 
 
5.4. Czechoslovakia: Internal and External German Problem 
 
Concurrently with the Austrian situation the Foreign Office became deeply 
concerned with the internal situation in Czechoslovakia as it was fairly obvious that in 
conjunction with the external pressure from Germany the question of the Bohemian 
Germans might rapidly come to the forefront. Addison was naturally called up to 
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provide a review of relations between the two national communities. In reply to this 
request he compiled a report which exuded with all his anti-Slav and particularly anti-
Czech prejudices to a hitherto unprecedented extent even by his standards. In a lengthy 
disquisition Addison briefly reviewed the historical background of Czech-German 
relations, dismissing the former’s assertion of mistreatment at the hands of the latter as 
unfounded and calculated ‘to make out a case, and to prolong into modern times the 
undoubted grievances of the comparatively distant past.’128 It was a Slav instinct to 
dislike and hate everything German and in the Czech case it was compounded with the 
German habit of looking down on the Czechs as racially inferior. Moreover, that 
inferiority was, according to Addison, a fact, and for that reason it further inflated a 
Czech grievance. On taking the reins of the country in their own hands the Czechs had 
embarked on a policy of which ‘the one object was to exalt their race at the expense of 
the other’ and this policy could be only executed ‘by injustice, partiality and 
favouritism, only by what, for want of a better term, I must call persecution and 
oppression’.129 In the existing circumstances, Addison went on, it was but natural that 
the overwhelming majority of Germans had Nazi sympathies as an expression of their 
resistance to the Czechs and a religious belief in Germandom. Against this background 
Addison proceeded to give his considered opinion about the immediate enquiries put 
before him: he ascertained that Berlin had entirely ceased to provide any financial 
subsidies as had been previously believed to have been distributed to the German 
minority and, if Germany exerted any influence, far from stirring any trouble, it did so 
‘in the direction of moderating enthusiasm.’130     
The tenor of Addison’s remarks in relation to the treatment and sentiments of the 
German minority in Czechoslovakia produced a corresponding effect in London and 
contrary opinions stressing its passive bearing were explained away accordingly: ‘The 
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“strange quiescence” of the German minority must be ascribed to effective measures of 
repression & the absence of any support from the German Govt.’131 Another of 
Addison’s onslaughts against Czechoslovakia and her policies, written with a view to 
appraising the position in the wake of the Marseilles assassinations, was compounded 
by fresh accusations of Czech misrule which was equated with the methods of a police 
state.132 On this occasion it was revealed that Addison’s slighting and immoderate 
observations about Czechoslovak conditions were raising some doubts among at least 
some of the officialdom at the Foreign Office. O’Malley questioned some of the basic 
suppositions that Addison had put forward time and again; however, the latter stuck to 
his views.133   
The German minority problem in Czechoslovakia centred on the growing 
strength of the Sudeten German party headed by Konrad Henlein – an obedient tool of 
Hitler - and its relations with the central government. In the elections of May 1935 
Henlein’s party came away as the largest single party in the country and the undisputed 
representative of the German electorate. In his report on the electoral prospects of the 
new party the British Vice-Consul at Liberec, Sydney Elliot, placed great emphasis on 
the fact that it had nothing in common, except perhaps in terms of its organisation, with 
the Nazis across the border.134 His views were readily accepted in the Southern 
Department which inferred that it was incumbent on Beneš and the Czech government 
to determine how the situation would evolve.135 If the former showed sense and 
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moderation, the Sudeten party should be taken into the cabinet in place of the current 
German Ministers who had lost their popular support at the elections. Henlein was 
believed to be willing to cooperate while Beneš was suspected of an intention forcefully 
to suppress the German party. Any move on the part of Prague to strengthen its 
executive power in case of the internal trouble, such as the extending of the 
Extraordinary Powers Bill on 26 June 1935, was consequently dimly viewed in London: 
‘It is this policy of continual pinpricks which has made the Sudetendeutsche Party what 
it is. I cannot understand why the Czechs cannot see that it is worth their while not to go 
out of their way constantly and unnecessarily to irritate the German minority.’136     
Henlein skilfully exploited this feeling, not least in his conversations in the 
Foreign Office. After the first of these in which he left upon his interlocutors ‘a strong 
impression of sincerity and honesty’, Vansittart, convinced that it would thus be ‘doing 
Czechoslovakia a service’, urged Eden to drop a hint to the Czechs at Geneva ‘to give 
these fellows a straighter deal, which, they say, is all that they want. It would be a stitch 
in time – and save a bad rent.’137 It remains unclear how long Vansittart and other 
officials laboured under their mistaken impression. ‘The Czechs suspected what I 
discovered later – that he [Henlein] was in Nazi pay’ – Vansittart laconically wrote 
afterwards.138 Not surprisingly, Addison confirmed Whitehall’s impressions reinforcing 
the image of a moderate Henlein and ‘the essentially legal and law-abiding nature’ of 
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his movement with all the zeal of his anti-Czech bias.139 As for Henlein’s two visits to 
London, Addison portrayed them as the last phase of the Bohemian German struggle, 
their offer of cooperation having been rejected by the Czech government. They were 
now endeavouring to bring external pressure to bear upon Prague by enlisting British 
sympathy, failing which, and along with the continued and increased repression by the 
government, the only remaining way out of their predicament would be to turn to 
Berlin.    
The British outlook on the internal problems of Czechoslovakia was inextricably 
connected with their attitude towards the new orientation of Beneš’s foreign policy. In 
the wake of the Franco-Soviet mutual assistance pact of 2 May 1935, which was an 
attempt to contain Germany by facing her with the prospect of a two-front war, 
Czechoslovakia followed suit and two weeks later concluded a pact herself with the 
Soviet Union, the implementation of which was made conditional on the Franco-Soviet 
pact being put into effect. The majority of the Foreign Office officials, including the 
Foreign Secretary himself, were of the opinion that the Czechs had embarked on a 
highly dangerous course by overtly associating themselves with the Soviet Union.140 
This school of thought propounded that on account of her heterogeneous composition 
and inherent weakness it was a folly for Prague to pursue a forward foreign policy, 
especially one which was bound, by virtue of its anti-German character, to further 
antagonise not just the Bohemian Germans but also the Roman-Catholic Slovaks who 
were wary of any rapprochement with communist Moscow. On the other hand, Collier 
and Vansittart argued that Beneš had no alternative.141 The latter clearly recognised that 
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the Germans entertained the idea of disrupting Czechoslovakia and thus could not be 
conciliated.     
Beneš’s clumsy attempts to put a brave face on the impending troubles did not 
help his standing in the Foreign Office either. Addison, who described three and half 
million Germans in Bohemia as being ‘Nazi to a man’, contemptuously recorded 
Beneš’s account of his refusal of a pact of non-aggression with Germany on the grounds 
that it was superfluous since there were no questions at issue between the two 
countries.142 Patrick Reilly of the Southern Department shared the Minister’s 
bewilderment: ‘Dr. Benes’ apparently sublime confidence in face of the danger of 
encirclement by a hostile Germany is indeed astonishing.’143 On another occasion the 
Czech professed that the German minority problem was ‘not active’ and that the 
Anschluss was not a Czech problem but rather one that concerned the Great Powers. 
None of these statements were taken seriously in the Foreign Office.144 Nor did he seem 
any more credible when oozing optimism as to Czechoslovakia’s prospects irrespective 
of whether German or Italian influence prevailed in Vienna. His utterance invoked 
Vansittart’s scorn: ‘The more I see & hear of Dr. Benes, the less I think of him.’145 The 
Permanent Under-Secretary offered an unflattering explanation of the Foreign 
Minister’s rhetoric: ‘Dr Benes has 2 stories, one tranquillising, the other alarming. I 
think the former is what he really believes. But he tries to put a good face on it, and says 
that he has a policy for every eventuality, when really he has a policy for none. Probably 
the most overrated man in Europe.’146  
The markedly unfavourable impression of Beneš’s diplomatic style was all the 
more unfortunate insofar as it tarnished the more sound and justifiable estimates that he 
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made of Central European politics. When Prague warned about the intention of taking 
forcible measures against the Socialists in Vienna, Hankey typically blamed the Czechs 
and Beneš in particular as ‘the villains of the piece all through Austrian affairs’ for 
spreading rumours and panic about the troubles ahead.147 Likewise Beneš admonished 
Addison that Mussolini had reached an understanding with Dollfuss to send two army 
corps into Austria in the event of a Nazi putsch, but Gallop dismissed any such 
contingency as an ‘unlikely eventuality’ and proclaimed a theory that it was the talk of a 
war that ‘must bring that danger appreciably nearer’.148 A great deal of German 
propaganda centred on the convention for the cooperation between the Czechoslovak 
and Soviet air forces, which had allegedly been signed to give effect to the military 
collaboration as provided for by the mutual assistance pact. British reaction to it became 
a supreme example of the distorted perception that took hold in Whitehall as a 
consequence of the unfavourable view taken of Beneš and all his works. The British Air 
Attaché in Moscow did not believe in the existence of such a convention and told 
Collier that ‘it would make no practical military difference even if there was one.’149 
Nevertheless, far from discounting the story, the growing tendency in the Foreign 
Office was to take many of the diplomatic rumours for granted.150  
 
 
 
5.5. The Little Entente and the Soviet Union 
 
The Head of the Central Department, Ralph Wigram, described Barthou’s tour 
of Prague, Belgrade and Bucharest in the spring of 1934 as signifying ‘the new 
alignment of French foreign policy to the Little Entente.’151 It was part of the strategy to 
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encircle Germany with the support of the USSR, Poland and, if possible, Italy for which 
latter collaboration Barthou was reported to be particularly keen to work. Wigram was 
favourably disposed towards this new policy: ‘The more it succeeds, the less important 
and the less immediate is likely to be the effort required from ourselves.’ A successful 
start was made with the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty, but it was necessary to bring 
Romania and Yugoslavia into the fold as well for the alignment to be completed, at least 
as far as the Little Entente was concerned.      
The rise of Nazism in Germany had had its repercussions in Romania where the 
fascist Iron Guard had gained in strength. Its illegal and subversive activities culminated 
in the murder of Prime Minister Duca which took place in retaliation for his dissolving 
the organisation. Titulescu repeatedly complained to Palairet about the hard struggle he 
had to endure against King Carole, who was imbued with totalitarian sympathies, and in 
particular his efforts to counter the influence of the king’s camarilla which secretly 
supplied the Iron Guard with money.152 Initially the Foreign Office was not too much 
impressed with these utterances on account of the Romanian’s notorious 
unreliability.153   
Nevertheless, even when it became obvious that dangerous internal 
undercurrents were at work in Romania, both Reilly and Carr ruminated that there was 
not much difference between Romanian democracy and potential fascism.154 Sargent 
and Vansittart also discounted ‘Titulescu’s pessimism’, but for different reasons. While 
the former did not believe that King Carol would promote the establishment of a fascist 
dictatorship which he would not be able to control, the latter disclosed the usual 
contempt for the military-political weight of Bucharest: ‘Rumania has never counted for 
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anything anyway, and there is no visible reason in nature why she even should 
count.’155 Nor could such an impression be diminished on hearing news of the 
revelation of a serious plot to assassinate the king which originated with the army 
although Palairet intimated that this definite evidence of the discontent among the 
armed forces could be a potent deterrent to the king’s plans to introduce a dictatorship 
and that it might strengthen the political parties again.156  
According to the account given to Palairet by both Titulescu and the French 
Foreign Minister himself, Barthou’s visit to Bucharest in June 1934 was designed with 
the ulterior motive of staging a public display of friendship between the two countries 
that would force the hand of King Carole by demonstrating Romanian devotion to 
democracy and traditional pro-French leanings in foreign policy.157 However, such 
considerations did not matter much to Whitehall diplomats. The flamboyance of the 
visit and the pronounced anti-revisionist rhetoric were bound, in British opinion, to 
make a rapprochement between Rome and Paris more difficult and moreover to 
antagonise Hungary. Vansittart in particular took a dim view of French policy and gave 
vent to his feelings by indulging in some personal abuse of Barthou who he accused of 
being carried away as a result of his old age. According to the Permanent Under-
Secretary, the Frenchman had been ‘very foolish and impulsive’.158 Still, the real 
position in Romania was fully appreciated by this time. The analysis of German 
economic and political expansion in the region acknowledged Titulescu as being a dam 
to the influx of German influence in Romania.159 On the other hand, Vansittart 
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recognised the unsettling activities of the Romanian sovereign: ‘King Carol would be a 
very disturbing factor if his country were not so incapable.’160   
Titulescu gave clear evidence of his political orientation in conversation with 
Sargent by revealing his intention to open negotiations with the Soviets for the 
conclusion of a pact on the lines of the recent Czechoslovak-Soviet model in order to 
enable the execution of the latter by defining the routes through Romanian territory 
which the Soviet army would be able to pass on their way to Prague – pointedly 
excluding Bessarabia.161 He was also perturbed by the Yugoslav government’s aversion 
to the recognition of the Soviet Union and even asked for British help in order to 
influence Prince Paul in the direction of cooperation with Moscow. His request met 
with an entirely non-committal reply but that did not stop Titulescu from misleading 
King Carol that the British were favourably disposed to Romano-Soviet and Yugoslav-
Soviet rapprochement.162      
At this juncture the Yugoslav attitude towards both Germany and the Soviet 
Union became crucial as it had the potential to determine the stance taken by the Little 
Entente as a whole and thus substantially to influence the future course of events in 
Central Europe. That attitude had been in the making for a long time. With regard to 
Moscow Yugoslavia had always been an implacable opponent of any official relations 
with the Bolshevik regime on account of the large and influential body of White 
Russian refugees who had settled in the country and feelings of detestation on the part 
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of the royal house who had close connexions with the Romanoff dynasty.163 On the 
other hand, official Yugoslav opinion had long since displayed a propensity to look for 
a rapprochement with Germany.164 Henderson recalled how Marinković had often used 
to tell him that it was not the Little Entente’s business to prevent the Anschluss.165 
Moreover, Marinković had an interesting explanation for his view that the Little Entente 
did not depend on France but that it was rather the other way round: the Little Entente 
could protect its interests by aligning itself with Germany from which it had not taken ‘a 
single village’ in the peace settlement, and Berlin would without doubt enthusiastically 
seize such an opportunity for it would provide the Germans with an exceptionally 
favourable position in Central Europe.166 Henderson also observed the pronounced 
German sympathies in King Alexander: ‘Incidentally His Majesty has a great 
admiration for Hitler and his works. I think he would like to ally himself with Germany 
and that is why he is worried over the position of Czechoslovakia as his partner in the 
Little Entente’.167 After the king’s death the legacy of his foreign policy was heartily 
embraced by Prince Paul. The latter struck John Balfour, on his arrival at the Belgrade 
Legation, as not just deeply sympathetic to Germany but also as a rabid anti-Bolshevik 
owing to the fact that he was half White Russian himself.168  
Fearful of communism, the Prince Regent was firm in his decision to postpone 
as long as possible the establishment of diplomatic relations with Moscow and his 
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government were not favourable towards the French policy of alliance with the 
Soviets.169 Nor was the French policy of rapprochement with Yugoslavia’s arch-enemy 
Italy any more palatable to Belgrade; Henderson noticed that confidence in France had 
been shaken since the time of the Franco-Italian agreement in Rome.170 The confusion 
was amplified by a new departure in German policy in the Danube valley. General 
Göring’s visits to Budapest and Belgrade in mid-1935 signalled the beginning of a 
sustained effort to bring about a rapprochement between Hungary and Yugoslavia as a 
preliminary step to breaking up the Little Entente and the eventual dismemberment of 
Czechoslovakia.171 Sargent had predicted a German initiative in this direction as early 
as December 1934.172   
Weighing carefully the prospects of a closer understanding between Belgrade 
and Berlin, Henderson was not unduly alarmed. Despite Germany’s potential usefulness 
as a form of insurance against Italy, the responsible political and military authorities 
fully realised the great menace that a dominant Germany would pose for Yugoslav 
interests and they were highly unlikely to proceed to a definite German alliance unless 
they were driven to the extreme either through abandonment by France or through 
further pressure from Italy.173 Indeed, the British Military Attaché, Colonel Denis Daly, 
discovered that the Yugoslav General Staff believed that the Little Entente could not 
count on effective military assistance from France. Nevertheless, there was still no 
                                                 
169 Ibid.; Henderson to Simon, 1 April 1935, N 1729/160/38, and Henderson to Hoare, 20 July 1935,  N 
3776/160/38, FO 371/19461; Balfour to O’Malley, private, 19 August 1935, R 5178/3350/92, FO 
371/19580. 
170 BDFA, vol. 11, Doc. 77, Henderson to Simon, 10 February 1935; TNA, Henderson to Simon, 20 May 
1935, R 3350/3350/92, FO 371/19580.  
171 BDFA, vol. 11, Doc. 113, Henderson to Hoare, 10 June 1935; Doc. 190, Ramsay to Hoare, 8 June 
1935; TNA, Minutes by Lambert, 18 June 1935, Carr, 19 June 1935, and Vansittart, 30 June 1935, R 
3811/1/67, FO 371/19499.   
172 TNA, Minute by Sargent, 8 December 1934, R 6725/1608/22, FO 371/18436. 
173 TNA, Annual Report on Yugoslavia for 1933, R 488/488/92, FO 371/18455; Annual Report on 
Yugoslavia for 1934, R 526/526/92, FO 371/19578; Balfour to Sargent, private, 6 September 1935, R 
5583/3350/92, FO 371/19580.  
 242
indication of any tendency to jettison the French alliance in favour of an arrangement 
with Germany.174  
Henderson underscored that Britain had an important role and great weight at 
Belgrade: ‘Even to-day it is to a great extent the more sympathetic attitude of His 
Majesty’s Government towards Yugoslavia which is the chief drag on the Berlin drift, 
and it was always British goodwill rather than French backing which the late King 
sought as the most essential guarantee for any Italo-Yugoslav agreement’.175 The 
Oxford-educated Prince Paul, whose ‘whole outlook is essentially English’, was 
expected to be particularly amenable to British advice.176 The Foreign Office chose to 
offer that advice in order to prod Yugoslavia towards adhering to an anti-German 
Danubian pact. When Henderson wondered how to influence the Yugoslavs in that 
direction, pointing out Britain’s inconsistency in declining to involve herself in anti-
German combinations and her disapproval of the Balkan pact, Gallop brushed aside his 
considerations: ‘I think, therefore, we must reply that Sir N. Henderson is to “urge 
Yugoslavia to come into a combination directed against Germany” but that he must use 
what he himself calls “the language of collective security” and wrap his advice in such 
euphuistic language as will best commend it to the anti-Russian and pro-German Prince 
Paul.’177      
In contrast, the question of Yugoslavia’s recognition of the Soviet Union which 
lay at the foundation of the wider dilemma of the eventual conclusion of mutual 
assistance pacts between all the members of the Little Entente and Moscow presented a 
notable but unutilised opportunity for exercising British influence. In reply to 
Henderson’s enquiry as to what attitude he should adopt when the Little Entente 
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conference met in Belgrade on 20 June 1935 in order to discuss the question of their 
relations with the Soviet Union, Vansittart instructed him to refrain from giving advice 
unless pressed for it. But Vansittart’s musings clearly demonstrated that the Foreign 
Office, or rather he himself, had some definite views on the subject. Although the 
reappearance of Russian influence in Central Europe and the Balkans was deprecated as 
a matter of principle, it was admitted to be an inevitable consequence of German 
penetration of the region; the necessity for the Little Entente to devise a common stand 
was understood accordingly: ‘Also it is probably better in the long run that the Little 
Entente should have in this matter a common policy than that they should break up over 
it, with the result that Czechoslovakia and Roumania would fall into the orbit of Russia 
and Yugoslavia into that of Germany.’178 This essentially favourable attitude towards 
pacts with the USSR stemmed from the conviction that  
it may fairly be said - as things are at present without looking too far ahead – that 
Russian influence is causing less apprehension as to stability and peace in Central 
and Southern Europe than German influence, for the latter is generally interpreted 
as being directed towards territorial expansion and political domination, whereas 
Soviet foreign policy, at present at any rate, is ranked as purely defensive or 
anyhow not immediately dangerous.179  
 
Vansittart was not alone in his appreciation. Collier was also convinced that a 
conclusion of a Romano-Soviet pact was in the British interest.180  
In the opinion of Balfour, the Little Entente conference at Bled at the end of 
August 1935 demonstrated the apparent divergence of views between Yugoslavia, on 
the one hand, and Czechoslovakia and Romania, on the other, as to the former’s refusal 
to enter into relations with the Soviet Union due to reasons of internal policy and, as 
Balfour suspected although it was never explicitly stated, due to her unwillingness to 
incur German displeasure.181 His judgement was confirmed in a conversation with 
Martinac, Secretary-General of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, who severely criticised 
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Beneš for his agreement with the Soviets which, in the Yugoslav view, was directly 
responsible for the German encouragement given to General Gömbös.182 Yugoslav 
opposition defeated the policy expounded by Beneš and Titulescu. When the Romanian 
Foreign Ministry officially denied that negotiations with Moscow providing for the 
passage of the Soviet troops through Romanian territory had ever taken place, Sargent 
remarked that Titulescu had ‘had to eat his words’, although the exact circumstances 
which had compelled him to give in were not clear.183 If Sargent was somewhat 
reserved as to the final outcome, Carr was quite satisfied that Romania had been ‘saved 
from following Czechoslovakia along the rash course of military alliance with the 
Soviet Union.’184 The latter’s comment reveals an interesting and intriguing 
phenomenon within the Foreign Office: a policy concerning the relations between the 
Little Entente states and the USSR could not be agreed, decided and acted upon, despite 
the fact that such collaboration, including mutual assistance pacts, had powerful 
advocates in the shape of the Permanent Under-Secretary Vansittart and the heads of the 
Central and Northern Departments, Wigram and Collier.     
 
 
 
5.6. Yugoslavia and Italy 
 
The Foreign Office wavered in its appreciation of Italy’s ultimate designs on 
Yugoslavia insofar as it came to the realisation that Rome sought to obtain control of 
Dalmatia. ‘Italy has thus been playing with the most dangerous fire since the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia and the processes by which that consummation could be 
achieved would gravely imperil the whole peace of Europe.’185 On that basis the 
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integrity of Yugoslavia was recognised as an essential requirement for the maintenance 
of peace and, as such, a direct British interest. Although it was admitted that Italy’s 
dangerous policy was primarily responsible for the inflammable state of relations 
between the two countries, the precarious dictatorship of King Alexander was deemed a 
source of weakness for Yugoslavia and a standing temptation for Italy. The British 
government found it impossible to intervene directly with advice in Belgrade as it was 
not willing to undertake any commitment but soundings were taken of the French as to 
the possibility of urging the king, perhaps in conjunction with the Czechoslovak 
government, to introduce a more liberal regime with a view to improving the internal 
situation and frustrating Italian hopes for – and underground intrigue towards – the 
dissolution of the country. Henderson repeated time and again his conviction that real 
internal troubles or revolution were not to be expected despite all the disturbing features 
of the dictatorial government. Indeed, after a series of worrying signs and developments 
which were discernible as early as February 1933 and which included dissatisfaction in 
Slovenia and Croatia, he even registered a distinct improvement in the situation later in 
the year.186 From their end the Foreign Office deprecated the anti-Yugoslav propaganda 
that was gaining strength in the British press and among certain members of the House 
of Commons as it was bound to play into Italian hands. Steps were accordingly taken to 
draw the attention of the News Department and representatives of the press to the 
undesirability of prolonging such a campaign.187     
To Henderson’s mind, however, much more was needed. He was adamant that 
the British government should clearly state to Mussolini their views as to Italian policy 
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towards Yugoslavia and Balkans.188 Another recommendation was to make an official 
statement in parliament to the effect that the integrity and consolidation of Yugoslavia 
was a British interest.189 The Foreign Office thought this suggestion premature as the 
Yugoslav situation was deemed ‘so uncertain that it would be extremely dangerous for 
us to prophesy on this matter or to pit our opinion against that of Signor Mussolini’; 
moreover, it disliked the air of commitment that would accompany it.190 Nevertheless, 
Henderson’s persistent warnings still produced some impression in Whitehall. In fact, 
Vansittart for the first time abandoned a long-held dogma that Italo-Yugoslav frictions 
could only be resolved through the improvement of relations between Rome and Paris 
and himself suggested a forward action in the former capital:  
That is only a part, and a small part, of the truth – which is: that Italy is consumed 
with the desire, and the impending need, of expansion. She proclaims it on the 
house-tops. In the present state of the world this means getting or taking something 
that belongs to someone else. To these adventures a strong Yugoslavia is an 
obstacle. She would still be an obstacle in a tripartite [Franco-Italo-Yugoslav] 
agreement. Therefore the agreement is not desired. It is rather desired that 
Yugoslavia should disintegrate - or be disintegrated. And Italy believes this to be 
possible or imminent (with all her follies Yugoslavia does not believe this of Italy.) 
It is a very dangerous frame of mind… But the foregoing is the fundamental. Italy, 
says Sir R. Graham, wants to expand. Well, say I, not in the Balkans anyway. 
Where else? says Sir R. Graham… Anyway not the Balkans, for that can’t be done 
without an [sic] European war. And since, if Italy goes on with these ideas – which 
of course she would deny – there will quite probably be another European war at 
this rate, I would not be at all averse from a friendly and tactful warning to Italy 
that we know what is going on & that it fills us with alarm. But this must be of 
none [sic] effect unless we make it plain that in our view the Italians are more to 
blame for refusing the tripartite agreement than their adversaries.191  
 
British action eventually amounted to an interview between the Foreign Secretary, John 
Simon, and Grandi, and corresponding conversation between Graham and Suvich in 
Rome during which the Italian side was warned about the dangers of conflict with 
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Belgrade. The remarks and tone of the British diplomats were, however, distinctly 
milder than those previously contemplated,192 presumably in deference to an anticipated 
Four-Power solution for the problem.   
 In the Foreign Office’s view the confrontation between Rome and Belgrade, one 
of the most dangerous features of international politics ever since the war, was 
becoming even more prominent in the context of the Italo-German trial of strength over 
Austria. By throwing her weight into the scales Yugoslavia could tilt the balance against 
one or other contender:  
Her geographical position and her potential military strength may make Yugoslavia 
a more or less decisive factor in future developments, not only in the Balkans, but 
also in Central Europe; and from the point of view of our own policy it is clearly 
desirable that Yugoslavia, if she is faced with the choice, should cooperate with 
Italy rather than with Germany. Close Germano-Yugoslav cooperation directed 
against Italy would seriously alter the balance of power in Central Europe, and 
constitute a disturbing element which might well hamper all attempts at 
pacification. It is a thousand pities that this should happen at a moment when Italy 
(no doubt from interested motives) has at last showed some fitful readiness to bury 
the hatchet and bring all her neighbours into a system of central European 
cooperation.193
 
Vansittart accordingly instructed Henderson to exert all his influence in Belgrade to 
promote reconciliation with Italy and win the Yugoslavs over for ‘the Italian as opposed 
to the German solution of the central European problem.’194   
The Southern Department’s task in this respect was not made any easier by the 
differing appreciations coming from the Rome Embassy and the Belgrade Legation as 
to the real position. Drummond described the Italian attitude towards Yugoslavia as an 
aberration from an otherwise sensible foreign policy and he was still hopeful of some 
satisfactory solution.195 Having discussed the problems of Italo-French and Italo-
Yugoslav relations with both Suvich and the Duce, Drummond was left ‘with a firm 
conviction that Signor Mussolini was undoubtedly and sincerely desirous of coming to 
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terms with his two neighbours.’196 Henderson, however, believed that an agreement was 
further off than it had ever been for the previous four years.197 He was positive that 
Yugoslavia would never trust the Italians to come to an exclusive arrangement with 
them and that therefore the only possibility was a tripartite agreement including 
France.198 Henderson thus suggested to Vansittart that Suvich should be pressed for a 
tripartite agreement during his impending visit to London and assured him that he had 
already been endeavouring to dissuade the Yugoslavs from a pro-German orientation. 
Vansittart concurred and, despite reservations voiced by Sargent and Carr, 
recommended that the question should be raised during Suvich’s visit.199 Indeed, Simon 
and Vansittart did so, but the Italian was not forthcoming.200 The impression that 
Yugoslavia was gradually drifting towards Germany made Vansittart determined to 
persevere in his efforts. He again mooted the suggestion of a tripartite agreement, both 
to the French and the Italian Ambassador, but without results.201  There was one more 
suggestion that aimed at solving Italo-Yugoslav tensions in a wider framework. 
Henderson and Waterlow argued that a concoction of a ‘Mediterranean Locarno’ with 
some form of British participation or at least blessing would be highly conducive to 
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fostering a sense of security in the region.202 However, the proposal was not deemed 
practical politics in Whitehall.     
Despite Italian unresponsiveness, the Foreign Office did not lose hope of an 
agreement on the calculation that Rome was becoming increasingly frightened of the 
German danger and was thus serious in its self-proclaimed wish to come to terms with 
Belgrade. Henderson cautioned against Italian duplicity and particularly repudiated the 
accusation that Yugoslavia wanted to wreck the Franco-Italian rapprochement or 
coveted any immediate agreement with Berlin.203 But there were certainly many 
difficulties in the way of the materialisation of a Franco-Italo-Yugoslav combination 
which stemmed from the apparent suspiciousness and reserve that Belgrade showed 
even towards France in this respect. Carr observed that relations between the French and 
Yugoslav delegations at Geneva had grown decidedly cool and that the latter was 
increasingly prone to seek British sympathy in consequence, a development which he 
found somewhat embarrassing.204 Having conversed with King Alexander on the eve of 
his fateful departure for Paris, Henderson noticed that the monarch was ‘not particularly 
pleased at the moment with his French allies’ and predicted that he could prove even 
less tractable in terms of any modification of his country’s attitude towards Italy ‘lest it 
give the impression of being due to French pressure and insistence. In fact the reverse is 
more likely to be the case.’205   
The assassination of King Alexander threatened irreparably to stall the prospects 
of conciliation. Although he was personally convinced that Mussolini had stopped 
hankering after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Sargent feared that he could revert to his 
previous policy at the slightest sign of disintegration following the tragedy in 
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Marseilles.206 In order to pre-empt any such contingency the Foreign Office instructed 
Drummond to impress upon the Duce the British hope that he would resume his 
conciliatory efforts.207 To reinforce this point the Foreign Secretary even stated in his 
speech at Northampton on 19 October 1934 that a united and prosperous Yugoslavia 
was in both the British and the general European interest.208 The divergence of views 
between Drummond and Henderson resurfaced on this occasion. Drummond sent 
reassuring reports that the Italians did not seem to have contemplated any change of 
policy and stressed the necessity of handling them carefully.209 In contrast, Henderson 
was all in favour of plain speaking and taking a lead in bringing the Italians round to the 
realities of the situation. If an agreement was ever to be made, the Minister was 
convinced, Italy would have to forego her political ambitions in Albania and cease 
intriguing in the Balkans.210 He wanted the British government to step boldly and make 
a communication to Rome requesting an effective neutralisation of Albania. Drummond 
disagreed fearing that any such step might throw Italy into the German embrace. The 
Foreign Office decided not to take any action on the grounds that ‘a demarche would be 
difficult to make and would serve no useful purpose.’211  
The situation exasperated British diplomats and Gallop opined that more 
resolute action might be needed: ‘The time will soon come when we shall have to 
consider telling Sig. Mussolini outright that we consider Italian provocation of 
Yugoslavia the most dangerous factor in the whole European situation.’212 The Foreign 
Office approved of Henderson’s thesis and instructed Drummond to make it clear to 
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Mussolini that in the British view it was the Italian attitude that was responsible for 
Yugoslavia’s flirtation with Germany. In carrying out this instruction Drummond 
considerably watered down his remarks, but his language was approved in Whitehall 
which was inclined to make allowance for the discretion of the man on the spot.213   
It was a measure of British exasperation that the Foreign Office was easily led to 
take at face value another Italian pretence which was presented as a change of tactics. 
When Mussolini offered Prince Paul a renewal of negotiations, which were to be 
pursued independently of France, through the same unofficial channel he had used in 
his abortive communication with the late king in 1931-32, the Foreign Office 
wholeheartedly encouraged Prince Paul to receive the proposals sympathetically.214 The 
wish being father to the thought, the Southern Department was again easily swung to 
the opinion, upheld by Drummond and acquiesced in by Henderson, that it was ‘no 
longer in any way true to say that Italy pursues a disruptive policy towards 
Yugoslavia.’215 Contrary to what he had said, and even put into writing, to Prince Paul 
as his private views concerning the prospective Yugoslav attitude towards Italian feelers 
for negotiations, Henderson was instructed to influence the regent along the lines of 
greater leniency towards Mussolini.  
The Duce’s overtures were not followed up; nor was it clear what would be the 
most appropriate method by which Rome and Belgrade might come to terms. On this 
point Henderson and Drummond differed once again. Henderson strongly felt that Italy 
should take the initiative and reach a bilateral agreement with Yugoslavia as a 
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preliminary for their cooperation within the framework of a Danubian pact. Such a pact 
might take a long time to be realised and, even if it were realised, it would hardly be 
accepted by the Yugoslavs with confidence or sincerity without prior and specific 
Italian assurances as to their good faith in respect of Yugoslav integrity; Drummond, in 
contrast, contended that a multilateral pact of mutual non-interference in the domestic 
affairs of the contracting parties should bring about an Italo-Yugoslav rapprochement 
and suffice to allay the mistrust of Belgrade.216 The Foreign Office staff was in favour 
of Henderson’s viewpoint and suggested that it should be conveyed to Grandi by the 
Foreign Secretary. Nevertheless, as had happened so many times before, the matter was 
not pursued.217 This time it was probably a concern not to interfere with Italian 
susceptibilities and jeopardise the Franco-Italian Danubian policy that accounted for the 
inaction. Later that year the Italian campaign in Abyssinia extinguished any prospect of 
either a direct agreement between Rome and Belgrade or a settlement between the two 
countries through the agency of a wider Danubian pact.    
 
 
 
5.7. The Rhineland Crisis and Danubian Europe 
 
Following the complications caused by Italy’s aggression against Abyssinia, 
Hitler’s forward action in Europe marked a watershed in the international relations of 
the interwar period. On 7 March 1936 German troops re-occupied the Rhineland in clear 
violation of the stipulations of both the Versailles and Locarno treaties. This profoundly 
improved the strategic situation of Germany in Europe by making her position much 
stronger in the event of a French offensive on German soil and, by implication, left her 
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with the initiative to turn her attention in the direction of Central Europe. Therefore, 
although the crisis erupted in Western Europe, its immediate consequences were most 
acutely felt among the smaller countries in the Danube basin and the Balkans.    
The Yugoslav General Staff produced an analysis of the effects on Yugoslavia 
of the German breach of the Locarno agreement. It adduced a number of drawbacks: the 
principle of the territorial status quo had been disputed which could not but fail to react 
unfavourably on the stability of the stipulations concerning the Yugoslav frontiers; the 
position of France, the only unequivocally anti-revisionist Great Power, had been 
weakened; Czechoslovakia would henceforth be absolutely absorbed by the German 
threat to her existence and would have to leave ‘all the Little Entente’s work entirely in 
the hands of the Romanians and ourselves’; this, in turn, would encourage Budapest to 
try and make the best of her improved situation.218 The conclusion was obvious: 
‘Therefore, the denunciation of the Locarno agreement is an unfavourable fact to us, 
and all the consequences, which will stem from it, will in general be detrimental to our 
country.’219 According to the Yugoslav military’s appreciation, the futile negotiations 
for the conclusion of a ‘New Locarno’ were calculated to provide for the protection of 
France and Belgium alone while Germany would be given a free hand towards the east 
and south of Europe. That meant that if the question of revision were to be eventually 
introduced, it would be solely ‘directed at the expense of the states of the Little Entente 
and the Balkan Entente.’220 Another consideration of the Yugoslav army concerned the 
ever present Italian danger: in the new circumstances, France was forced to rely even 
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more on Rome’s help against Germany and, for that reason, might sacrifice 
Yugoslavia’s interests.221   
However, it did not follow from this appreciation that the countries of the Little 
and Balkan Ententes would be able to present a united front. The cracks in their 
solidarity in respect of the policy to be adopted towards Germany were becoming more 
apparent. Czechoslovakia, being the most exposed to German might, was prepared to 
follow a French lead in asserting a stiffer policy towards Hitler, including economic 
sanctions. Titulescu was also in favour of the overt support of the French standpoint. On 
his way to London, where a session of the League of Nations Council had been 
summoned to deal with the Rhineland crisis, he presided over a joint meeting between 
the representatives of the Little and Balkan Ententes on 11 March at Geneva. After the 
meeting a communiqué was issued stating that the two ententes fully accepted the 
French and Belgian stance on the violation of the Locarno treaty and the reoccupation of 
the Rhineland and were moreover willing to uphold the application of the peace treaties.  
Yugoslavia was, however, resolutely opposed to Titulescu’s policy. Convinced 
that France and Britain would acquiesce in the German action and in keeping with the 
Yugoslav policy of propitiating Berlin, Prime Minister, Milan Stojadinović, backed by 
his two partners in the Balkan Entente, Greece and Turkey, proceeded to scotch 
Titulescu’s manoeuvres: he instructed Purić, the Yugoslav representative at the 
League’s deliberations in London, to act accordingly.222 Furthermore, Stojadinović 
procrastinated and evaded a Czechoslovak initiative to summon a new and urgent 
meeting of the Little Entente; he wanted to associate Yugoslavia with the conciliatory 
British attitude towards Germany.223     
Sir Ronald Campbell, the new British Minister in Belgrade, was told that the 
intention of the Yugoslav government was ‘to lie low and play the modest part of a 
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small Power.’224 Belgrade was anxious for a peaceful solution to be found and was 
especially alarmed about the possibility of applying economic sanctions against 
Germany, which would be unbearable coming in the wake of the considerable sacrifice 
that had been endured as the result of the application of sanctions against Italy, 
Yugoslavia’s best customer, during the Abyssinian conflict. Campbell rightly surmised 
that the Yugoslavs were prepared quietly to support any conciliatory policy adopted by 
British government. The divergence of views between Yugoslavia and her Little Entente 
partners was duly noted in the Foreign Office. ‘It is a pity that people talk about the 
“Little Entente” as if it were still a body with a common policy’, Sargent remarked.225     
He also mused as to whether the British should ask France to free herself from 
the obligations she had undertaken towards her eastern allies in return for a more 
binding and automatic guarantee of French territory than that provided for under the 
Locarno agreement. This, he believed, would at least be more palatable to British public 
opinion.226 Sargent clearly recognised that France was in such a pacific mood that she 
would repudiate her eventual obligations rather than fight Germany; but he warned that 
that mood could change in the different conditions brought about by British military 
alliance. Indeed, in October 1935, a prominent French politician, Pierre-Étienne 
Flandin, had had no qualms about admitting that the true state of feeling in France was 
such that she would never ‘incur the risk of war for Austria and Czechoslovakia’.227 His 
confession caused no surprise in the Foreign Office.228
 The French tried to counter the reoccupation and the expected refortification of 
the Rhineland with the conclusion of a general European security agreement which 
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would prevent German aggression in Central Europe.229 The proposal amounted, as 
Sargent made plain, to a British guarantee of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and 
Lithuania. He considered it a better alternative to economic sanctions against Germany, 
but impractical of application for two reasons. The first was the standard argument of 
the impossibility of making material commitments in regard to frontiers which the 
British public did not perceive as being direct British interests; the second revealed the 
fundamental lack of confidence which the stability of Central European countries 
inspired in Whitehall:  
Besides, by giving these guarantees we would be definitely pledging ourselves to 
the policy of the status quo (e.g. as regards Danzig, Memel, and the Corridor)  and 
at the same time making ourselves responsible for the government or 
misgovernment of Austria and Czechoslovakia (e.g. suppression of Liberals and 
Social Democrats by Austrian dictatorship; ill-treatment of Sudetendeutsche in 
Czechoslovakia).230   
 
Germany was thus left to reap the benefits of her successful coup. After two months, 
having observed the impact of the Rhineland crisis, Campbell confirmed that German 
interests in South-Eastern Europe were promoted by sowing dissension between France 
and Yugoslavia and loosening the cohesion of the Little and Balkan Ententes as an 
effective bulwark to Berlin’s political expansion eastwards.231 The road was now open 
for the further strengthening of the German grip on the smaller countries of the region.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The German danger to the peace of Europe which became so evident after the 
Nazi takeover made an already unstable Central European situation bristle with 
additional uncertainty. The Foreign Office navigated the course between the reorganised 
Little Entente, which closed ranks and stiffened its front against the revisionist 
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tendencies, and Mussolini’s Four-Power project which promoted those very tendencies. 
The British attitude reflected the indefinite and unresolved nature of British policy in 
the region. On the one hand, the Foreign Office was careful in handling the Little 
Entente and studiously avoided giving it any reason for concern in respect of treaty 
revision. On the other, it actually favoured the Italian suggestion in principle as offering 
a reasonable way of breaking the deadlock and surmounting the intransigence of the 
anti-revisionists. That being so, it was understood that the Polish Corridor would be the 
primary intended object of the Four-Power mechanism. Although there was a feeling in 
Whitehall that something would eventually have to be done to redress Hungarian 
grievances as well, it was not thought to be practical politics as yet and Mussolini would 
have to be persuaded accordingly.  
The most pressing issue was Austria and it presented something of a quandary. 
To begin with, the Foreign Office could not agree on the urgency and significance of the 
Austrian question. While Vansittart incessantly reiterated that Austrian independence 
was a vital British interest, there were others who did not subscribe to this viewpoint 
and who furthermore doubted that any solution for Vienna except domination by 
Germans was viable and tenable in the long run. In addition to the impasse in the 
Foreign Office, the unhelpful attitude of other departments in the matter of economic 
help to the Dollfuss government and the unfavourable stance of both the government 
and the public made sure that any prospect of active assistance to Vienna was drastically 
curtailed. In the circumstances the only open avenue seemed to have been a common 
stand of France, Italy and Britain which should have been formidable enough to deter 
the Germans. Since there was no question of any British commitment, responsibility for 
the defence of Austria had to be shouldered by Paris and Rome. Britain nevertheless 
still had an important role to play in using its considerable influence to facilitate the 
agreement between the prospective guardians of Austria. The greatest obstacle to 
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Franco-Italian cooperation was the conflict of interests between Italy and the Little 
Entente. In endeavouring to bring them together the Foreign Office operated under the 
same misperceptions as previously. While Italy was habitually credited with far more 
sincerity than was due to her in view of her policy which put thwarting the Little 
Entente before the necessities of the defence of Austria, the Little Entente was, as usual 
if not more so, condemned for not pulling its weight in the Austrian matter. In fact, the 
Little Entente was taken to be purposely obstructive in the essentials which were 
indispensible for the improvement of the Austrian situation – economic cooperation, the 
negotiated re-armament of the ex-enemy states and the refusal to denounce the use of 
force in case of a Habsburg restoration or unilateral rearmament. There was certainly 
some substance to the accusations, but they completely ignored the basic fact that the 
Little Entente could hardly be expected to make concessions without getting anything 
tangible in the way of their own security. Italian control over Vienna, which the British 
were willing to condone in the last resort, could hardly appeal to the three allies and be 
conducive to their cooperation.  
In the Balkans the Foreign Office still favoured the all-round appeasement. 
While diplomatic activity was underway for the conclusion of a Balkan pact the British 
insisted on Bulgarian participation and let it be known that every effort should be 
exerted to attain this object.  
The outlook on Czechoslovakia presented another and supreme instance of 
misperception which heavily influenced policy-making. The mounting German minority 
problem in that country was deemed to be the result of Czech mismanagement; the 
possibility of enticement from Nazi Germany was categorically discounted. This was a 
natural corollary of a stream of impassioned reports from Addison which seriously 
undermined British faith in the viability and durability of Czechoslovakia. Czech 
foreign policy was viewed in the light of this domestic instability. Beneš’s 
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rapprochement with the Soviet Union was deplored as a risky and dangerous path that 
could precipitate a disaster. Although this school of thought took hold in the Foreign 
Office, it was not unanimous: Vansittart and Collier maintained that Prague did not 
really have a choice.  
It was certainly not a coincidence that the same two men – and Wigram as well – 
favoured the conclusion of mutual assistance pacts with the USSR by the other two 
members of the Little Entente. Once more a clear divergence of views emerged 
regarding the policy towards the alliance as a whole between those who disliked the 
idea of its active involvement in the containment of Germany and those who favoured 
it. This divergence seems to have prevented the formulation of a definite policy and a 
non-committal attitude was adopted in consequence. That meant that an opportunity to 
influence events was consciously abandoned, despite the fact that Britain’s advice 
would have carried great weight in the circumstances even without assuming any 
commitment.   
The attitude towards the Italo-Yugoslav imbroglio put in a nutshell the dilemmas 
of Whitehall’s Central European policy. After a long time the Foreign Office came fully 
to realise that Italy indeed nurtured territorial ambitions against Yugoslavia and 
therefore wanted her disruption. At the same time a rapprochement between Yugoslavia 
and Italy became ever more important as a prerequisite for a Danubian pact which 
would safeguard Austrian independence. If there was to be any prospect of bringing the 
two countries together a more decisive British stance was necessary to break the vicious 
circle of their enmity - which meant applying additional pressure on Italy. Although it 
was often contemplated, a firm expression of the British attitude as to the detrimental 
effect of Italian policy was never delivered in Rome for a variety of reasons: the belief 
that Italy really wanted a détente herself, deference to Italian susceptibility and not least 
the customary disinclination of the Rome Embassy to employ stronger language in its 
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dealings with Mussolini. It was also due to an unwillingness to make any 
pronouncement whatsoever in favour of Yugoslav integrity due to the internal 
difficulties in that country and a general ambiguity in relation to frontier revision. To 
cap it all, the cart was put before the horse in a persistently fostered illusion that instead 
of dealing with the problem it could be subsumed into the even more complex issue of 
the defence of Austria through a wider Danubian pact when in reality the Italo-
Yugoslav conflict was one of the principal obstacles to the materialisation of any such 
instrument. The final failure of a Danubian combination directed against Germany due 
to the repercussions of Italy’s Abyssinian adventure was compounded by the German 
re-occupation of the Rhineland which fundamentally changed the position of the 
Danubian states.  
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CONLUSION  
 
 
 
The problems arising from the post-war settlement in Central Europe commanded the 
attention of policy-makers in the Foreign Office even before the end of the Great War. 
The contentious issues were clearly recognised and anticipated, but it was nevertheless 
well-nigh impossible to opt for any particular policy. The pace of events in the wake of 
the armistice created a fait accompli which – to the peace-makers assembled in Paris – 
it did not seem opportune or desirable to interfere with. In Britain, the New Europe 
group inspired by the liberal nationalist ideas of Professor Seton-Watson was influential 
in the Foreign Office and lent its support to the promotion of the new successor states. 
According to its view, those countries were bound to be the pillars of the new order 
established on the ruins of Austria-Hungary. This view was by no means unanimous 
and, in fact, faced opposition from many quarters – among them a number of British 
political and military officials stationed in Central European countries and the Prime 
Minister Lloyd George and his entourage.    
 This dichotomy in the British outlook on the new configuration of the region 
and the practical problems which sprang from it thus manifested itself from the very 
outset and remained a permanent feature of Foreign Office policy. In November 1919, 
commenting on Cyril Butler’s suggestion that Britain should embark on a policy 
independent of its Entente Allies and work for the carving out of a nucleus of a Central 
European federation which would become ‘a bulwark against the Germany of the 
future’, Sir Eyre Crowe indignantly stated:   
It would, in my opinion, have the most disastrous effect, alike on the general 
situation and on the position of British prestige in the countries in question, were 
the conviction to be spread that His Majesty’s Government, while officially 
supporting the new Czecho-Slovak Republic, were in fact behind their backs 
offering any sort of support to such elements as were working for disruption there. 
Such suspicions of British policy have, unfortunately, been spread alike in Czecho-
Slovakia and in Roumania by interested parties, and I venture to urge that every 
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possible opportunity be taken for dispelling them and for reassuring our somewhat 
susceptible allies with regard to this.1  
 
However, Crowe’s recommendations were never going to be wholeheartedly accepted, 
still less implemented.   
The reasons for the pronounced ambiguity of the British attitude lay in the basis 
of British policy towards Central Europe throughout the interwar period. In short, 
Whitehall viewed the group of the new smaller states - the members of the Little 
Entente - with profound mistrust as to the solidity and permanence of their foundation. 
The extent and the exact nature of the faults found with the new countries varied from 
one to another and depended on the present circumstances, and, not least, on the outlook 
of the individual observer. Nevertheless, there were certain common perceptions which 
cropped up time and again: the Little Entente states were seen as unsettled in terms of 
the disharmony among their different nationalities; their governments, particularly in 
the case of Romania and Yugoslavia, were deemed lamentably lacking in honesty and 
efficiency; their economic policies were deplored in London as being unreasonably and 
unwisely protectionist, and, as such, these policies were thought to be hampering the 
economic recovery of Danubian Europe to the detriment of themselves and their 
antagonistic neighbours; finally, their foreign policies, individually and as a group, were 
not considered to have been conducive to that all-round appeasement policy which 
Britain pursued across the continent, and in the case of Yugoslavia, at least during the 
1920s, even dangerous. Indeed, after a short period of time following the formation of 
the Little Entente, which had initially been greeted as a stabilising factor in a still 
unsettled Central Europe, the Foreign Office’s view underwent a substantial change. 
The events in connexion with the second putsch of Karl Habsburg were a catalyst in this 
turnabout.  
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In contrast, the ex-enemy countries, Austria and Hungary, were treated with a 
great deal of sympathy. The former country appeared to be resigned to her new status as 
a small and insignificant state in the middle of Europe and did not pose a threat to peace 
by nurturing any revisionist ambitions. Her economic plight spurred the British to 
extend as much help as possible and constituted the most convincing argument for the 
necessity of restoring the economic unity of the Danubian region. No wonder then that 
the Habsburg supporters always tried to impress upon their British interlocutors the 
commercial advantages of a monarchical restoration. In the political sphere, there was 
the prospect of a union between Vienna and Berlin which would bristle with potential 
difficulties, but it did not rise in an acute form until Hitler’s advent to power in 
Germany.  
Unlike Austria, Hungary was devoutly revisionist and it was her implacable 
opposition to the Trianon settlement that constituted the chief danger to peace in Central 
Europe. Although the Foreign Office had no illusions on this score, it took a favourable 
view of the regime established under Regent Horthy and Prime Minister Bethlen to the 
creation and maintenance of which it had contributed a fair share. The Foreign Office 
was prodded and sometimes led in this direction by the powerful influence of the 
Treasury and the Bank of England which pursued their own schemes for the economic 
rehabilitation of Central Europe, as evidenced by the Hungarian reconstruction loan 
affair. The Horthy-Bethlen government was believed to be a solid conservative creation 
which maintained an orderly administration in the country and kept under control the 
inflammatory forces of irredentism, thus conducting, despite occasional fiery rhetoric 
and other appearances to the contrary, a moderate and sensible foreign policy. In this 
respect, the British perception of the Hungarian government bore a striking resemblance 
to that of Mussolini’s fascist regime. It was no doubt further strengthened by the 
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favourable comparison it made with the governments in Romania and Yugoslavia with 
their reputation of corruption and maladministration.          
Finally, the inertia of views regarding the time-honoured distribution of power 
among the nations in the defunct Habsburg monarchy combined with strong racial 
prejudices to make some of the most influential officials doubt the permanence of the 
new order. As late as mid-1926, Miles Lampson did not hesitate to put on record the 
following prediction: ‘But my prophesy is that sooner or later the Hungarian will be on 
top again, when he will (as usual, for he is a tactless fellow!) let his neighbours know it. 
He is a far more virile creature than any of his neighbours, with the possible exemption 
of the Serb who has the strength & mentality of a bear.’2  
Another failing of the Little Entente, in the eyes of Whitehall, concerned its 
connexions with Paris. French Premier Poincaré was determined firmly to incorporate 
the Little Entente into the French security system which was naturally built up with a 
view to containing Germany. This endeavour, and the fact that it was made at the time 
of the Ruhr crisis when Anglo-French relations reached their low point, accounted for 
the singularly frosty reception in London. The outlook on the Franco-Czechoslovak 
treaty of 1924 bore witness to the ill-feeling prevalent in the Foreign Office. To begin 
with, the treaty was disliked for its resemblance, like the Little Entente itself, to ‘a 
system of alliances reminiscent of pre-war methods’3 which became so unpopular in 
post-war Britain. Furthermore, while Masaryk and Beneš did everything in their power 
to avoid any military commitments towards France, and indeed succeeded in doing so, 
they were suspected of doing exactly the opposite. This was part of the wider tendency 
to entertain greatly exaggerated and distorted views of the depth and nature of the 
relations existing between France and the Little Entente countries. Admittedly, the 
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Franco-Romanian treaty of 1926 did not cause that much resentment but this was only 
due to the propensity to disparage the importance of Romania.     
 All these essential elements of the British appreciation of the situation in 
Danubian Europe were duly demonstrated in connexion with the attempts to bring about 
a Central European and a Balkan Locarno. Headlam-Morley’s compelling case for the 
indivisibility of peace on the continent and the need to provide for the security of the 
successor states fell on deaf ears. His suggestion that the successor states would have to 
be assured of their existence in terms of external threats in order to be able to settle 
down peacefully to the work of internal consolidation and economic development had 
no chance of being seriously entertained. In the predominant British perspective, those 
states had to make a success of themselves by means of domestic improvement - and 
they had to do it on their own. ‘Apart from Germany and Russia, the real danger to the 
security of the new States is not external, but internal’, Headlam-Morley himself 
proclaimed.4   
 The abortive attempts at Locarno-modelled agreements showed another 
conspicuous feature of British policy. Apart from the direct confrontation between the 
Little Entente and Hungary, the former played a prominent part in the Franco-Italian 
rivalry in Central Europe. By virtue of their common interest in the preservation of the 
status quo the Little Entente and France maintained close ties of friendship which 
Mussolini saw as a thorn in his flesh in pursuit of the ambitious designs of Italian 
preponderance in that region. In the appreciation of this trial of strength, in which the 
Duce was the aggressive party bent on the disruption of Yugoslavia as a prerequisite for 
Italian expansion, and of the policy that followed from it, the Foreign Office, and 
particularly Foreign Secretary Chamberlain, operated on entirely fallacious premises. 
They were convinced that, despite the militant cries of fascist jingoists, Mussolini 
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himself was a responsible and sensible statesman who could be counted on not to allow 
his country to be plunged in an armed adventure. On the other hand, it was Yugoslavia 
which was perceived as an enfant terrible with her high-handed methods and dangerous 
turns in foreign policy, the origin of which was believed to have derived from the 
militarism of an obscure and restless clique of officers who exercised an invisible but 
powerful influence with the king.   
 Chamberlain’s policy was based on the assumption that Mussolini could be 
lured into loyal cooperation with Britain and France which would ensure that the 
smaller countries would adhere to a Locarno-like settlement. The fault for the failure of 
the attempt was placed at the door of the Yugoslavs who were thought not to have 
approached their neighbourings in the right conciliatory spirit. The British outlook did 
not waver with the oncoming deterioration of the situation in Central Europe. The 
Foreign Office supported Mussolini in his rejection of a tripartite agreement between 
France, Italy and Yugoslavia because its formula fell short of the Locarno ideal, a 
circumstance of which the Duce made great propaganda use. The Albanian crisis 
brought to light the menace which poor Italo-Yugoslav relations presented for the peace 
of Europe. It was followed by the conclusion of the Franco-Yugoslav treaty of 1927 
which underlined the tendency of the Danubian countries to divide into hostile blocs. It 
was exactly the avoidance of such an outcome that was the avowed object of British 
diplomacy.   
Throughout these events Whitehall backed the Italian standpoint. The 
underlying reason lay in the fact that, in the view of the Foreign Office, Italy was not 
acting according to a premeditated, still less aggressive, plan, but out of fear and 
insecurity faced with a solid Little Entente bloc which was directed by France – the 
most powerful continental state. It was thus France and the Little Entente that were the 
true offenders: they were giving needless provocation to Italy, a young and susceptible 
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power still trying to find its feet. It is rather obvious that the negative image of the Little 
Entente and Yugoslavia in particular, which had already taken root in London, had a lot 
to do with such estimation. Even the growing body of evidence about surreptitious 
Italian machinations did little to alter the Foreign Office’s perception of Mussolini’s 
ultimate objectives. He was still excused on the grounds of his having to contend with 
the extremist faction of his party and also having to take up an essentially defensive 
stance towards what was perceived to be a policy of containment by France and her 
smaller allies, particularly Yugoslavia. Nevile Henderson’s emphatic assurances from 
Belgrade to the effect that Yugoslavia was not a danger point, and that she, in fact, lived 
in a constant fear of Italy’s aggression, were in time accepted, but did not change the 
fundamental outlook.  
When the Little Entente closed its ranks at the turn of 1932-1933 by 
transforming itself into a more compact body under the new Organisation Pact for fear 
of what future might hold in store, it met with reprobation in London, although these 
feelings were not publicaly expressed. This poor view of the new arrangements was 
founded on the same premise as ever: the publically promoted strengthening of the 
alliance presented a continued provocation to Hungary instead of conciliating her and 
did it on the unpalatable ‘Old Adam’ pattern. This reaction was a natural corollary of 
the steadily deteriorating impression of the Little Entente which had been taking hold 
for some years past. There were two main irritants which were responsible for the 
Foreign Office’s distaste for what it saw as an ill-assorted trio. The first was the 
annoying connexion with Paris, especially since it was believed to have amounted to 
much more than was actually the case. The second irritant was the growing conviction 
that the Little Entente was the worst offender in the matter of protectionist economic 
policy which thwarted economic intercourse between the Danubian countries. Foreign 
Secretary Simon put it as follows: ‘Incidentally, such pious hopes of economic co-
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operation, &c., between the Little Entente and Hungary had been for the last ten years 
the usual stock-in-trade of Little Entente statesmen. Needless to say, they had never 
even begun to take practical shape.’5 Since Beneš was widely regarded as the moving 
spirit of the Little Entente it was not surprising that the incurred odium for both of the 
irritants was unanimously laid at his feet. The rising dissatisfaction with Beneš and all 
his works could be fairly accurately gauged by the increasingly violent and vituperative 
language employed at his expense.  
As sensible as it sounded, all the talk of economic cooperation as a panacea for 
the ills of Danubian Europe amounted to very little and served only to conceal the lack 
of a proper policy. The question really turned on the crucial dilemma as to how to 
achieve a measure of political stability which would allow for the restoration of 
unrestricted economic intercourse. Henderson tackled this question by disputing Robert 
Vansittart’s accusations that the Little Entente was the chief offender: he put forward a 
thesis that it was impossible to obtain economic reconstruction unless political 
pacification had been achieved ‘first or at least simultaneously’.6 That opened up the 
question of Britain’s attitude towards the successor states. Henderson took care not to 
appear out of step with the predominant current of thought in Whitehall when he stated: 
‘An Anglo-Little Entente bloc would indeed be a monstrosity, fortunately an 
inconceivable one, but between that and too little attention to Yugoslavia there is a “via 
media”, which I recommend to your consideration.’7 Henderson’s guarded remarks, 
especially if taken in the context of his whole political credo while he was in Belgrade, 
seem to have hinted at the necessity for a more positive British attitude.   
 However, other British diplomats arrived at completely different appreciations. 
Commenting on Beneš’s statement that Czechoslovakia was the key to the whole post-
war structure of Central Europe, Joseph Addison expressed his ‘doubt whether the 
                                                 
5 DBFP, ser. II, vol. V, No. 84, Simon to Palairet, 20 April 1933.   
6 TNA, Henderson to Sargent, private, 17 August 1935, R 4617/662/3, FO 371/19483.  
7 DBFP, ser. II, vol. XII, No. 133, Henderson to Carr, private, 8 October 1934.   
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maintenance of this post-war structure is conducive to peace.’8 He had long been clear 
in his mind, contrary to the trend of thought in Whitehall, that there could be no lasting 
settlement in Central Europe without previous or simultaneous territorial 
readjustments.9 ‘In short, the troubles of Central Europe are much more political than 
economic to the extent that economics are dependent upon politics and the outcome of 
political reactions.’10 Addison was not alone in his thinking. By May 1936 Alexander 
Cadogan came to conclusion that the Covenant of the League was not working for the 
reason of its inherent fault of being built on the rotten foundation of the peace 
settlement of 1919-1920. If a new and endurable peace structure was to be erected, he 
argued, this fundamental problem had to be addressed: the Treaty of Versailles was the 
most pressing issue and thus had to be recast first, followed by the revision of the other 
peace treaties and ‘particularly in the case of the Treaty of Trianon, the territorial 
settlement certainly would be called in question!’11 Therefore, another school of 
thought also propounded a theory that half-measures were not satisfactory but sought a 
solution in the opposite direction; if the ‘post-war structure’ had been proven to be 
untenable, it contended, it should be thoroughly dismantled and a new and feasible 
solution be implemented in its place.  
The official policy, however, kept pursuing a middle course. Vansittart did not 
pay attention to Henderson’s ideas. He was equally not enamoured with Cadogan’s 
proposal: ‘I fear, however, that your remedy would probably prove to be too heroic and 
far-reaching to be practical politics, anyhow at present.’12 As to the practical manner in 
which the smouldering conflict between Hungary and the Little Entente should be 
handled, the Foreign Office remained at a loss. Vansittart alone professed what the 
                                                 
8 DBFP, ser. II, vol. XV, No. 209, Addison to Hoare, 11 November 1935.   
9 BDFA, vol. 3, Doc. 264, Addison to Simon, 11 November 1933.   
10 Ibid.  
11 Cambridge, Churchill Archives Centre, The Papers of Sir Alexander Cadogan [hereafter ACAD], 4/1, 
Cadogan to Eden, private, 13 May 1936. Emphasis in original.  
12 Cambridge, Churchill Archives Centre, ACAD 4/1, Vansittart to Cadogan, private, 14 May 1936.   
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others preferred not to state out loud: he called for some sort of treaty revision which 
would finally enable Europe to settle down, but he did not proffer any suggestion as to 
the concrete form that this policy should take, apart from the vague notion that it needed 
to be done peacefully and within the framework of the League of Nations. The same 
vagueness and ambiguity was visible in the British approach to Mussolini’s Four-Power 
Pact and the prospect of revision it entailed. Likewise, British attitude towards 
Habsburg restoration became highly ambiguous torn between the realisation that it was 
a possible antidote to the Anschluss and the fear of the successor states’ violent 
reaction.      
Hitler’s accession to power put the whole Central European imbroglio into an 
entirely new perspective. The Foreign Office approached it now with a view to 
organising the Danubian countries into a united front for the sake of supporting Austria 
in her struggle for the preservation of her independence against the subversion coming 
from Nazi Germany. This entailed the necessity of not only France and Italy composing 
their differences and acting in unison with each other, but also the Little Entente and 
Hungary, which had hitherto been at loggerheads with the support of Paris and Rome 
respectively. British diplomacy endeavoured to promote a comprehensive Danubian 
security pact through the agency of which its goal might be accomplished. The attempt 
was somewhat half-hearted. This was not just because of the obvious reluctance to 
undertake any commitments which British public opinion would not stand for. In fact, 
the reluctance itself seems to have had something to do with the absence of feasible 
alternatives for policy-makers.      
Vansittart voiced his doubts as to the utility of the Little Entente in an endeavour 
to contain Germany: ‘Events are going to move fast, if we are not resolute, too fast for 
the newly-united Little Entente to grow up… but I do not think that the Little Entente, 
with the exception of Yugoslavia, could ever be of much military value. The 
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Czechoslovak army is too dangerously mixed, the Roumanian too ill-officered.’13 
Nevertheless, Ralph Wigram tried to counter the unpopularity of the Little Entente on 
account of its being perceived, in the well-known words of Winston Churchill, as a 
‘pack of small nations on a leash to France’.14 In one of his lectures on foreign policy 
Wigram reminded his audience that the three small countries had the potential to be a 
significant factor in international relations: 
Yet their growing population, the increasing length of their experience and the 
closer association of the three Little Entente Powers elaborated under the influence 
of Benes early this year [1933], are elements of great interest. We should not lose 
sight of the fact that, if their stability and existence can be assured, they may well 
provide a counterweight to the risks of any fresh German adventures in Europe.15
 
In view of the true disposition in the Foreign Office towards Beneš and his allies 
Wigram’s task appears to have been an exceedingly difficult one and his words sounded 
somewhat hollow.  
In addition, the Little Entente was also perceived as something of a stumbling-
block in the attempts to help Austria on account of its economic protectionism, 
resistance to the agreed re-armament of Austria and Hungary and its definite stand 
against a Habsburg restoration. Indeed, there was an air of strange unreality surrounding 
the attitude towards the Little Entente which was expected to make all the concessions 
without receiving anything concrete in the way of its own security. According to the 
British ideas, the conflict between the policies of the Little Entente and Italy in Central 
Europe was not to be resolved first in order to make possible their alignment in support 
of Austria, but submerged in a comprehensive Danubian pact which should by the sheer 
virtue of its existence smooth away the existing differences.     
A glance at the British handling of the troubled Italo-Franco-Yugoslav relations 
provides another instance of the Foreign Office’s mismanagement and its hopeless 
                                                 
13 DBFP, ser. II, vol. V, No. 371, Memorandum by Sir R. Vansittart on the Present and Future Position in 
Europe, 28 August 1933.    
14 Churchill to A. Chamberlain, 1 December 1924, quoted from Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, 
Companion, vol. V, part I, The Exchequer Years, 1922-1929 (London: Heinemann, 1967-82), p. 279.   
15 TNA, Private Office Papers of Ralph Wigram, Lecture by Wigram at the Royal Naval War College, 17 
July 1933, FO 800/292 [on microfilm]  
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lagging behind the events: the support given to Mussolini in his rejection of a tripartite 
agreement in 1926 was bitterly regretted in 1930 but still on grounds that ‘Italy’s 
suspicions and fears of French policy in Central Europe would never have reached the 
pitch which now makes all attempts at conciliation so difficult’16; in 1933 it was finally 
recognised that the Italians were intent on expansion in the Balkans, that they found 
Yugoslavia to be an obstacle to their designs and that they thus did not want to conclude 
a tripartite agreement; nevertheless, in 1934 it was precisely for a tripartite treaty that 
the British pressed Rome and Belgrade as a means of creating a united front for the 
protection of Austria against Germany.  
 Once again, the lack of confidence in one of the successor states, in this case 
Yugoslavia, can be detected as one of the crucial reasons for the British disinclination at 
least to speak more resolutely in Rome against Italian policy. The Foreign Office fully 
realised that it was Mussolini’s conviction and hope that Yugoslavia would collapse 
which made him persevere in his anti-Yugoslav policy and it did not underestimate the 
serious repercussions which the break-up of that country would have in Central Europe. 
Still, despite Henderson’s emphatic assurances that the disruption of Yugoslavia was 
not to be, Whitehall decided that it would not be safe ‘to prophesy on this matter or to 
pit our opinion against that of Signor Mussolini’.17  
 The same sort of consideration was much more conspicuous in the case of 
Czechoslovakia. The viability of that country was viewed with growing suspicion in the 
light of the stream of reports from Joseph Addison who presented in scathing terms all 
aspects of Prague’s internal and external policies. The rise of Henlein’s party was 
interpreted as a natural consequence of Czech oppression and any notion of interference 
from Hitler’s Nazis was dismissed out of hand. The Foreign Office was quite receptive 
to this extremely biased depiction which to a large extent shaped its outlook on Beneš’s 
                                                 
16 TNA, Vansittart to Tyrell, private, 2 August 1930, C 5970/29/22, FO 371/14406.  
17 TNA, Minute by Sargent, 30 January 1933, C 768/44/92, FO 371/16829.  
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endeavours to secure his country against German attack by conclusion of mutual 
assistance pacts with France and the USSR. Many an official and the Foreign Secretary 
himself regarded Beneš’s policy as a dangerous one which was incompatible with the 
precarious domestic conditions in Czechoslovakia. The Foreign Office was so possessed 
of a strong anti-Czech sentiment that it tended to take seriously the fantastic stories 
spread by the Germans about the alleged cooperation between the Czechoslovak and 
Soviet air forces.     
It is against this background that British policy on the eve of the Munich 
agreement may be understood in all its proper dimensions. It was in this frame of mind 
that the Permanent Under-Secretary, Alexander Cadogan, succinctly noted in his diary 
his impressions of the Cabinet’s discussion concerning the Czechoslovak crisis: 
‘Cabinet quite sensible, - and anti-Czech!’18 It was in the same frame of mind that in 
September 1938 Nevile Henderson, the arch-appeasing British Ambassador in Berlin 
before the outbreak of the Second World War delivered to his fellow diplomat, Ian 
Colvin, one of his ‘interminable attacks on Dr. Benes, the [then] Czechoslovak 
president, culminating with the exclamation, “Benes is a traitor, a traitor to his 
people.”’19 In an interesting reversal of roles, Vansittart, once a staunch proponent of 
the need for revision, but now marginalised in the policy-making process on the 
grounds of his resistance to the German demands for revision, opposed the proposal for 
a Four-Power Conference that was eventually to take place in Munich, arguing that it 
was the redressing of the Sudeten Germans’ grievances that was in question rather than 
‘revising Versailles’.20    
A word of caution is necessary here. It would certainly be going too far to say 
that the British lack of confidence in the successor states and the new Central European 
                                                 
18 The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945, ed. by David Dilks (London: Cassel, 1971), entry 
on 22 May 1938, p. 79.     
19 Colvin, p. 239.   
20 Ibid., p. 248.   
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order constituted a chief reason for bowing to German force in Munich. No doubt the 
wish to avoid war for the sake of something that was perceived as a doubtful British 
interest, coupled with Britain’s military unpreparedness, would be more than enough 
reason to back down in front of a determined Hitler. Yet the widespread conviction that 
the rectification of the Central European settlement was justified on its merits and long 
overdue was a distinct feature of the British policy on the eve of the Munich conference. 
It certainly accounted, to a large extent, for the failure to engage more effectively with 
the security issues in the region during the earlier period when the Nazi shadow was not 
cast on the banks of Danube.   
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